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Greece - US Department of State

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626 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX<br />

247. Letter From the Chargé d’Affaires in <strong>Greece</strong> (McClelland)<br />

to the Country Director for Greek Affairs (Brewster) 1<br />

Athens, April 28, 1969.<br />

Dear Dan:<br />

Arch and I have reapplied ourselves over the week-end to the important<br />

question raised in your letter <strong>of</strong> April 14th, 2 and reiterated in<br />

your telephone call <strong>of</strong> Friday, 3 <strong>of</strong> whether continuing the current U.S.<br />

policy <strong>of</strong> withholding delivery <strong>of</strong> suspended MAP items can still serve<br />

to impel the GOG to make more rapid and genuine progress toward<br />

representative government.<br />

In summary, it is our conclusion that, whereas we can probably<br />

extract some further short-range, tactical mileage from a continuation<br />

<strong>of</strong> this policy (i.e. until a new Ambassador arrives and has been able<br />

to assess the situation, in other words, for perhaps another 3 months),<br />

we believe this would be unlikely over the longer range to have any<br />

appreciable effect on the pace and nature <strong>of</strong> internal political evolution<br />

in <strong>Greece</strong>. As was noted in NEA/GRK’s succinct March “Memorandum<br />

for the President” on the subject <strong>of</strong> “Policy on Military Deliveries<br />

to <strong>Greece</strong>”: “the Regime clearly ...is not prepared to make basic<br />

concessions in return for a lifting <strong>of</strong> the arms suspension.” Persisting<br />

with suspension would moreover retain all the inherent disadvantages<br />

<strong>of</strong> this policy. 4<br />

A second part <strong>of</strong> our conclusion—and we regard this as an important<br />

concomitant—is that by abandoning the MAP withholding policy,<br />

we do not necessarily need at the same time to abandon significant<br />

leverage over the GOG which could be exerted in other ways. We believe<br />

that this conclusion is reenforced by recent evidence, in particular<br />

the exaggerated interpretation in the controlled Greek press <strong>of</strong> the<br />

significance <strong>of</strong> Pattakos’ visit, and to a lesser extent that <strong>of</strong> Pipinelis<br />

and General Angelis, 5 to Washington, together with the disproportionate<br />

reaction to the seemingly minor Viewpoint episode, 6 that it is<br />

1<br />

Source: <strong>Department</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>State</strong>, Greek Desk Files: Lot 75 D 227, U.S. Policy Towards<br />

<strong>Greece</strong>. Secret; Official-Informal.<br />

2<br />

Not found.<br />

3<br />

No record <strong>of</strong> this conversation on April 25 was found.<br />

4<br />

The <strong>Department</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>State</strong> memorandum was not found. The President ordered a<br />

study <strong>of</strong> military aid to <strong>Greece</strong> on April 26; see Document 246.<br />

5<br />

Angelis accompanied Pipinelis to Washington April 9–11. A memorandum <strong>of</strong> his<br />

conversation with the Vice President is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files<br />

1967–69, POL GREECE–<strong>US</strong>.<br />

6<br />

This <strong>US</strong>IA publication had printed an article critical <strong>of</strong> the Greek junta.

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