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Greece - US Department of State

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<strong>Greece</strong> 657<br />

2. Outside <strong>Greece</strong> expatriate opponents <strong>of</strong> the military government—most<br />

recently ex-Prime Minister Karamanlis—continue to press<br />

for return to constitutional government, either by urging opposition<br />

action in <strong>Greece</strong> or by urging <strong>US</strong> and western European action to isolate<br />

<strong>Greece</strong>. They continue to seek signs <strong>of</strong> <strong>US</strong> support.<br />

3. <strong>US</strong>-Greek relations. The Greek government has in essence asked<br />

the Nixon Administration to stop pressing it to return to constitutional<br />

government. It says it will do so as soon as possible, but it argues that<br />

pressure from outside will not help and will only irritate <strong>US</strong>-Greek<br />

relations.<br />

E. The issues, therefore, are:<br />

1. What are <strong>US</strong> interests in <strong>Greece</strong>? (Section II)<br />

2. Do these interests require us to maintain a full-scale military assistance<br />

program? (Section III)<br />

3. How does the nature <strong>of</strong> government in <strong>Greece</strong> affect <strong>US</strong> interests?<br />

(Section IV)<br />

4. What are our options? (Section V)<br />

II. What Are <strong>US</strong> interests in <strong>Greece</strong>?<br />

A. <strong>US</strong> economic benefits from <strong>Greece</strong> are relatively small. <strong>US</strong> direct<br />

investment by private firms is only $155 million. We maintain a<br />

small surplus in our trade with <strong>Greece</strong>, but obtain no resources through<br />

trade that we could not obtain elsewhere.<br />

B. Specific <strong>US</strong> political benefits from <strong>Greece</strong> are negligible aside<br />

from firm Greek support for a strong NATO and aside from a general<br />

interest in any government that is not a source <strong>of</strong> international disorder<br />

and is willing to do business according to general international<br />

practice. The present Greek government has little influence over other<br />

governments or in international forums. Opposition to military government<br />

in some quarters has turned our normal relationship with a<br />

NATO partner into a political issue.<br />

C. In contrast to <strong>US</strong> economic or political interests some <strong>of</strong> our<br />

strategic benefits from continued close association with <strong>Greece</strong> are<br />

significant:<br />

1. <strong>Greece</strong>’s military forces (160,000 men) are capable <strong>of</strong> a conventional<br />

defense against attack by Bulgaria (159,000 men) without significant<br />

<strong>US</strong> assistance or the use <strong>of</strong> nuclear weapons. Besides defending<br />

<strong>Greece</strong> itself, these forces could help divert Warsaw Pact forces or<br />

substitute for <strong>US</strong> forces in a <strong>US</strong>-Soviet conflict. [21 ⁄2 lines not declassified]<br />

2. <strong>Greece</strong> could provide base and staging rights to the <strong>US</strong> for the<br />

Middle East. The <strong>US</strong> bases in <strong>Greece</strong> are both suitable and probably<br />

available for the staging <strong>of</strong> humanitarian, peace-keeping or military intervention<br />

missions into the Middle East.

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