2012 PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY UPDATE - Eckert Seamans

treatments while at VA’s facilities, including medication, group therapy sessions and one-on-onecounseling.After about five months, Decedent was transferred to Landing Zone II TransitionalResidence (“LZ”), a privately run organization located on VA’s grounds and to which VAprovides medical and psychiatric services. Decedent was involved in an altercation with anotherLZ resident in which he wielded a knife. As a result, LZ and VA decided to discharge Decedent.VA had an opportunity to commit Decedent but ignored warning signs of Decedent’s imminentphysiologic breakdown. Within a day of being discharged, decedent shot and killed two of hischildren, two of the neighbor’s children, and then killed himself.Plaintiffs brought suit asserting claims, among others, of gross negligence, failure to warnand negligent infliction of emotional distress. After a bench trial, the trial court grantedDefendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to the failure to warn claim, finding thata mental healthcare provider only has a duty to warn if a patient communicates a specific andimmediate threat of serious bodily injury against a specifically identified or readily identifiablethird party. With regard to the remaining claims, the trial court entered judgment for Plaintiffs.On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The court, relying onEmerich found that Decedent never communicated a specific threat of immediate harm.Accordingly, the court found that Defendants did not have a duty to warn. With regard to thescope of other duties the VA may have owed to the victim children, the Third Circuit agreed withthe District Court’s conclusions that: 1) liability could not be based on a Pennsylvania commonlawduty owed to the victims; 2) the MHPA created a duty to the third-party victims, and 3) theVA had been grossly negligent and so had violated this duty. See also Francis v.Northumberland Cty., 636 F. Supp. 2d. 368 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (holding a psychiatrist could beheld liable for malpractice in relation to inmate’s death by suicide and was not entitled toqualified immunity under MHPA where jury could find that psychiatrist acted with “recklessindifference” with respect to prison’s suicide prevention protocol).In Bayer v. Monroe County Children and Youth Services, 557 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2009),the mother of minor children who were removed from her custody brought a section 1983 claimagainst Monroe County Children and Youth Services (“MCCYS”) and two MCCYS employees,alleging that her due process rights were violated after a dependency hearing regarding herchildren’s custody was held more than seventy-two hours after removal. At the close ofdiscovery, the MCCYS employees filed motions for summary judgment on grounds of qualifiedand absolute immunity and argued that they could not be held liable to Plaintiff as a matter oflaw. The trial court denied both motions and the MCCYS employees appealed.On appeal, the Third Circuit noted that “[t]he doctrine of qualified immunity protectsgovernment officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violateclearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would haveknown.’” Bayer, 557 F. 3d at 191 (citing Pearson v. Calhoun, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172L.Ed.2d. 565 (2009)). Examining the facts of record, the court held that the actions of theMCCYS employees, including the filing and processing of the necessary paperwork for thedependency hearing, were reasonable under the framework set forth by the United States80