On appeal, Plaintiffs claimed that they had substantially complied with the certificate ofmerit requirements because two partners in the law firm had outlined the bases for legalmalpractice in the underlying wrongful death suit, and that such an outline satisfied therequirement of a written statement by “an appropriate licensed professional.” In addition,Plaintiffs asserted that verification submitted by their attorney constituted substantial compliancebecause it was served the same function as the certificate of merit. Id.The Superior Court disagreed, reasoning that Plaintiffs’ interpretation of “appropriatelicensed professional” was overly broad in that it would encompass almost every member of thefirm representing appellants, and would allow certification by parties who have a vested interestin the case. Moreover, the court asserted that attorney verifications are not sufficient substitutesfor certificates of merit. Verifications can be submitted by any person with sufficientknowledge, information and belief. Pa. R. Civ. P. 1024(c). Therefore, if verifications wereappropriate substitutes for a certificate of merit, the requirement that the certificate be submittedby an “appropriate licensed professional” would be nullified.In Moore v. John A. Luchsinger, P.C., 862 A.2d 631 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004), the SuperiorCourt determined that a praecipe for non pros cannot be filed for failure to timely file acertificate of merit, or a petition to extend the time for filing, after a certificate of merit hasalready been filed, regardless of whether the certificate was filed late.In Scaramuzza v. Sciolla, 345 F. Supp. 2d 508 (E.D. Pa. 2004), the United States DistrictCourt for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting in diversity, declared that Rule 1042.3 wascontrolling substantive state law. The court further concluded that Plaintiff’s failure to file acertificate of merit within sixty days of filing original complaint did not warrant dismissal withprejudice where Defendants did not show prejudice from the delay and responded to Defendants’motion to dismiss by filing a proper certificate. The court found that Plaintiff was entitled to therelief provided by Rule 3051 (relief from entry of judgment for non pros) and deniedDefendants’ motion to dismiss.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania has held thatRule 1042.7 (Entry of Judgment of Non pros for Failure to File Certification) is procedural innature and thus inapplicable to federal practice. Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure donot provide for a judgment of non pros, the proper procedure in federal court is to treat a motionto dismiss a professional negligence action for failure to comply with Rule 1042.3 as a motion todismiss, without prejudice. Ward v. Knox, McLaughlin, Gornall & Sennett, No. 08-43 Erie,2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20302 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2009).In Cuevas v. U.S., No. 09-43J, 2010 WL 1779690, *3 (W.D. Pa. April 29, 2010), thecourt addressed whether a pro se prisoner plaintiff substantially complied with the certificate ofmerit requirement. The court noted that, in his answers to defendant’s expert interrogatories,plaintiff stated the names of three physicians who would testify as expert witnesses. Id. Plaintifffurther stated in the answer to interrogatories that two physicians would testify that the incidentin question caused plaintiff’s fractures and the third physician would testify that defendant didnot act responsibly in treating plaintiff. Id. The court stated that plaintiff did not produce anywritten report from the physicians. Id. at *4. Further, the court noted that one of the physicians166
submitted a declaration to defendant that she opined that plaintiff received appropriate treatmentfrom defendant. Id. The court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment and explainedthat plaintiff did not set forth a prima facie case of medical malpractice and failed to complywith the certificate of merit requirements. Id.Yet on appeal, Cuevas v. U.S., 422 Fed. Appx. 142 (C.A. 3 Pa. April 6, 2011), theCourt of Appeals, remanded the case to the lower court, holding that because they had notyet determined if the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure regarding malpractice claims,and specifically the certificate of merit requirement, constituted substantive law, it wasuncertain whether the Rules applied to the instant case. 12 Id. at 146. Consequently,whether plaintiff’s claim was foreclosed based upon failure to file a certificate of merit wasnot yet settled. Id. Further, the court reasoned, assuming the