13.11.2012 Views

fm 44-100 us army air and missile defense operations

fm 44-100 us army air and missile defense operations

fm 44-100 us army air and missile defense operations

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

FM <strong>44</strong>-<strong>100</strong><br />

1-6<br />

1-30. An <strong>air</strong>craft threat has fixed nature <strong>air</strong>craft-related support facilities,<br />

th<strong>us</strong> making the operational battlespace (opportunities to engage) much<br />

greater. Aircraft conducting <strong>operations</strong> against the force are exposed to<br />

defensive fires for tens of minutes, while <strong>missile</strong> engagement opportunities<br />

are measured in seconds.<br />

1-31. The unique challenges posed by theater <strong>missile</strong> <strong>defense</strong> require a highly<br />

responsive C2 structure, which decentralizes engagement <strong>operations</strong> to the<br />

lowest level. By comparison, the requirement to avoid fratricide of friendly<br />

<strong>air</strong>craft m<strong>and</strong>ates strict, highly centralized control of theater <strong>air</strong> <strong>defense</strong><br />

engagements.<br />

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE<br />

1-32. World War II offered lessons about modern warfare that remain<br />

relevant 50 years later. Army divisions joined both joint <strong>and</strong> allied forces in<br />

the conduct of combined arms, force-projection <strong>operations</strong> supported by<br />

modern fighter <strong>air</strong>craft <strong>and</strong> bombers. Enemy <strong>air</strong> forces were large, <strong>and</strong> highly<br />

capable, <strong>and</strong> had the potential to deliver both conventional <strong>and</strong> chemical<br />

munitions. They held US <strong>and</strong> allied forces at risk throughout the duration of<br />

the war. In addition to the <strong>air</strong> threat, the allies faced attack by surface-tosurface<br />

<strong>and</strong> cruise <strong>missile</strong>s. To counter the introduction of sizeable enemy <strong>air</strong><br />

forces, the Army developed <strong>and</strong> fielded equally capable <strong>air</strong> <strong>defense</strong> forces.<br />

Early experiences at Kasserine Pass <strong>and</strong> in the Pacific taught the importance<br />

of <strong>air</strong> <strong>defense</strong> to force protection. By 19<strong>44</strong>, comm<strong>and</strong>ers routinely integrated<br />

<strong>air</strong> <strong>defense</strong> forces into Army <strong>operations</strong> at all echelons.<br />

1-33. The Norm<strong>and</strong>y campaign of June 19<strong>44</strong>, <strong>and</strong> the subsequent breakout,<br />

provides excellent examples of <strong>air</strong> <strong>defense</strong> <strong>operations</strong> in a force-projection<br />

scenario. Eleven battalions of anti<strong>air</strong>craft artillery (AAA) supported the<br />

assaulting US divisions. As the beachhead exp<strong>and</strong>ed, additional AAA groups<br />

<strong>and</strong> brigades joined the assault forces to form a near-leak-proof <strong>defense</strong>.<br />

Though the Luftwaffe flew tho<strong>us</strong><strong>and</strong>s of sorties against the forces <strong>and</strong> assets<br />

concentrated in the beachhead, the allies suffered no significant damage due<br />

to <strong>air</strong> attack. American anti<strong>air</strong>craft artillery met the challenge by destroying<br />

more than 300 enemy <strong>air</strong>craft.<br />

1-34. Following bloody hedgerow fighting, American forces conducted a<br />

breakout in July 19<strong>44</strong>. The plan fully integrated <strong>and</strong> synchronized AAA with<br />

ground force <strong>operations</strong>. AAA again successfully protected the maneuver<br />

forces as they swept across France, destroying more than 300 German<br />

<strong>air</strong>craft. As units moved forward, the allies captured new ports for <strong>us</strong>e as<br />

forward logistics centers. The Germans made a determined effort to destroy<br />

the major port, Antwerp, <strong>us</strong>ing V-1 <strong>air</strong>craft, the first cruise <strong>missile</strong>s.<br />

American <strong>air</strong> defenders rose to the challenge, destroying more than 70<br />

percent of the <strong>missile</strong>s <strong>and</strong> keeping the port open throughout the five-month<br />

attack.<br />

1-35. Operation OVERLORD is ill<strong>us</strong>trative of the steps taken in a forced<br />

entry, force-projection operation. Air <strong>defense</strong> protected the force in the points<br />

of embarkation <strong>and</strong> throughout entry <strong>operations</strong>, expansion of the lodgment,<br />

<strong>and</strong> conduct of decisive <strong>operations</strong>. The threat posed by enemy <strong>air</strong>craft <strong>and</strong>

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!