the original Complaint was delivered to the court, the filing of an amended complaint didnot afford the plaintiff an additional sixty days in which to file a certificate of merit. Id. at*2 (citations omitted). Consequently, as the original Complaint was filed on March 24,2011, and the certificate of merit is required to be filed within sixty days of the filing of theoriginal complaint, defendants were free to file the Notices any time after April 23, 2011.Id. at *2.(iii) Substantial ComplianceIn Booker v. U.S., 366 Fed. Appx. 425, 429 (3d. Cir. 2010), the Third Circuit reversed atrial court’s order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to timely file a certificate of merit andheld that the pro se prisoner plaintiff’s actions were “a substantial attempt to conform to therequirements of the rule.” Plaintiff was a prisoner who the trial court gave several extensions tofile a certificate of merit. Id. at 426. Within the time the trial court gave plaintiff to file acertificate of merit, plaintiff filed a letter from a physician, along with an accompanyingdocument entitled “Notice of Filing of Certificate of Merit.” Id. at 427. The letter stated that thephysician reviewed plaintiff’s medical records and essentially concluded that plaintiff’s medicalcare “warrants a closer look.” Id. Importantly, plaintiff also requested in his filing, guidance inproperly phrasing the certificate of merit and, if necessary, an extension of time to satisfy thecertificate of merit requirements. The court noted that, unlike in Womer, where the plaintiff tookno action or ignored his obligations to the court, the plaintiff, “while incarcerated and proceedingpro se and in forma pauperis, has located a qualified physician, compiled his medical records,timely filed the necessary requests for extensions of time and attempted to provide the Courtwith a compliant COM.” Id. at 429. The court found these actions constituted substantialcompliance with the rules governing certificates of merit. Id. The court vacated the districtcourt’s judgment, noting that plaintiff should be given the opportunity to file a compliantcertificate of merit. Id.Plaintiff in Shon v. Karason, 920 A.2d 1285 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007), appeal denied, 936A.2d 41(Pa. 2007), brought a medical malpractice action against Defendants, a podiatrist and apodiatry center. Defendant doctor performed surgery to remove a neuroma on plaintiff’s foot.After the surgery, Plaintiff’s foot did not heal as expected. Plaintiffs then requested the presurgeryMRI study from Defendant. Plaintiffs alleged that the MRI showed no signs ofneuroma. Plaintiffs filed the complaint, but failed to file a certificate of merit. Defendants filed aPraecipe for Judgment of Non Pros, which was not docketed until a day later. Hours afterDefendants filed the praecipe but before it was docketed, Plaintiffs filed a certificate of merit.About a week later, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Open or Strike Non Pros for Failure to FileCertificate of Merit. The trial court denied the motion and Plaintiffs appealed.Plaintiffs argued that they should be excused from the certificate of merit requirementbecause Defendants had access to the MRI and pathology reports. Plaintiffs asserted that thesemedical records were the equivalent of the required certificate of merit. Relying on Womer v.Hilliker, 908 A.2d 269 (Pa. 2006), the court held that Plaintiffs’ assertion was flawed. The Courtnoted that where a plaintiff takes no steps to comply with Rule 1042.3, the plaintiff is not entitledto open a judgment of non pros granted because of the plaintiff’s failure to file a certificate ofmerit.116
Plaintiffs further asserted that Rule 1042.3 does not apply to the podiatry center becauseit is not a licensed professional. The court held that the podiatry center is a health care providerfor purposes of the certificate of merit requirement. The court explained that Rule 1042.1 refersto the MCARE act in defining a “health care provider.” MCARE defines a “health careprovider” to include a corporation or professional partnership. A health care provider need notbe licensed; mere state approval is sufficient. Thus, the court held that the podiatry center is ahealth care provider and Rule 1042.3 applied.Lastly, Plaintiffs contended that their certificate of merit was timely filed because it wasdocketed before Defendants’ Praecipe for Judgment of Non Pros. The