Rules did apply, plaintiff’sargument that a certificate of merit was unnecessary tolled the requirement until a judicialruling on the subject was made. Id.In Liggon-Redding v. Estate of Robert Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258 (3d Cir. 2011), theUnited States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found Pennsylvania’s certificate ofmerit statute was substantive law. Although district courts recognized Rule 1042.3 wassubstantive law, no precedential Third Circuit opinion previously addressed the issue. TheCourt applied the Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2000) three-part test todetermine whether the statute was procedural or substantive. The Court found there wasno direct collision between the certificate of merit statute and Federal Rules of CivilProcedure 7, 8, 9, 11 or 41(b). The Court also found failure to apply the certificate of meritstatute would be outcome determinative and failure to apply the statute would “frustratethe twin aims of the [Erie Rail Road v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (138)] Rule: discouragingforum shopping and avoiding inequitable administration of the laws.” Liggon-Redding,659 F.3d at 264. The Court noted that if a plaintiff fails to comply with the statute in statecourt a defendant may file a praecipe for entry of judgment of non pros, which wouldresult in dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims. Id. “Dismissing a claim or case can certainlydetermine the outcome of the matter.” Id. The Court also reasoned failing to apply thestatute in federal court would encourage forum shopping because, if the rule was foundprocedural and inapplicable in federal court, it would theoretically be easier to pursue afrivolous or meritless professional liability cause of action in federal court in diversity orpendent jurisdiction cases than in state courts. Id. Failure to apply the rule also wouldresult in inequitable administration of the law. If the state rule did not apply, a defendantin federal court would be forced to engage in additional litigation and expense in a nonmeritoriousmalpractice suit simply because the plaintiff was from a different state. Id. Inaddition, non-diverse plaintiffs would be required to follow the rule in state court, butdiverse plaintiffs could avoid the rule in federal court. The Court also found there was nocountervailing federal interest that would prevent the application of the rule. Id.12 The Third Circuit in Liggon-Redding v. Estate of Robert Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258 (3d Cir. Oct. 4, 2011),subsequently held that Pennsylvania’s certificate of merit statute was substantive law pursuant to the Eriedoctrine because it did not collide with any relevant Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, was because failing toapply the statute would be outcome-determinative, encourage forum shopping, and lead to inequitableadministration of the laws. 659 F.3d at 262-64. Consequently, as the certificate of merit requirement wassubstantive law, a federal court sitting in diversity in a legal malpractice action was required to apply it. 659F.3d at 264-65.167
- Page 3 and 4:
EMTALA CASES ......................
- Page 5:
Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
- Page 8 and 9:
II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
- Page 10 and 11:
The Superior Court reversed the tri
- Page 12 and 13:
to a third party pursuant to the st
- Page 14 and 15:
After approximately five months, De
- Page 16 and 17:
learned the day after the surgery t
- Page 18 and 19:
conduct to the delay in colon cance
- Page 20 and 21:
court admitted the expert’s testi
- Page 22 and 23:
(b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
- Page 24 and 25:
corroborated his testimony. The cou
- Page 26 and 27:
husband’s estate. Plaintiff alleg
- Page 28 and 29:
Other notable federal cases arising
- Page 30 and 31:
The Superior Court found that in re
- Page 32 and 33:
§ 1303.512(b). The court, however,
- Page 34 and 35:
In Neidig v. United States, No. 07-
- Page 36 and 37:
Additionally, the Supreme Court not
- Page 38 and 39:
were not indicated for her conditio
- Page 40 and 41:
surgeon is the same as it would be
- Page 42 and 43:
It should be noted that the Superio
- Page 44 and 45:
Finally, the court held that the tr
- Page 46 and 47:
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania r
- Page 48 and 49:
nurses deviating from applicable st
- Page 50 and 51:
certainty, the court reviews expert
- Page 52 and 53:
Under Pennsylvania law, the Court n
- Page 54 and 55:
testimony, Defendant presented his
- Page 56 and 57:
Following Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.
