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Single-Particle Electrodynamics - Assassination Science

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3.2 Notions of rigidity<br />

In this section, we briefly review the philosophical assumptions underlying<br />

Galilean (Section 3.2.1) and Einsteinian (Section 3.2.2) notions of rigidity.<br />

3.2.1 Galilean rigidity<br />

The Galilean concept of rigidity—namely, that the three-positions of the<br />

constituents of the rigid body maintain a fixed three-geometrical relationship<br />

with respect to one another, up to three-rotations—clearly is nonsensical in<br />

a Lorentz world: it is not formulated in Lorentz-covariant terms.<br />

There are two ways in which one can view the problem. The first is<br />

to invoke the FitzGerald–Lorentz contraction [87]: as the body’s velocity<br />

increases, the body should effectively “contract” in length along the direction<br />

of its motion. The Galilean model would require extra, contrived forces to<br />

bring about such a contraction.<br />

The second way to view the problem—which the author overwhelmingly<br />

prefers—is to start with a stationary body. According to Galilean mechanics,<br />

a boost by a velocity v of this system does not affect the three-geometrical<br />

relationships between the constituents: they all move coherently, with the<br />

same velocity, and the same separation vectors between them, as when the<br />

body is static. But according to relativistic mechanics, we find that a boost<br />

by velocity v should actually take us into a new Lorentz frame, which mixes<br />

the temporal and spatial components of the original frame. Thus, if the<br />

three-geometry is fixed in one Lorentz frame, then it will not, in general, be<br />

so in another.<br />

The reason that the second way of looking at the problem is preferred by<br />

the author is that the former, “contraction” argument clings somewhat to<br />

the pre-relativistic concept of Newton’s “universal time”: it “measures” the<br />

lengths of objects over a constant-time hypersurface of the measurer, rather<br />

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