Greece - US Department of State

694 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX
On the Greek domestic level we foresee no radical political development
in any direction. At best we anticipate a slow and spotty
political evolution which may give back to the Greek people some
measure of political freedom and of political activity. As far as we can
see, political opposition within Greece, and its counterpart abroad will
not change the situation decisively. The present Greek leadership, in
one form or another, will be around for some time to come. As long
certainly as economic prosperity continues, the attitude of the mass of
the Greek people will probably continue to be colored by their abhorrence
(based on experience) of civil strife, and by unwillingness to risk
very much for ideological principle.
Greece’s economic prospects look good for the long run. Like any
developing country with fairly limited resources Greece has a number
of economic problems, the most crucial being that of its balance of payments.
Servicing on borrowing to cover that endemic deficiency will
in the middle run put a considerable squeeze on the Government and
perhaps even cause some revamping of its current ambitious development
plan. Given Greece’s trading patterns and experiences, it is
fairly certain that it will not embark on any adventurous course but
will follow traditional methods in facing its problems.
GNP grew by 8.3% in 1969. This may be too high a rate for continuing
sound growth, but Greece will probably continue to try for substantial
rates of increase and probably has the capability of achieving
it. Per capita income is now almost $800, and the regime hopes to increase
this to over $1,000 by 1974.
A potentially serious problem of both economic and political dimensions
is the discrepancy between the urban and rural sectors. If the
regime should face serious trouble in the future it would most likely
come from that imbalance and the problems inherent in resultant
urbanization.
On the international scene we can expect Greece to continue to
display a strong sense of identification with the West and particularly
with the United States. Whoever controls the Mediterranean determines
Greece’s orientation. As long as the United States is dominant
or holds its own in the Mediterranean, Greece’s traditional ties and security
considerations reinforce one another.
At the same time Greece will continue to try to improve or “normalize”
its relations with all its immediate neighbors especially as far
as trade is concerned. It will also continue to try to enhance its relations
with Turkey. These are small ways it has of reducing its necessary dependence
on a great power and it can be expected to follow this course,
especially as the US military grant aid program comes to an end.
As Greece pursues these aims it will show somewhat greater independence,
but almost certainly within the framework of its NATO