Greece - US Department of State

732 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX
3. PriMin began his reply with preface that what he had to say
would unfortunately have to be unpleasant. GOG was unable understand
U.S. posture, particularly delay of USG in regularizing relations.
Resumption of military aid (i.e., suspension of embargo) did not depend
on public opinion or action of Congress. It required simple decision
by USG. Moreover, USG had been able to conclude an agreement
with Franco Spain, 5 and undertaken Cambodian operation without being
blocked by hostile opinion of a minority in Congress. Why had
USG hesitated on Greece? Even worse, we had taken the place of Denmark
and the Scandinavians in seeking to pressure Greece and to intervene
in Greek internal affairs. He asked how Denmark with one regiment
could be allowed to exercise so much influence. Did U.S. really
care more about Denmark in NATO than Greece? Greece had its public
opinion also and if he told Greek people arms, urgently needed for
NATO defense, were being withheld by USG because of GOG internal
policies, Greek people would be upset with U.S. and react negatively.
It was for this reason that he had not to date made arms issue clear to
Greek people. If President favored strong relations with Greece, why
did he not deal with the minority frankly and straightforward? Bulgaria
was building up military strength and gap growing greatly. He
was really fighting to move forward toward constitutional government.
Did we want him to be replaced through the type of pressure we were
exerting? What would take his place? We might have someone else
tougher to deal with. Had we really thought this through? PriMin continued
that DPC a matter for NATO and that U.S. action on this matter
essentially a NATO matter not a bilateral question, since in U.S. interest
to keep Greece in NATO. If NATO wished to expel Greece
through DPC, then that was decision for its members.
4. As for my specific question, he emphasized there was nothing
further to tell USG at this time. When time came for action, he would
tell us and Greek people, implying that he would not inform U.S. Government
before he told Greek people.
5. In my comments on his lengthy statement, which was made
with obvious emotion, I repeated positive aspects our relations, my
conviction that we were at a key turning point, and my sincere hope
he would understand my comments as coming from a friend conveying
a message from President Nixon, the same man who told me last
December prior to my departure for Greece that he considered PriMin
Papadopoulos a friend of America and his friend and who had expressed
his disagreement with action by Council of Europe against
5 Reference is to the cooperation agreement signed August 6. For text, see 21 UST
1667. Documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume
XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.