considered speculative “only if the uncertainty concerns the fact of damages, rather than theamount.” Rizzo v. Haines, 555 A.2d 58 (Pa. 1989) (quoting Pashak v. Barish, 450 A.2d 67, 69(Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).In Ammon v. McCloskey, 655 A.2d 549 (1995), appeal denied, 670 A.2d 139 (Pa. 1995),the court held that Plaintiff in a legal malpractice action could prove economic harm simply byshowing that judgment had been entered against him in the underlying case. Under Rizzo v.Haines, a case in which the recovery was lost by the attorney’s acts or omissions, a successfullegal malpractice plaintiff is entitled to receive as damages the difference between the actualrecovery and what would have been recovered absent attorney negligence. Rizzo, 555 A.2d at68-69.In Carnegie Mellon University v. Schwartz, 105 F.3d 863 (3d Cir. 1997), the ThirdCircuit reiterated that under Pennsylvania law, an action for professional negligence requiresproof of actual loss. Relying on Duke & Co., the court concluded that “the mere breach of aprofessional duty, causing only nominal damages, speculative harm or threat of future harm, notyet realized, does not suffice to create a cause of action for negligence.” See also Int’l LandAcquisitions, Inc. v. Fausto, 39 Fed. Appx. 751, (3d Cir. 2002) (not precedential) (to show actualdamages, Plaintiff must prove that he had a viable cause of action against the party he wished tosue in the underlying case).In Kituskie v. Corbman, 714 A.2d 1027 (Pa. 1998), the Pennsylvania Supreme Courtreiterated the rule that a Plaintiff in a legal malpractice action can only be compensated for hisactual losses. Such losses “are measured by the judgment the Plaintiff lost in the underlyingaction.” Id. at 1030.In Trauma Service Group. P.C. v. Hunter, MacLean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., No. 99-CV-5979, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3712 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2000), Plaintiff was a medical providerthat had hired Defendant law firm as local counsel to help defend a medical malpractice action.The law firm, in the course of the defense, prepared a motion for summary judgment, which wasgranted and all claims against the medical provider were thereby dismissed.Subsequently, a dispute arose about the law firm’s bill, which the medical provider atfirst promised to pay, but then did not. The law firm eventually obtained a judgment for its fees,but the medical provider then filed a suit against the firm alleging negligence, fraud and breachof contract. The District Court ruled, however, that the negligence claim was barred by thestatute of limitations, and that the breach of contract claim was meritless. Furthermore, the Courtnoted that Plaintiff’s malpractice action must fail because “[Plaintiff] cannot prove that it wouldhave prevailed in the [underlying] action because it did prevail, a fact which would appear toyield the logical conclusion that no malpractice occurred.” Id. at *10. Summary judgment wasentered in favor of Defendant law firm.To sustain a malpractice claim against his trial counsel, a criminal defendant must firstsecure post-conviction relief and demonstrate his actual innocence. Hull v. Mallon, et al., No.00-5698, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12758 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2001). However, a breach of contractclaim may still prove viable for a criminal defendant who has not secured post-conviction relief.Bailey v. Tucker, 621 A.2d 108 (Pa. 1993).152
In Abood v. Gulf Group Lloyds, No. 3:2007-299, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51406 (W.D.Pa. July 1, 2008), the court addressed whether a declaratory judgment action brought by anattorney against his insurer, regarding the applicability of malpractice insurance coverage,exceeded the federal jurisdictional requirement that the amount in controversy exceed $75,000.The court determined there were three categories of damages presented in the malpracticeinsurance coverage dispute that could be included in calculating the amount in controversy. Thecourt stated the first category of damages is limited to the amount Plaintiff could have won in theunderlying lawsuit, but for the negligence of the attorney. The second category of damages isthe cost necessary to defend the malpractice action. The court explained the cost necessary todefend the malpractice action could only be included in the calculation of the amount incontroversy if the costs were a “necessary part of the amount in controversy.” (quoting Suber v.Chrysler Corp., 104 F.3d 578, 585 (3d Cir. 1997)). The court explained the costs of litigationinclude the costs for attorney’s fees, expert’s fees, depositions, and other trial-related costs. Thethird and final category of damages includes the cost of other benefits provided by theprofessional liability insurance policy. The court noted the professional liability policy includeda provision providing payment for lost wages due to time off from work to assist in the defenseof the claim. The court held that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000 for jurisdictionalpurposes, reasoning that through the three sources of money, “it cannot be shown to a legalcertainty that the jurisdictional amount will not exceed $75,000.” (citing St. Paul MercuryIndem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938)).In Giesler v. 1531 Pine St. Ass’n, L.P., 2010 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 152 (Feb. 2,2010) the court held that an attorney could not be joined as a defendant in the instant actionbecause that action, in which the client was a defendant, would determine whether the clientsuffered an actual loss. As no liability had yet been found, nor any damages yet assessed, joinderof the attorney was inappropriate. The court noted that Defendant was not precluded from filinga separate legal malpractice claim at a later time.In General Nutrition Corp. v. Gardere Wynne Sewell, LLP., No. 2:08-cv-831, 2010 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 73654 