is a failure to report changes in a patient’s condition and/or toquestion a physician’s orders which is not in accord with standardmedical practice and the patient is injured as a result, the hospitalwill be liable for such negligence.Id. at n.13.The Welsh court did not require a showing of “systemic” negligence by the hospitalDefendant in order to establish corporate liability.In Krapf v. St. Luke’s Hospital, 4. A.3d 642 (Pa. Super 2010), the plaintiffs, on behalf ofthe estates of five (5) decedents, filed wrongful death and survival actions against the defendanthospital. By way of background, a critical care unit (“CCU”) nurse employed by the defendanthospital raised suspicion of harming patients by administering various intravenous medicationswithout authorization. Id. at 645. A nursing manager initially investigated the situation afterused and unused medications were found in a trash receptacle. Id. The hospital’s attorneyinvestigated. Id. During his investigation, employees raised concern about Nurse Cullen, but theattorney completed his investigation without interviewing Nurse Cullen or identifying the culprit.Id. Additional used and unused medications were found two (2) days later in another location.Id. The hospital’s risk manager informed the attorney and advised him that Nurse Cullen may beto blame. Id. The attorney confronted Nurse Cullen and, despite denying the allegations, NurseCullen resigned. Id. at 645-646. The hospital’s attorney investigated into whether any patientswere harmed by the improperly administered medications and, based upon his investigation,apparently was confident that no patients were harmed. Id. at 646. Despite the attorney’sfindings, various nurses raised concerns about an unusually high number of patient deaths duringNurse Cullen’s shift to the attorney, as well as the hospital’s Clinical Care Coordinator and theCCU Nursing Manager. Id. at 646-647. Their concerns apparently were met with resistance andultimately ignored. Id. at 647.Approximately a year and a half later, Nurse Cullen was fired when his new employerhad suspicion of inappropriate patient care. Id. In response to questioning by police, NurseCullen confessed to killing a number of patients, including the plaintiffs’ decedents. Id. Theplaintiffs subsequently filed suit against the hospital, alleging inter alia, corporate negligence.The hospital moved for summary judgment arguing that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by thestatute of limitations. Id. at 648. The motion was denied. Id. The hospital appealed. Id.In affirming the denial of summary judgment, the Superior Court addressed thesufficiency of the plaintiffs’ corporate negligence claims. The Superior Court noted that[c]orporate negligence is a doctrine under which the hospital is liable if itfails to uphold the proper standard of care owed the patient, which is toensure the patient’s safety and well-being while at the hospital. Thistheory of liability creates a nondelegable duty which the hospital owesdirectly to the patient. Therefore, an injured party does not have to rely onand establish the negligence of a third party.64
The hospital’s duties have been classified into four general areas: (1) aduty to use reasonable care in the maintenance of safe and adequatefacilities and equipment; (2) a duty to select and retain only competentphysicians; (3) a duty to oversee all persons who practice medicine withinits walls as to patient care; and (4) a duty to formulate, adopt and enforceadequate rules and policies to ensure quality care for the patients.Id. at 651 (citing Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 527 Pa. 330, 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991)). Inexplaining the hospital’s duties, the court stated that hospital staff and employees have “[a] dutyto recognize and report abnormalities in the treatment and condition of [their] patients.” Id.(citing Thompson, supra). A hospital may be held liable for a breach of the Thompson dutieswhere it has constructive notice – “should have known” – but fails to act. Id. at 653. Moreover,[c]onstructive notice must be imposed when the failure to receive actualnotice is caused by the absence of supervision. We interpret “failure toenforce adequate rules and policies” as an analog to “failure to provideadequate supervision.”Id. The court concluded that the facts of record, specifically the testimony of the nurse whoclaimed that their concerns went ignored by hospital supervisors charged with investigating thesituation, support the application of constructive notice. Id.In Davis v. Frederick, 2010 WL 3566833 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2010), the plaintiffs filed amedical malpractice action against the physician and hospital arising out of allegedly negligenttreatment of the plaintiff’s decedent. The plaintiffs set forth, intra alia, claims of corporateliability against the hospital defendant. Id. at *1. The defendant hospital filed a Motion toDismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. In its motion, the defendantargued that the plaintiffs failed to plead sufficient facts to support a claim of corporatenegligence. Id. at *2. In addressing the defendant’s motion, the district court noted that “[u]nderPennsylvania law, corporate negligence is a basis for hospital liability separate from the liabilityof the practitioners who actually have rendered medical care to a patient.” Id. (internal citationsand quotations omitted). The court noted the four (4) discrete areas of a hospital’s generalcorporate duties as first recognized in Thompson. Id. Upon examining the plaintiffs’ Complaint,the court found that the claim for corporate negligence was properly pled. Id. The courtexplained that the Complaint alleged that the hospital defendant[failed] to insure that physician personnel and resident physicianspracticing at [the defendant hospital] and participating in [the plaintiff’s]treatment and care were appropriately knowledgeable, experienced, andtrained in the management, diagnosis, treatment, treatment options andindications for gall bladder surgical intervention and complications fromthese medical conditions; [failed] to implement adequate policies andprocedures for discharge and follow-up of patients having outpatientabdominal surgery; and [failed] to formulate, adopt and enforce policiesand procedures for adequate evaluations in the post-operative recovery65
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EMTALA CASES ......................
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Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
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II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
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The Superior Court reversed the tri
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to a third party pursuant to the st
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After approximately five months, De
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learned the day after the surgery t
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conduct to the delay in colon cance
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- Page 52 and 53: Under Pennsylvania law, the Court n
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- Page 56 and 57: Following Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.
- Page 58 and 59: Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
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- Page 62 and 63: accomplished. In Valles v. Albert E
- Page 64 and 65: In 1980, the Pennsylvania Superior
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ule, but who intentionally ignores
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the original Complaint was delivere
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foreclose all challenges against th
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number of boxes), which was support
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questions of professional judgment
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deviated from any professional stan
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The Third Circuit affirmed the Dist
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claims and cross-claims remain agai
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By an Amendatory Order dated March
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The court acknowledged that there i
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apply and that the trial court misa
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Barbados had enough litigation-spec
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E. Preemption of Vaccine Design Def
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2. Pa. R. Civ. Pro. 1036.1 - Reinst
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Barrick, at *34-35.Furthermore, the
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(b) the utility of the defendant’
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2006). In this case, Plaintiffs bro
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B. Elements of a Cause of Action fo
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decision in Muhammad precluded Mr.
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considered speculative “only if t
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underlying cause of action involved
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In Capital Care Corp., the Superior
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The court found, however, to state
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of reasonable diligence. The standa
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not be set aside. On July 7, 2005,
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complete bar to recovery. Since a l
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On appeal, Plaintiffs claimed that
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In Liggon-Redding, 659 F.3d at 265,
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elieved of those minimum standards
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elevant to the proceedings, the com
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establish professional misconduct b
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Upholding the Superior Court’s Or
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Id.Rejecting revocation and suspens
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order as a sanction under Rule 4019
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