health center or its equivalent or an agent thereof,” which the unruly patient was not. In otherwords, the Fund is not required to provide coverage when the alleged injury was the result of atort by a fellow patient.In West Penn Allegheny Health Sys. v. MCARE, No. 101 M.D. 2010, 2010 WL 5156806(Pa. Commw. Ct. Dec. 21, 2010), the Commonwealth Court was called upon to determine theaggregate liability limit under Section 715 extended claims. The MCARE Fund accepted a suitagainst West Penn as an extended claim under section 715. However, the Fund noted that theaggregate limit for that year was $2,700,000 (set by the Malpractice Act and CAT Fund, as thecause of action arose in 1998), and that the Fund would only pay $394,917 of the judgmentagainst West Penn, as that amount would cause the yearly aggregate limit to be met.Section 715 of the MCARE Act sets the Fund’s liability limit in extended claims as$1,000,000 per occurrence. Nowhere is an annual aggregate limit set for extended claims.However, section 712 sets forth both a per occurrence limit and an annual aggregate limit forMCARE’s normal excess coverage claims. The Fund argued that extended claims are subject tosection 712’s aggregate yearly limit, while West Penn argued that they are not, and that MCAREmust pay the $1,000,000 per occurrence limit in this judgment against West Penn.The court agreed with West Penn, finding that the Pennsylvania General Assemblycreated a difference between excess and extended claims. The court looked to the CAT Fund’sper occurrence and annual aggregate liability limits, and found that while the limits were set outfor excess claims, no limits were set out for extended claims, which meant that to find theliability limits for extended claims under the CAT Fund, one had to look to the excess claimslimits. The court noted that MCARE differs from the Malpractice Act’s CAT Fund, in thatSection 712 of MCARE sets forth per occurrence and annual aggregate limits for excesscoverage claims, but Section 715 also sets forth a per occurrence limit for extended claims,which is different than the per occurrence limit for excess claims. Therefore, the court concludedthat, “unlike in the Malpractice Act, there is no need to resort to Section 712 to find limits onliability for extended claims,” and that an annual aggregate liability limit for excess claims doesnot apply to extended claims, so the Fund is required to pay the full $1,000,000 towardssatisfying the judgment against West Penn.Also, for the Fund to provide section 715 coverage, the Fund must receive a writtenrequest for coverage within 180 days of an eligible provider’s first notice of the claim. TheCommonwealth Court examined whether a Writ of Summons constitutes adequate notice to aprovider by which the 180 day statutory period begins to run. See Cope v. Ins. Comm’r of theCommw., 955 A.2d 1043 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008). In Cope, the eligible healthcare provider wasserved with a Writ of Summons containing no factual information. See id. Approximatelynineteen months later, on February 1, 2006, Plaintiffs filed and served a professional liabilityComplaint alleging malpractice between April and June, 2000. See id. On February 12, 2006,the Fund received an MCARE claim from the provider requesting section 715 coverage. See id.The Fund denied coverage on the basis that the provider had not notified it of the claim withinthe timeframe required by section 715. See id. The provider appealed this decision.At issue before the Commonwealth Court was whether the Fund erred as a matter of lawin finding that the medical provider’s 180-day statutory period to request section 715 benefits106
egan to run upon service of a bare writ of summons. See id. at 1047. In addressing this issue,the court first looked to the language of section 715. See id. at 1049. The court found that insection 715, the language “the claim” refers specifically to a medical malpractice claim subjectto section 715 coverage. Id. The court contrasted the language of section 715 with that ofsection 714, which refers to “any claim.” See id. at 1050. Because the legislature used “theclaim” in section 715, the court determined that the statutory time period begins to run when theprovider is first given notice that “the claim” against him is eligible for section 715 coverage. Id.Thus, the court held that the 180-day reporting period under section 715 does not begin to rununtil a provider receives notice that the claim against him is eligible for section 715 coverage,which, the court held, is not provided by a bare Writ of Summons. The bare Writ of Summonsdoes not provide enough information for a provider to determine whether or not the claim iseligible for section 715 coverage and will not start the 180-day statutory reporting period. Id. at1052; see also Upper Bucks Orthopedic Ass’n v. Ins. Comm’r of the Commw. of Pa., 2008 Pa.Commw. LEXIS 387 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Aug. 18, 2008).MCARE also ensures that all health care providers may be afforded access to malpracticeinsurance through the creation of the Pennsylvania Liability Joint Underwriting Association. 40Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1303.731. It is the purpose of the Joint Underwriting Association to offermalpractice insurance to physicians who cannot conveniently obtain insurance at reasonablerates through ordinary methods. Id. The Joint Underwriting Association is comprised of allinsurers authorized to write malpractice insurance in the Commonwealth. Id.The Pennsylvania Senate voted in early November of 2007 to approve Senate Bill 1137,which would extend the MCARE abatement program for another year, while also preparing forits eventual elimination. The MCARE abatement program was subsequently repealed. Act ofOct. 9, 2009, Pub. L. 537, No. 2009-50. According to the Pennsylvania InsuranceDepartment website, “[t]o date, legislation authorizing abatement of the MCAREassessment has not been enacted.” Pa. Ins. Dept., Expired Abatement Program,http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/additional_resources/12990/expired_abatement_program/608424 (last visited January 4, <strong>2012</strong>).The Commonwealth Court has addressed two cases dealing with the Act of October 9,2009, and issued both opinions on April 15, 2010. Hospital and HealthSystem Association ofPennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 997 A.2d 392 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010); Pennsylvania MedicalSociety v. Department of Public Welfare, 994 A.2d 33 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010). Hospital dealtwith the transfer of $100 million from the MCARE Fund to the General Fund pursuant toOctober 9, 2009’s Act No. 2009-50. After the Treasury Department effectuated the transfer,petitioners filed an application for summary relief, based on § 712(k) of the MCARE Act, whichstated that when the MCARE Fund was phased out, any money remaining in the Fund would bereturned to participating health care providers. After finding that the petitioners had standing tobring their claim, the Court found that they had a vested right in the monies in the MCARE Fundbased on § 712(k)’s “guarantee that . . . the money was to be returned to the contributing healthcare providers” when the Fund was phased out. (emphasis added). The court therefore grantedpetitioners’ application for summary relief, and held that the transfer of money from the MCAREFund to the General Fund was unlawful since it interfered with petitioner’s vested right to themoney once the MCARE Fund is phased out.107
- Page 3 and 4:
EMTALA CASES ......................
- Page 5:
Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
- Page 8 and 9:
II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
- Page 10 and 11:
The Superior Court reversed the tri
- Page 12 and 13:
to a third party pursuant to the st
- Page 14 and 15:
After approximately five months, De
- Page 16 and 17:
learned the day after the surgery t
- Page 18 and 19:
conduct to the delay in colon cance
- Page 20 and 21:
court admitted the expert’s testi
- Page 22 and 23:
(b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
- Page 24 and 25:
corroborated his testimony. The cou
- Page 26 and 27:
husband’s estate. Plaintiff alleg
- Page 28 and 29:
Other notable federal cases arising
- Page 30 and 31:
The Superior Court found that in re
- Page 32 and 33:
§ 1303.512(b). The court, however,
- Page 34 and 35:
In Neidig v. United States, No. 07-
- Page 36 and 37:
Additionally, the Supreme Court not
- Page 38 and 39:
were not indicated for her conditio
- Page 40 and 41:
surgeon is the same as it would be
- Page 42 and 43:
It should be noted that the Superio
- Page 44 and 45:
Finally, the court held that the tr
- Page 46 and 47:
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania r
- Page 48 and 49:
nurses deviating from applicable st
- Page 50 and 51:
certainty, the court reviews expert
- Page 52 and 53:
Under Pennsylvania law, the Court n
- Page 54 and 55:
testimony, Defendant presented his
- Page 56 and 57:
Following Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.