court, however, indicatedthat Plaintiff’s certificate of merit was not timely; it was about two months overdue.Additionally, Rule 1042.6 requires the prothonotary to enter a Judgment of Non Pros for failureto file a certificate of merit within the specified time so long as there is no pending motion toextend the time to file a certificate of merit. Furthermore, Defendants filed their Praecipe forJudgment of Non Pros before Plaintiffs filed their certificate of merit. The court also noted thatthere was no pending motion for an extension of time to file a certificate of merit. Accordingly,the court affirmed the trial court’s ruling.In Ditch v. Waynesboro Hospital, 917 A.2d 317 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007), aff’d, 17 A.2d 310(Pa. Jan. 18, 2011), the complaint alleged that the decedent, who had suffered a stroke and beentaken to the emergency department at the Defendant hospital, fell from her hospital bed, struckher head on the floor and suffered a fractured skull and subdural hematoma from which she diedthree days later. Plaintiff, the administratrix of the patient’s estate, alleged that the patient’sdeath was caused by the negligence of the hospital, in failing to properly restrain the patient,failing to train the staff on proper procedures in transporting patients and in leaving the patientalone while she was being transported.Defendant filed preliminary objections based on lack of specificity and failure to file acertificate of merit. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint but did not file a certificate of merit.The hospital filed a Praecipe for Judgment of Non Pros pursuant to Rule 1042.6 and judgmentwas entered. About one week later, Plaintiff filed a petition to open this judgment and also fileda certificate of merit. The trial court denied the petition, finding that the complaint raised aprofessional negligence claim and so required a certificate of merit.On appeal, Plaintiff argued that her complaint contained only claims of ordinarynegligence, of a “slip and fall” type, and that, therefore, no certificate of merit was required. TheSuperior Court disagreed, noting that the events involved all occurred during the course ofmedical treatment and also involved, at least to some extent, medical judgments. The courtfurther disagreed with Plaintiff’s argument that no expert testimony would be required to proveher case and that this established that her claim was not one of medical negligence. The courtstated that expert testimony would, in fact, be required to prove her claims, that her claims werefor professional negligence, and that accordingly, a certificate of merit was required.The Superior Court also disagreed with Plaintiff’s arguments that Defendant was requiredto raise by preliminary objections on the issue of whether the complaint asserted a professionalclaim, and that the amended complaint served to withdraw the original complaint and to117
- Page 3 and 4:
EMTALA CASES ......................
- Page 5:
Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
- Page 8 and 9:
II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
- Page 10 and 11:
The Superior Court reversed the tri
- Page 12 and 13:
to a third party pursuant to the st
- Page 14 and 15:
After approximately five months, De
- Page 16 and 17:
learned the day after the surgery t
- Page 18 and 19:
conduct to the delay in colon cance
- Page 20 and 21:
court admitted the expert’s testi
- Page 22 and 23:
(b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
- Page 24 and 25:
corroborated his testimony. The cou
- Page 26 and 27:
husband’s estate. Plaintiff alleg
- Page 28 and 29:
Other notable federal cases arising
- Page 30 and 31:
The Superior Court found that in re
- Page 32 and 33:
§ 1303.512(b). The court, however,
- Page 34 and 35:
In Neidig v. United States, No. 07-
- Page 36 and 37:
Additionally, the Supreme Court not
- Page 38 and 39:
were not indicated for her conditio
- Page 40 and 41:
surgeon is the same as it would be
- Page 42 and 43:
It should be noted that the Superio
- Page 44 and 45:
Finally, the court held that the tr
- Page 46 and 47:
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania r
- Page 48 and 49:
nurses deviating from applicable st
- Page 50 and 51:
certainty, the court reviews expert
- Page 52 and 53:
Under Pennsylvania law, the Court n
- Page 54 and 55:
testimony, Defendant presented his
- Page 56 and 57:
Following Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.
