vicariously liable if the plaintiff shows that a “reasonably prudent person in the patient’sposition” would believe that the care was being rendered by the hospital or its agents or that thecare in question was “advertised or otherwise represented” as being care rendered by the hospitalor its agents. 40 P.S. § 1303.516(a). MCARE changes the traditional subjective belief of thepatient to a reasonable prudent person standard.3. Insurance ReformMCARE created the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Fund (“TheMCARE Fund”) which replaced the Pennsylvania Medical Professional Liability Fund (“TheCAT Fund”) as of October 1, 2002. 40 P.S. § 1303.712. Like its predecessor, the MCARE Fundprovides insurance coverage in excess of the basic limits for each eligible health care provider.40 P.S. § 1303.712(a). The MCARE Fund is subsidized through assessments on eachparticipating health care provider. 40 P.S. § 1303.712(d).In <strong>2012</strong>, the annual assessment will be 23% applied to the prevailing primarypremium for each participating health care provider. Medical Care Availability &Reduction Of Error Fund Notice Of And Amount Of Assessment Action, PA Notice No.2011-09, WL 5307822 (October 29, 2011). The total assessment cost for <strong>2012</strong> will be$203,824,513. This amount is $26,741,075 greater than what was collected from the 2011assessment to cover claims, expenses, and a 10% buffer. This difference will be paid fromMCARE’s carryover balance. The increase in the assessment percentage for <strong>2012</strong> isattributable to an increase in claims in 2011, as well as a rate reduction by the JointUnderwriting Association.An amendment to the Act, entitled the “Health Care Provider Retention Program”(“HCPR”), allowed eligible healthcare providers to receive an abatement of this assessment uponapplication to the Insurance Department, in exchange for which the health care provider isrequired to attest in writing that he or she will continue to provide health care services inPennsylvania for at least one full year following the year for which he or she receives theabatement. 40 P.S. § 1303.1101-1115 (repealed 2009). However, in 2009, the HCPR wasrepealed. Id.Under MCARE, the minimum required limits of professional liability insurance are thesum of the basic limits (for policies issued or renewed in 2003, $500,000 per occurrence or claimand $1,500,000 per year for a participating provider) and the MCARE fund limits ($500,000 peroccurrence or claim and $1,500,000 per year). 40 P.S. § 1303.711(d); § 1303.712(c). The basiclimits are secured from private commercial insurance carriers, or, upon certain qualifications,through self-insurance. 40 P.S. § 1303.711. The MCARE fund will eventually terminatefollowing satisfaction of all liabilities of the Fund. 40 P.S. § 1303.712(k). The MCARE fundlimits, during the phase-out, will be reallocated to the basic insurance coverage provided by theprivate insurers (or the self-insurers). 40 P.S. § 1303.711(d), 712(c)-(d).The MCARE fund generally functions as excess coverage for medical providers.However, section 715 of the MCARE Act provides an exception, requiring the MCARE fund toact as primary insurer and provide first-dollar indemnity and defense to providers for eligibleclaims. 40 P.S. § 1303.715. To be eligible for this first-dollar indemnity of MCARE, also104
known as extended claims, section 715 requires the claim be made against an eligible providermore than four years after the alleged malpractice, and filed within the applicable statute oflimitations.In Yussen v. MCARE Fund, 17 A.3d 422 (Pa. Commw. Ct. March 24, 2011), thecourt clarified that the date on which the claim “is made” against an eligible provider forpurposes of section 715 can be the date on which the writ of summons is filed in a medicalnegligence case. In Yussen, a doctor submitted a claim to the MCARE Fund on August 30,2007, requesting coverage with respect to a malpractice claim for medical negligence thatallegedly occurred on July 7, 2003. Id. at 423. The Fund denied Section 715 coveragebecause the claim was made less than four years after the alleged malpractice. Id. Inaffirming the Fund’s decision, the court found that the date the writ of summons was filed,June 4, 2007, was the date on which the claim was “made.” Id. Consequently, as the writwas filed less than four years after the alleged malpractice, the doctor was ineligible forcoverage under Section 715. Id. at 424. See also In re Kimberly S. Harnist, MD, MM06-02-014 (filed October 10, 2006) (holding that that the date on which the writ of summonswas filed is the date on which a claim is made).In Polyclinic Medical Center v. MCARE Fund, No. 399 M.D.2010, 2011 WL 9270 (Pa.Commw. Ct. Jan. 4, 2011), the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that the MCARE Fund(the “Fund”) is only required to provide coverage for injuries caused by health care providers asa result of providing medical services, not for injuries caused by third parties, even if the healthcare provider is responsible for the third party.The suit stemmed from an underlying case in which a psychiatric patient sued PolyclinicMedical Center (the “Medical Center”) for failing to properly supervise its employees. Theemployees allegedly failed to properly supervise an “unruly and violent” psychiatric patient. Theunruly patient gained access to a wheelchair that was easily accessible from the psychiatric unit,and crashed the wheelchair into the back of another patient’s leg, causing her “permanentdebilitating pain.” The Fund denied the Medical Center’s claim for excess coverage, and theMedical Center appealed. The issue went to the Insurance Commissioner; however, before theCommissioner ruled, the matter was transferred to the Commonwealth Court pursuant to Fletcherv. Pa. Property and Casualty Guaranty Assoc., 985 A.2d 678 (2009).The Fund argued that, in order to be eligible for MCARE coverage, the claim mustinvolve the provision of medical services, which the instant claim did not. The Medical Centerargued that the claim did, in fact, involve the provision of medical services, including negligenthiring and supervision of employees, specifically “a failure to render adequate medical services.”The court noted that there was no authority on the issue of whether an injury caused by athird party resulted from the provision of medical services. Therefore, the court examined theactual MCARE Act. Section 102 of the Act stated the purpose of the Act to be the creation of “asystem through which a person who has sustained injury or death as a result of tort or breach ofcontract by a health care provider can obtain a prompt determination of his claim.” (quoting 40P.S. § 1301.102) (emphasis in original). The court then examined Section 103 of the Act, anddetermined that “a health care provider is a health center or its equivalent or an agent thereof.”Therefore, the court held, MCARE coverage is available only when a patient is injured by “a105
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EMTALA CASES ......................
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Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
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II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
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The Superior Court reversed the tri
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to a third party pursuant to the st
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After approximately five months, De
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learned the day after the surgery t
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conduct to the delay in colon cance
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court admitted the expert’s testi
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(b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
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corroborated his testimony. The cou
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husband’s estate. Plaintiff alleg
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Other notable federal cases arising
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The Superior Court found that in re
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§ 1303.512(b). The court, however,
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In Neidig v. United States, No. 07-
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Additionally, the Supreme Court not
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were not indicated for her conditio
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surgeon is the same as it would be
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It should be noted that the Superio
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Finally, the court held that the tr
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania r
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nurses deviating from applicable st
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certainty, the court reviews expert
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Under Pennsylvania law, the Court n
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testimony, Defendant presented his
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Following Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.
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Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
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underlying cause of action involved
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In Capital Care Corp., the Superior
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The court found, however, to state
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of reasonable diligence. The standa
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not be set aside. On July 7, 2005,
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complete bar to recovery. Since a l
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On appeal, Plaintiffs claimed that
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In Liggon-Redding, 659 F.3d at 265,
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elieved of those minimum standards
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elevant to the proceedings, the com
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establish professional misconduct b
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Upholding the Superior Court’s Or
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Id.Rejecting revocation and suspens
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order as a sanction under Rule 4019
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