Greece - US Department of State

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644 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX ator Fulbright’s pronouncement), may tend to speed up the process of reaching an Executive Branch decision on the MAP question. While I have no particular illusions that a tactic of this sort will produce notably greater political progress on the part of the GOG, it could serve to force Papadopoulos & Co. to improve somewhat on the constitutional timetable the GOG recently submitted to the Council of Europe. 4 Although it is not yet clear whether the GOG, if the initiative fails (which it apparently will), will maintain this timetable for use in other contexts, I think they probably will do so since the Junta is no less anxious, and probably even more so, to conciliate the United States than the Council of Europe. In many ways, their relationship to the U.S. is more important to them than their relationship to an essentially parliamentary, and hence rhetorical body, like the Strasbourg organization. We should also not overlook the GOG’s concomitant offer, (related to Article 3 of the Human Rights Convention), 5 to permit free access by the ICRC to political detainees in Greece. It is curious that this almost equally significant offer was not conveyed to us (when Grigoriades came to see the Secretary) along with the constitutional timetable but seems to have been limited mainly to Bonn. If they make good on this matter alone, it could go a long way toward improving their shabby public image in the United States and in Western Europe. I hope you will accept these views and recommendations for what they are, Stuart: an effort to focus attention as precisely as possible on the key issues which will confront Ambassador Tasca when he takes over the management of our relations in Athens. As you know, I myself have exercised pretty much of a holding brief during this interim period, but I believe it is time we came more actively to grips with the problem. I’m afraid that from a personal standpoint, our new Ambassador’s job is not going to be either an easy or a particularly pleasant one. But he is happily a skilled professional, and this will be a great advantage. What steps in the right direction we can prod this unattractive government into taking will be small, slow and unsatisfactory at best, but I think it’s the only course open to us since we clearly do not propose to adopt either of the extreme courses of attempting actively to displace them or of accepting them as they are. As is so often the case in our trade, the result has to be a compromise. With my warm personal regards. Sincerely, Ross 4 Pipinelis presented the timetable on August 25. It called for a multi-stage reintroduction of basic liberties to be completed with the election of a new parliament in mid-1971. 5 For text, signed September 3, 1953, see 213 UNTS 221.
256. Minutes of the National Security Council Review Group Meeting 1 SUBJECT Military Assistance to Greece (NSSM 52) PARTICIPATION Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger State William I. Cargo Donald McHenry Stuart W. Rockwell Defense G. Warren Nutter CIA Edward W. Proctor JCS LTG F. T. Unger OEP Haakon Lindjord USIA Frank Shakespeare Treasury Anthony Jurich NSC Staff Harold H. Saunders Robert E. Osgood Jeanne W. Davis Greece 645 Washington, October 2, 1969, 3:10–4:14 p.m. SUMMARY OF DECISIONS —Mr. Saunders should prepare a summary paper 2 which would project two courses: 1. Continue present policy, or 2. Resume military deliveries. If latter, consider two general approaches: a. a quid pro quo approach which would lift the embargo as the Greek regime takes steps toward constitutional government; or 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1969. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. 2 See Document 257.
Page 1 and 2: Eastern Mediterranean Greece 239. L
Page 3 and 4: Greece 607 If anything is clear at
Page 5 and 6: Greece 609 their fulfillment. There
Page 7 and 8: Greece 611 have been inclined to tr
Page 9 and 10: Greece 613 whereas certain temporar
Page 11 and 12: Greece 615 nist reaction and precip
Page 13 and 14: Greece 617 Mr. Pappas and the Presi
Page 15 and 16: Greece 619 had been in the garden a
Page 17 and 18: Greece 621 The King then briefly de
Page 19 and 20: Greece 623 Secretary noted this req
Page 21 and 22: Greece 625 Dr. Kissinger in an exch
Page 23 and 24: Greece 627 not so much the intrinsi
Page 25 and 26: Greece 629 “carpet trading” app
Page 27 and 28: I have just heard that Henry Kissin
Page 29 and 30: Greece 633 the Congress. The Reuss
Page 31 and 32: Greece 635 3. To Sisco’s question
Page 33 and 34: Greece 637 subject we addressed in
Page 35 and 36: Greece 639 253. Memorandum From the
Page 37 and 38: Greece 641 255. Letter From the Cha
Page 39: Greece 643 Greece, willy-nilly, con
Page 43 and 44: Greece 647 options of the new admin
Page 45 and 46: Greece 649 General Unger agreed tha
Page 47 and 48: Greece 651 Mr. Rockwell thought tha
Page 49 and 50: Greece 653 Mr. Rockwell commented t
Page 51 and 52: Greece 655 Mr. Cargo agreed that th
Page 53 and 54: Greece 657 2. Outside Greece expatr
Page 55 and 56: Greece 659 4. A continuing military
Page 57 and 58: Greece 661 V. What are our options?