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 2010), Plaintiff alleged that it had entered into asettlement agreement based on faulty advice of the defendant attorneys. The Court grantedsummary judgment in favor of Defendants based on the fact that a separate corporate entity hadpaid the settlement on behalf of Plaintiff and that no reimbursement would ever be made. TheCourt reasoned that because reimbursement of the settlement funds would never be made thatplaintiff never suffered an “actual loss”.In Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Law Firm of Richard M. Squire & Assoc., LLC,No. 10-1415, 2011 WL 1810603 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 2011), the court found that an essentialelement in a legal malpractice claim, whether the action is in trespass or assumpsit, is proofof actual loss. The court found to prove actual loss the plaintiffs were required to establishthey would have recovered a judgment in the underlying action but for the defendant’sactions. The court found the plaintiff failed to establish they would have recovered ajudgment, as the plaintiffs offered “little more than assertions that the damages are‘liquidated’ in the amount of the lost deficiency.”In Coleman v. Duane Morris, LLP, No. 0917, 2011 WL 5838278 (C.P. Phila. Nov. 4,2011), the plaintiffs did not pay the attorney fees in the underlying cause of action. The153
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EMTALA CASES ......................
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Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
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II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
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The Superior Court reversed the tri
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to a third party pursuant to the st
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After approximately five months, De
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learned the day after the surgery t
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conduct to the delay in colon cance
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court admitted the expert’s testi
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(b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
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corroborated his testimony. The cou
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husband’s estate. Plaintiff alleg
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Other notable federal cases arising
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The Superior Court found that in re
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§ 1303.512(b). The court, however,
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In Neidig v. United States, No. 07-
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Additionally, the Supreme Court not
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were not indicated for her conditio
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surgeon is the same as it would be
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It should be noted that the Superio
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Finally, the court held that the tr
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania r
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nurses deviating from applicable st
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certainty, the court reviews expert
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Under Pennsylvania law, the Court n
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testimony, Defendant presented his
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Following Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.
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Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
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where payment is made by Medicaid w
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accomplished. In Valles v. Albert E
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In 1980, the Pennsylvania Superior
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Plaintiff had a routine monitoring
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Plaintiff’s Contract ClaimsThe Co
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is a failure to report changes in a
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unit to assure post-surgical patien
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sliced his wrist and arm with a raz
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licensed professionals for whom the
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(c)Limitations of Corporate Neglige
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Even more recently, our Superior Co
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(a)HMO IssuesIn McClellan v. Health
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affidavit submitted by Defendants o
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treatments while at VA’s faciliti
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[s]ubstantively, we believe that a
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The party claiming the benefit of t
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deprive (him) of civil rights guara
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found that the District Court was w
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With respect to fraudulent concealm
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would be applied in situations wher
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they had not raised them in the cou
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(a)Informed ConsentUnder MCARE, a p
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civil enforcement provisions and ma
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MCARE also changes the manner in wh
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