- Page 58 and 59:
Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
- Page 60 and 61:
where payment is made by Medicaid w
- Page 62 and 63:
accomplished. In Valles v. Albert E
- Page 64 and 65:
In 1980, the Pennsylvania Superior
- Page 66 and 67:
Plaintiff had a routine monitoring
- Page 68 and 69:
Plaintiff’s Contract ClaimsThe Co
- Page 70 and 71:
is a failure to report changes in a
- Page 72 and 73: unit to assure post-surgical patien
- Page 74 and 75: sliced his wrist and arm with a raz
- Page 76 and 77: licensed professionals for whom the
- Page 78 and 79: (c)Limitations of Corporate Neglige
- Page 80 and 81: Even more recently, our Superior Co
- Page 82 and 83: (a)HMO IssuesIn McClellan v. Health
- Page 84 and 85: affidavit submitted by Defendants o
- Page 86 and 87: treatments while at VA’s faciliti
- Page 88 and 89: [s]ubstantively, we believe that a
- Page 90 and 91: The party claiming the benefit of t
- Page 92 and 93: deprive (him) of civil rights guara
- Page 94 and 95: found that the District Court was w
- Page 96 and 97: With respect to fraudulent concealm
- Page 98 and 99: would be applied in situations wher
- Page 100 and 101: they had not raised them in the cou
- Page 102 and 103: (a)Informed ConsentUnder MCARE, a p
- Page 104 and 105: civil enforcement provisions and ma
- Page 106 and 107: MCARE also changes the manner in wh
- Page 108 and 109: whose death, in 2005, was allegedly
- Page 110 and 111: vicariously liable if the plaintiff
- Page 112 and 113: health center or its equivalent or
- Page 114 and 115: In Pennsylvania Medical Society, th
- Page 116 and 117: to any professional who is alleged
- Page 118 and 119: Since the 2005 amendments, there ha
- Page 120 and 121: ule, but who intentionally ignores
- Page 124 and 125: foreclose all challenges against th
- Page 126 and 127: number of boxes), which was support
- Page 128 and 129: questions of professional judgment
- Page 130 and 131: deviated from any professional stan
- Page 132 and 133: The Third Circuit affirmed the Dist
- Page 134 and 135: claims and cross-claims remain agai
- Page 136 and 137: By an Amendatory Order dated March
- Page 138 and 139: The court acknowledged that there i
- Page 140 and 141: apply and that the trial court misa
- Page 142 and 143: Barbados had enough litigation-spec
- Page 144 and 145: E. Preemption of Vaccine Design Def
- Page 146 and 147: 2. Pa. R. Civ. Pro. 1036.1 - Reinst
- Page 148 and 149: Barrick, at *34-35.Furthermore, the
- Page 150 and 151: (b) the utility of the defendant’
- Page 152 and 153: 2006). In this case, Plaintiffs bro
- Page 154 and 155: B. Elements of a Cause of Action fo
- Page 156 and 157: decision in Muhammad precluded Mr.
- Page 158 and 159: considered speculative “only if t
- Page 160 and 161: underlying cause of action involved
- Page 162 and 163: In Capital Care Corp., the Superior
- Page 164 and 165: The court found, however, to state
- Page 166 and 167: of reasonable diligence. The standa
- Page 168 and 169: not be set aside. On July 7, 2005,
- Page 170 and 171: complete bar to recovery. Since a l
- Page 172 and 173:
On appeal, Plaintiffs claimed that
- Page 174 and 175:
In Liggon-Redding, 659 F.3d at 265,
- Page 176 and 177:
elieved of those minimum standards
- Page 178 and 179:
elevant to the proceedings, the com
- Page 180 and 181:
establish professional misconduct b
- Page 182 and 183:
Upholding the Superior Court’s Or
- Page 184 and 185:
Id.Rejecting revocation and suspens
- Page 186 and 187:
order as a sanction under Rule 4019
- Page 188:
{1009912]182