- Page 58 and 59:
Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
- Page 60 and 61:
where payment is made by Medicaid w
- Page 62 and 63:
accomplished. In Valles v. Albert E
- Page 64 and 65:
In 1980, the Pennsylvania Superior
- Page 66 and 67:
Plaintiff had a routine monitoring
- Page 68 and 69:
Plaintiff’s Contract ClaimsThe Co
- Page 70 and 71:
is a failure to report changes in a
- Page 72 and 73:
unit to assure post-surgical patien
- Page 74 and 75:
sliced his wrist and arm with a raz
- Page 76 and 77:
licensed professionals for whom the
- Page 78 and 79:
(c)Limitations of Corporate Neglige
- Page 80 and 81:
Even more recently, our Superior Co
- Page 82 and 83:
(a)HMO IssuesIn McClellan v. Health
- Page 84 and 85:
affidavit submitted by Defendants o
- Page 86 and 87:
treatments while at VA’s faciliti
- Page 88 and 89:
[s]ubstantively, we believe that a
- Page 90 and 91:
The party claiming the benefit of t
- Page 92 and 93:
deprive (him) of civil rights guara
- Page 94 and 95:
found that the District Court was w
- Page 96 and 97:
With respect to fraudulent concealm
- Page 98 and 99:
would be applied in situations wher
- Page 100 and 101:
they had not raised them in the cou
- Page 102 and 103:
(a)Informed ConsentUnder MCARE, a p
- Page 104 and 105:
civil enforcement provisions and ma
- Page 106 and 107:
MCARE also changes the manner in wh
- Page 108 and 109:
whose death, in 2005, was allegedly
- Page 110 and 111:
vicariously liable if the plaintiff
- Page 112 and 113:
health center or its equivalent or
- Page 114 and 115:
In Pennsylvania Medical Society, th
- Page 116 and 117:
to any professional who is alleged
- Page 118 and 119:
Since the 2005 amendments, there ha
- Page 120 and 121:
ule, but who intentionally ignores
- Page 122 and 123: the original Complaint was delivere
- Page 124 and 125: foreclose all challenges against th
- Page 126 and 127: number of boxes), which was support
- Page 128 and 129: questions of professional judgment
- Page 130 and 131: deviated from any professional stan
- Page 132 and 133: The Third Circuit affirmed the Dist
- Page 134 and 135: claims and cross-claims remain agai
- Page 136 and 137: By an Amendatory Order dated March
- Page 138 and 139: The court acknowledged that there i
- Page 140 and 141: apply and that the trial court misa
- Page 142 and 143: Barbados had enough litigation-spec
- Page 144 and 145: E. Preemption of Vaccine Design Def
- Page 146 and 147: 2. Pa. R. Civ. Pro. 1036.1 - Reinst
- Page 148 and 149: Barrick, at *34-35.Furthermore, the
- Page 150 and 151: (b) the utility of the defendant’
- Page 152 and 153: 2006). In this case, Plaintiffs bro
- Page 154 and 155: B. Elements of a Cause of Action fo
- Page 156 and 157: decision in Muhammad precluded Mr.
- Page 158 and 159: considered speculative “only if t
- Page 160 and 161: underlying cause of action involved
- Page 162 and 163: In Capital Care Corp., the Superior
- Page 164 and 165: The court found, however, to state
- Page 166 and 167: of reasonable diligence. The standa
- Page 168 and 169: not be set aside. On July 7, 2005,
- Page 170 and 171: complete bar to recovery. Since a l
- Page 174 and 175: In Liggon-Redding, 659 F.3d at 265,
- Page 176 and 177: elieved of those minimum standards
- Page 178 and 179: elevant to the proceedings, the com
- Page 180 and 181: establish professional misconduct b
- Page 182 and 183: Upholding the Superior Court’s Or
- Page 184 and 185: Id.Rejecting revocation and suspens
- Page 186 and 187: order as a sanction under Rule 4019
- Page 188: {1009912]182