not be set aside. On July 7, 2005, the Court granted the motion to set aside the agreementand subjected the plaintiff’s assets to an equitable distribution hearing. On July 28, 2006,the plaintiff met with defendant Downey to discuss a legal malpractice action against theConnelly defendants. On October 26, 2006, Downey sent a letter to the Connellydefendants indicating they committed malpractice, informing the Connelly defendants toinform their insurance carrier, and stating the statute of limitations began to run on July 7,2005, the date of the judge’s order. On March 30, 2007, the plaintiff signed an officialagreement to file suit, but Downey did not file the lawsuit. On February 25, 2008, Downeysent the plaintiff a letter terminating the representation because the two-year statute oflimitations began to run on August 2, 2004, the date of the hearing, and, therefore, itexpired on August 2, 2006, before the plaintiff met with Downey. The plaintiff filed suit onJuly 6, 2009 against the Connelly defendants and against Downey alleging legalmalpractice. Downey filed a motion for summary judgment alleging the statute oflimitations barred any cause of action against the Connelly defendants, and, therefore, thelegal malpractice claim against Downey failed as a matter of law. The district courtapplied the occurrence rule, and found the claim barred by the statute of limitation, whichbegan to run on August 2, 2004, the date of the hearing. The Third Circuit reversed,finding the discovery rule applied and the statute of limitations did not begin to run untilJuly 7, 2005, the date of the order.The court noted that “under the occurrence rule, ‘the statutory period commencesupon the happening of the alleged breach of duty.’” Knopick, 639 F.3d at 607 (citingWachovia Bank N.A. v. Ferretti, 935 A.2d 565, 572 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007)). “Where aplaintiff could not reasonably have discovered his injury or its cause, however,Pennsylvania courts have applied the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations.” Id.(citing Wachovia, 935 A.2d at 572–74). If the discovery rule applies, the statute oflimitations begins to run when the plaintiff knew or in the exercise of reasonable diligenceshould have known of the injury and its cause. Id. (citing Crouse v. Cyclops Indus., 745A.2d 606, 611 (2000)). The court noted the discovery rule is “grounded on considerationsof basic fairness.” Id. (quoting Taylor v. Tukanowicz, 435 A.2d 181, 183 (1981)).The court outlined cases in which the discovery rule applied, including medicalmalpractice claims. It noted the principle for the discovery rule’s applicability in medicalmalpractice claims, i.e., that the plaintiff is not held responsible for knowing of an injuryuntil the abnormal condition manifests itself, is applicable in the context of legalmalpractice. Id. at 609. The court noted Pennsylvania courts and federal courts applyingPennsylvania law have applied the discovery rule to legal malpractice causes of action. Id.Courts apply the discovery rule where “the injured party is unable, despite the exercise ofdue diligence, to know of his injury or its cause.” Id. It is applied where requiring theplaintiff’s knowledge would be unreasonable and it tolls the statute until the plaintiff is putin a position to discover the injury or its cause. The court noted knowledge can be imputedwhere an adverse action is taken against the plaintiff.The court noted the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not addressed the discoveryrule’s applicability to legal malpractice actions in a civil suit. It analyzed the PennsylvaniaSuperior Court decisions discussing the rule’s applicability in the civil context as well as162
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s discussion of the discovery rule in medical malpracticecases.The court noted that “[o]f critical importance in this case is the distinction betweenthe act constituting the alleged breach—the Connelly Defendants’ failure to call witnesses,which would start the statute under the occurrence rule—and the injury that flowed fromthis failure, constructive knowledge of which would trigger the statute of limitations underthe discovery rule.” Id. at 615. The court found, although it is undisputed the plaintiffknew the witnesses were not called, “it remains in dispute, and a question . . . a jury shoulddecide, when [the plaintiff] knew that he was injured as a result of the witnesses not beingcalled.” The court concluded “reasonable minds could disagree in determining whetherKnopick knew or should have known, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, of hisalleged injury as early as August 2, 2004, the date of the hearing.” Id. at 616.K. Contributory Negligence DefenseIn KBF Associates L.P. v. Saul Ewing Remick & Saul, 35 Pa. D. & C. 4th 1 (Phila. Cty.Ct. Com. Pl. 1998), the court, per Judge Bernstein, held that contributory negligence is not aviable defense in a legal malpractice action. In KBF, Plaintiff-client alleged that Defendant lawfirm was negligent in failing to advise them of a late fee incurred by the postponement of a bondredemption, which was part of a larger and complex bond reoffering transaction. Defendant lawfirm asked the court “to rule that a client may be barred from suing his attorney for malpracticewith respect to errors within the scope of the attorney’s engagement where it can bedemonstrated that the client had the capability and expertise to have independently determinedthe error.” Id. at 3. The court found no support in Pennsylvania law for such a proposition andsoundly rejected it. Citing cases from other jurisdictions, the court reasoned as follows:Id. at 5, 7-8.[T]he [instant] legal malpractice action cannot be defended on thebasis of contributory negligence upon the allegation that the clientitself was sophisticated enough to do its own legal work andcorrect the error.* * *The Plaintiff had a right to rely on the advice of experienced bondcounsel without the risk that the consequences of Defendants’negligence would be shifted to the partnership because of thesophistication or experience of its general partner. . . Counsel maynot shift to the client the legal responsibility it was specificallyhired to undertake because of its superior knowledge.However, in Gorski v. Smith, et al., 812 A.2d 683 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002), appeal denied,856 A.2d 834 (Pa. 2004), the Pennsylvania Superior Court adopted the rule that the negligence ofa client may be raised as an affirmative defense by an attorney in a legal malpractice action thatis based on a theory of negligence. The client’s negligence, once proven, will serve as a163
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EMTALA CASES ......................
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Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
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II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
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The Superior Court reversed the tri
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to a third party pursuant to the st
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After approximately five months, De
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learned the day after the surgery t
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conduct to the delay in colon cance
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court admitted the expert’s testi
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(b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
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corroborated his testimony. The cou
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husband’s estate. Plaintiff alleg
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Other notable federal cases arising
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The Superior Court found that in re
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§ 1303.512(b). The court, however,
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In Neidig v. United States, No. 07-
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Additionally, the Supreme Court not
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were not indicated for her conditio
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surgeon is the same as it would be
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It should be noted that the Superio
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Finally, the court held that the tr
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania r
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nurses deviating from applicable st
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certainty, the court reviews expert
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Under Pennsylvania law, the Court n
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testimony, Defendant presented his
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Following Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.
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Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
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where payment is made by Medicaid w
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accomplished. In Valles v. Albert E
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In 1980, the Pennsylvania Superior
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Plaintiff had a routine monitoring
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Plaintiff’s Contract ClaimsThe Co
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is a failure to report changes in a
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unit to assure post-surgical patien
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sliced his wrist and arm with a raz
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licensed professionals for whom the
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(c)Limitations of Corporate Neglige
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Even more recently, our Superior Co
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(a)HMO IssuesIn McClellan v. Health
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affidavit submitted by Defendants o
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treatments while at VA’s faciliti
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[s]ubstantively, we believe that a
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The party claiming the benefit of t
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deprive (him) of civil rights guara
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found that the District Court was w
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With respect to fraudulent concealm
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would be applied in situations wher
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they had not raised them in the cou
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(a)Informed ConsentUnder MCARE, a p
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civil enforcement provisions and ma
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MCARE also changes the manner in wh
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whose death, in 2005, was allegedly
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vicariously liable if the plaintiff
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health center or its equivalent or
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In Pennsylvania Medical Society, th
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to any professional who is alleged
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