- Page 58 and 59:
Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
- Page 60 and 61:
where payment is made by Medicaid w
- Page 62 and 63: accomplished. In Valles v. Albert E
- Page 64 and 65: In 1980, the Pennsylvania Superior
- Page 66 and 67: Plaintiff had a routine monitoring
- Page 68 and 69: Plaintiff’s Contract ClaimsThe Co
- Page 70 and 71: is a failure to report changes in a
- Page 72 and 73: unit to assure post-surgical patien
- Page 74 and 75: sliced his wrist and arm with a raz
- Page 76 and 77: licensed professionals for whom the
- Page 78 and 79: (c)Limitations of Corporate Neglige
- Page 80 and 81: Even more recently, our Superior Co
- Page 82 and 83: (a)HMO IssuesIn McClellan v. Health
- Page 84 and 85: affidavit submitted by Defendants o
- Page 86 and 87: treatments while at VA’s faciliti
- Page 88 and 89: [s]ubstantively, we believe that a
- Page 90 and 91: The party claiming the benefit of t
- Page 92 and 93: deprive (him) of civil rights guara
- Page 94 and 95: found that the District Court was w
- Page 96 and 97: With respect to fraudulent concealm
- Page 98 and 99: would be applied in situations wher
- Page 100 and 101: they had not raised them in the cou
- Page 102 and 103: (a)Informed ConsentUnder MCARE, a p
- Page 104 and 105: civil enforcement provisions and ma
- Page 106 and 107: MCARE also changes the manner in wh
- Page 108 and 109: whose death, in 2005, was allegedly
- Page 110 and 111: vicariously liable if the plaintiff
- Page 114 and 115: In Pennsylvania Medical Society, th
- Page 116 and 117: to any professional who is alleged
- Page 118 and 119: Since the 2005 amendments, there ha
- Page 120 and 121: ule, but who intentionally ignores
- Page 122 and 123: the original Complaint was delivere
- Page 124 and 125: foreclose all challenges against th
- Page 126 and 127: number of boxes), which was support
- Page 128 and 129: questions of professional judgment
- Page 130 and 131: deviated from any professional stan
- Page 132 and 133: The Third Circuit affirmed the Dist
- Page 134 and 135: claims and cross-claims remain agai
- Page 136 and 137: By an Amendatory Order dated March
- Page 138 and 139: The court acknowledged that there i
- Page 140 and 141: apply and that the trial court misa
- Page 142 and 143: Barbados had enough litigation-spec
- Page 144 and 145: E. Preemption of Vaccine Design Def
- Page 146 and 147: 2. Pa. R. Civ. Pro. 1036.1 - Reinst
- Page 148 and 149: Barrick, at *34-35.Furthermore, the
- Page 150 and 151: (b) the utility of the defendant’
- Page 152 and 153: 2006). In this case, Plaintiffs bro
- Page 154 and 155: B. Elements of a Cause of Action fo
- Page 156 and 157: decision in Muhammad precluded Mr.
- Page 158 and 159: considered speculative “only if t
- Page 160 and 161: underlying cause of action involved
- Page 162 and 163:
In Capital Care Corp., the Superior
- Page 164 and 165:
The court found, however, to state
- Page 166 and 167:
of reasonable diligence. The standa
- Page 168 and 169:
not be set aside. On July 7, 2005,
- Page 170 and 171:
complete bar to recovery. Since a l
- Page 172 and 173:
On appeal, Plaintiffs claimed that
- Page 174 and 175:
In Liggon-Redding, 659 F.3d at 265,
- Page 176 and 177:
elieved of those minimum standards
- Page 178 and 179:
elevant to the proceedings, the com
- Page 180 and 181:
establish professional misconduct b
- Page 182 and 183:
Upholding the Superior Court’s Or
- Page 184 and 185:
Id.Rejecting revocation and suspens
- Page 186 and 187:
order as a sanction under Rule 4019
- Page 188:
{1009912]182