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Greece - US Department of State

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658 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX<br />

With the increasing restriction on <strong>US</strong> use <strong>of</strong> its bases in Libya or<br />

Turkey, we have no other bases near the Middle East with comparable<br />

ease-<strong>of</strong>-access.<br />

3. <strong>Greece</strong> also provides the <strong>US</strong> and NATO with a number <strong>of</strong> military<br />

facilities including communication links for the 6th Fleet and<br />

Turkey, [1 1 ⁄2 lines not declassified] and logistics bases for support <strong>of</strong> the<br />

6th Fleet. However, unlike staging rights to the Middle East, there are<br />

theoretical alternatives to these facilities, although they are subject to<br />

the unsteadiness <strong>of</strong> Italian policies and the willingness <strong>of</strong> Congress to<br />

appropriate either for new [less than 1 line not declassified] facilities or<br />

for satellite communications systems.<br />

4. Voice <strong>of</strong> America depends heavily on relay stations in <strong>Greece</strong><br />

for its Arabic and Eastern European broadcasts.<br />

D. Conclusions:<br />

1. Apart from general interest in the ability <strong>of</strong> a NATO partner to<br />

defend itself, the main <strong>US</strong> interest in <strong>Greece</strong> lies in maintaining unrestricted<br />

access to bases for <strong>US</strong> staging into the Mid-East and—unless unique—to<br />

communications [less than 1 line not declassified] facilities there.<br />

2. Ins<strong>of</strong>ar as the military regime in <strong>Greece</strong> arouses hostility in<br />

some NATO capitals—as well as in the <strong>US</strong> Congress—and could over<br />

time become a source <strong>of</strong> international disorder, the <strong>US</strong> must recognize<br />

that the <strong>US</strong> freedom <strong>of</strong> maneuver is somewhat limited by the existence<br />

<strong>of</strong> authoritarian government.<br />

E. These conclusions raise two issues which are examined in greater<br />

detail in the two following sections:<br />

1. Do <strong>US</strong> strategic interests require a full-scale <strong>US</strong> military assistance<br />

program? (Section III)<br />

2. How does the nature <strong>of</strong> the government in <strong>Greece</strong> affect <strong>US</strong> interests?<br />

(Section IV)<br />

III. Do these interests require us to maintain a full-scale military assistance<br />

program?<br />

A. Pro.<br />

1. <strong>US</strong> access to <strong>Greece</strong> will depend on a close political relationship<br />

and a continued sense <strong>of</strong> common objectives.<br />

2. Because <strong>of</strong> Greek inability to produce or purchase all <strong>of</strong> the sophisticated<br />

equipment it needs, the Greek forces cannot be modernized<br />

without continued assistance from the <strong>US</strong> on major items <strong>of</strong> equipment,<br />

such as F–5s, M–48 tanks, etc.<br />

3. A continuing military aid program, therefore, is one concrete<br />

way <strong>of</strong> demonstrating that a close political relationship exists. This is<br />

especially true as long as the Greek government is controlled by army<br />

<strong>of</strong>ficers.

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