Greece - US Department of State

660 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX
support, pressure for a change will increase. Failure of the present
government to provide for orderly change will increase the likelihood
of a sudden change which would probably increase instability.
B. As long as Greece remains divided between the military government
and its opponents, the US is caught in the middle. Any move
the US makes involves taking sides—whether intended or not—and
therefore affects US ability either now or later to maintain the close political
relationship necessary to pursue US interests. Although we have
no desire to involve ourselves and might prefer to make clear that we
ship arms solely in the NATO context, the following are facts we have
to cope with:
1. Most Greeks have always believed that there is an “American
factor” in Greek politics. Almost nothing we can say or do will change
this view.
2. The junta considers some sign of US support important. The
opposition feels that significant US pressure could remove the regime.
3. Whatever we do will be read in Greece as the US taking sides
regardless of our intent.
4. What we do will therefore adversely affect our relations either
with this government or with its successor.
C. The Administration’s attitude toward the Greek government
can have some effect on the success of its general legislation in Congress
and on the legislative authority for carrying on a military aid program
in Greece. While the majority of the Congress has not been involved,
resuming full military aid to Greece could, for example,
disaffect some of the liberal Democratic Committee members who are
traditional supporters of foreign aid and thereby affect the prospects
for the Foreign Assistance Act. Some influential senators who oppose
military aid in general have threatened to kill the appropriation for
Greece altogether.
D. Continuing opposition to the junta in European capitals generates
pressure to isolate Greece from the European Community. While
not in itself crucial in the near future, this is a trend opposite to what
the US would judge to be in its general interest.
E. Conclusion: Ideally, the US would like to maintain a normal
NATO military aid relationship with whatever government is in control
in Athens without prejudice to its interests. However, the situation
in Greece is such that whatever the US does puts it in a position of
taking sides and thereby prejudices either our present or future position
in Greece as well as the cooperation of influential members of our
own Congress in continuing general overseas programs. Finally, continuation
of the present situation for long has within it the seeds of
instability.