Greece - US Department of State

Greece 767
A Greek commitment was clearly made to take certain key steps
in the direction of constitutional order. This commitment took the form
of a timetable made public in April 1970. 3 The commitment was also
frequently privately stated to U.S. officials as well as in an April 1970
letter from the Greek Prime Minister to the President. 4 To a great extent
the Greeks met the letter, if not the spirit of the commitment. With
one key exception—martial law remains in force. In addition, it now
appears as though the prospect for a return to parliamentary government
has receded farther into the future. In any event critics of Greece
in NATO and in the Congress remain unconvinced that the regime
plans ever to return the reins of government of a freely elected parliament
or that the regime will abandon the repression of which it has
been accused.
The Greek regime remains in firm control of the country. A healthy
and burgeoning economy continues to dampen any incipient grass
roots movement against the regime. Although the Prime Minister has
faced some threats from within the regime to his continued primacy
he appears at least for the time being to have overcome them.
To the extent possible, we should chart a course in our relations
with the Greeks which would both preserve our security relationship
and make it possible to exert as much influence as possible for the
restoration of civil rights in Greece and for a return to a more normal
political situation. Serving both these objectives severely limits the viable
options available to us, eliminates the possibility of attempting to
use Military Aid as leverage as well as the possibility of adopting a position
of indifference to internal Greek affairs.
Options
In theory we have action alternatives ranging from a severe (and
high risk in terms of the Greek regime’s attitude) approach at one end
of the spectrum to a strict policy of non-concern for internal Greek affairs
(with high risk in terms of NATO and Congressional attitudes) at
the other. Practically, our options are more limited and can be expressed
as two alternatives: do somewhat more or do somewhat less.
Option II calls for a somewhat more energetic application of our
present two-pronged policy, calculated to preserve access to security facilities
in Greece while exerting as much pressure on the regime as is
possible without jeopardizing those interests. This course of action has
the advantage of providing evidence to our critics in Congress and
3
The timetable was first made public to the Council of Europe in August 1969; see
footnote 4, Document 255.
4
Document 274.