Greece - US Department of State

622 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX
we expected progress on implementing the Greek constitution and
restoring civil liberties and that this had been our posture for the past
23 months.
Mr. Rockwell said that the question of the relationship between
the King and the Greek Government was obviously a significant factor
in the Greek problem. With regard to our military aid policy, it
looked as if the Greek Government was not prepared to give up the
essence of its position in exchange for military equipment. The Greek
Government believes it has a mission to accomplish and does not seem
prepared to make basic adjustments in its policies simply to obtain military
aid. It is proceeding at its own speed. Mr. Rockwell’s personal
view was that pressures from within Greece would require the Greek
Government in time to adjust its policies in a desirable manner. This
would not happen overnight, and was something to be worked out between
Greeks, including the King and the Government. The United
States could not do this. The King dissented, saying that in another
year the Government’s control would be so tight that it could act as it
pleased toward the Greek people. Only United States pressure could
prevent this.
The Secretary noted that it was very difficult to put the question
of MAP deliveries bluntly in terms of “either you do what we want or
you do not receive MAP.” We wanted to see Greece progress to constitutionalism
but at the same time did not want to see Greece weakened
militarily as a NATO ally. Although we had a basic interest in political
evolution and constitutional development in Greece, we
questioned whether our voice could be decisive in achieving these objectives.
It was our policy not to intervene in domestic matters of this
sort, and it must be for the King and the Greek Government to work
out the political future of Greece.
The King said he now understood our policy and if this had been
made clear to him when he was in Washington in September 1967 2 he
might not have undertaken his action of December 13 and would have
instead stayed in Greece to continue influencing the government. He
went on to say that he was in touch with other Greek leaders abroad
about steps to move things back to political normalcy. He hoped that
whatever decision was reached by the USG regarding U.S. policy in
dealing with the Greek Government, and particularly on the question
of military deliveries, might be conveyed to him. He wanted to be sure
to be in step with whatever the USG was planning because his actions
would be affected in large measure by the United States stance. The
2
See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Document
301.