Greece - US Department of State
Greece - US Department of State
Greece - US Department of State
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750 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX<br />
299. Telegram From the Embassy in <strong>Greece</strong> to the <strong>Department</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>State</strong> 1<br />
Athens, November 23, 1970, 1631Z.<br />
6356. Ref: <strong>State</strong> 190828. 2 For the Secretary.<br />
1. As you know, I remain skeptical about prospects <strong>of</strong> future role<br />
for King in Greek politics for variety <strong>of</strong> reasons including his own behavior<br />
and extent <strong>of</strong> feeling against him among key leaders here. At<br />
same time I recognize that 1968 Constitution provides role for him and<br />
I can envisage circumstances in which his return might occur. There is<br />
good evidence, as [less than 1 line not declassified] has reported, that there<br />
have been occasional contacts with King involving individuals in or<br />
close to present government.<br />
2. As Embassy and [less than 1 line not declassified] have reported,<br />
however, there is considerable internal ferment within government at<br />
present, outcome <strong>of</strong> which remains uncertain. 3 Some <strong>of</strong> forces involved<br />
naturally consider King as one element to be reckoned with in arriving<br />
at future political establishment and are interested in exploiting him in<br />
their own interests. Others probably continue to regard him as hostile to<br />
“purposes <strong>of</strong> revolution” in view <strong>of</strong> his aborted December coup. Fluid<br />
situation means that any move by forces outside <strong>of</strong> <strong>Greece</strong> which can in<br />
any way be interpreted by Greeks, on whatever side, as evidence <strong>of</strong> U.S.<br />
“manipulation” <strong>of</strong> situation or <strong>of</strong> particular direction <strong>of</strong> U.S. interests is<br />
bound to have adverse ramifications.<br />
3. Consequently I do not believe timing would be propitious for<br />
you to have conversation with King in Brussels. Since one <strong>of</strong> purposes<br />
<strong>of</strong> such meeting would be, as reftel states, to show interest in alternative<br />
other than present establishment, and meeting would receive publicity,<br />
we could anticipate that all elements <strong>of</strong> political spectrum here<br />
would unite in criticism asserting such conversation involves interference<br />
in Greek domestic politics. I would have no objection, however,<br />
1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594,<br />
Country Files—Middle East, <strong>Greece</strong>, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret; Nodis.<br />
2 Dated November 20. In it, Rogers requested Tasca’s views on whether he should<br />
meet privately with the King during the NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels. (Ibid.)<br />
3 The Embassy reported on possible divisions within the Greek regime in telegrams<br />
6212 from Athens, November 13; 6385 from Athens, November 24; and 6467 from Athens,<br />
November 30. (All ibid.)