Page 59 and 60: Greece 663 to keep alive the potent
Page 61 and 62: Greece 665 I attended a lunch of te
Page 63 and 64: Greece 667 the King had made to him
Page 65 and 66: Greece 669 261. Memorandum From the
Page 67 and 68: Greece 671 My solution would be to
Page 69 and 70: Greece 673 democratic reform and a
Page 71 and 72: 264. Memorandum of Conversation 1 S
Page 73 and 74: Greece 677 the U.S. will not bring
Page 75 and 76: Greece 679 Tasca is to use that dec
Page 77 and 78: Greece 681 Constantine wishes to ha
Page 79 and 80: Greece 683 ation of military assist
Page 81 and 82: Greece 685 269. Telegram From the E
Page 83 and 84: Greece 687 rent slogans are “no e
Page 85 and 86: 4 Printed from a copy that bears th
Page 87 and 88: Greece 691 5. Ioannidis then develo
Page 89 and 90: 272. Response to National Security
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Greece 695 commitment. The nature o
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Greece 697 2. Relations Between the
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Greece 699 therefore substitute thi
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Greece 701 order”), by those obse
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Greece 703 275. Telegram From the E
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Greece 705 some of the others, woul
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Greece 707 Norway and Denmark, has
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2 See Document 262. Greece 709 The
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Greece 711 made démarches in the S
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assador Tasca to transmit to the Gr
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Greece 715 3. He then suggested to
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Greece 717 4. In reply I noted Pres
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Greece to maintaining a strong US-N
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Greece 721 The President then led t
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The discussion then turned to the r
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Greece 725 3. Regime, I am convince
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Greece 727 3. Supplementary assumpt
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Greece 729 1. I have read your tele
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Greece 733 Greece. With regard to D
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Greece 735 291. Note From the Presi
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Greece 739 in this direction, but u
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295. Memorandum of Conversation 1 W
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Greece 743 movements in the area. D
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Greece 745 296. Telegram From the D
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Greece 747 making a trip to Spain.
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Greece 749 Perhaps famous Greek-Ame
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Greece 751 to discreet contacts wit
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Greece 753 and Spain. The Foreign M
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Greece 757 personal life and partic
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Greece 759 regime is an agreement b
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Greece 761 provide present regime w
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Greece 763 13721) 6 —they came to
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Greece 767 A Greek commitment was c
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Greece 769 Abstract The original me
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Greece 771 —Senate Report. This i
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Summary The ideal would be to have
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310. Minutes of the Senior Review G
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Greece 777 Mr. Johnson: Perhaps it
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Greece 779 nessmen and I have found
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Greece 781 ward elections in Greece
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314. National Intelligence Estimate
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Greece 785 rify Greek political lif
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Greece 787 to economic policies fol
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Greece 789 The new Erim government
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Greece 791 The Arab World and Afric
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315. Memorandum From Harold Saunder
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itate for a shift in U.S. policy th
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Greece 797 tion. The President and
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318. Memorandum by Secretary of Sta
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Greece 801 6. The King said he was
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Greece 803 13. I agreed, adding my
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Greece 805 In welcoming Ambassador
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321. Memorandum of Conversation 1 P
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Greece 809 As in the case of his co
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Greece 811 As a result of Ambassado
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324. Editorial Note Greece 813 In a
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Greece 815 6. The Vice President sa
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Greece 817 13. Vice President said
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Greece 819 Nixon: “Émigré group
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Greece 821 327. Information Memoran
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Greece 823 member of the Greek Gove
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329. Memorandum From the President
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Greece 827 330. Telegram From the D
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Greece 829 332. Letter From the Amb
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Greece 833 tainees and other libera
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Greece 835 but their attitude may b
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Greece 837 opposition might exploit
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Greece 839 —Phase II—Six to Twe
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Greece 845 I would not want to end
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Greece 847 There are some weaknesse
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Greece - US Department of State

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