Greece - US Department of State

Greece 633
the Congress. The Reuss Amendment was written in response to these
pressures. While such pressures do not seem to dominate the Congress,
they are strong enough to prompt an effort to tighten restrictions, perhaps
extending them to the grant aid program as well this year. At
least, we may get some Congressional criticism from going ahead with
this sale.
Option 2: Shipping non-major items but continuing the suspension of
major items. This means continuing both the basic flow of non-major
items and completing shipment of the major items released from the
suspended list last fall—but not releasing anything more from the list.
The rationale for maintaining the partial suspension last fall was to indicate
our continuing displeasure over the slow pace at which the military
government is moving back toward constitutional government.
The rationale of the past Administration in trying to keep some pressure
on the military government was to respond in some way to Congressional
critics of the program while at the same time trying to maintain
our NATO relationship with Greece.
Option 3: Resumption of full military aid. Since January 20, the Greek
Government has mounted a persistent campaign to persuade us to remove
the pressure for return to constitutional government and to resume
a full military aid program. The Greek Foreign Minister argued
this case when he was here for the NATO meetings; Deputy Prime Minister
Pattakos stated the argument to you at the time of General Eisenhower’s
funeral; and Prime Minister Papadopoulos has written you
urging it. 4 In NATO terms this makes sense, but in deciding on this
course, we would have to consider its effect on all of those here and
in Western Europe who are pressing to have Greece suspended from
its formal membership in European organizations.
I believe the real choice is between options 2 and 3 above. This
choice will be the main subject of the NSC paper that will be coming
to you in a few weeks. No one in the Executive Branch has recommended
that we cut off our military supply program altogether. Although
this is obviously in the minds of some of the Congressional critics
of our maintaining a working tie with the military government, the
majority of Congress seems to recognize the need to maintain that tie.
I lay these options out in this way because your acquiescence in
this sale will foreclose option 1—the choice of cutting off even the supply
of spares and non-major items which has never been interrupted.
It would commit us to continue the flow of at least $20 million in spares
4 See Documents 243 and 245. The text of Papadopoulos’s April 4 letter to the President
and Nixon’s June 3 non-committal reply were transmitted in telegram 90814 to
Athens, June 5. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL GREECE)