affidavit submitted by Defendants of Amy Helmuth, R.N., the administrator of peer reviewactivity within the hospital, established that the documents in question were generatedexclusively for peer review purposes and were maintained exclusively with peer review files.Therefore the court held that the trial court erred in ordering production of the documents as theysquarely fell within the protection of the Peer Review Protection Act. The court stated that thepurpose of the Peer Review Protection Act is to facilitate comprehensive, honest and potentiallycritical evaluations of medical professionals by their peers. Documents used in the determinationof staff privileges are the type of documents the legislature contemplated when drafting the PeerReview Protection Act.It should be noted that the mere utilization of records in peer review proceedings will notautomatically result in preventing a plaintiff from obtaining discovery of those records from theiroriginal sources. PRPA, 63 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 425.4 provides in pertinent part that:information, documents or records otherwise available from originalsources are not to be construed as immune from discovery or use inany such civil action merely because they were presented duringproceedings of such committee . . . .See, Ellison v. Women & Children’s Hosp. of Buffalo, C.A. No. 08-313 Erie, 2010 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 130828 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2010) (“The PRPA does not protect “information, documentsor records otherwise available from original sources” or “non-peer review business records, evenif those records eventually are used by a peer review committee.”), citing, Dodson v. Deleo,2005 PA Super 137, 872 A.2d 1237, 1242-43 (Pa. Super. 2005).(c)The PRPA Does Not Bar Discovery of Committee Audiotape inPhysician Action for Alleged Misuse of Peer ReviewIn Hayes v. Mercy Health Care Corp., 739 A.2d 114 (1999), the Supreme Court ofPennsylvania affirmed in part a trial court order permitting a physician to obtain throughdiscovery an audiotape of a hospital medical board in staff privilege litigation. The physicianclaimed that members of the board acted with ulterior motives and marred his record. TheSupreme Court ruled that in the context of this physician’s case, the committee tape was notprivileged under the PRPA. The court stated in dicta that the privilege would apply where thepatient sued the physician or hospital for negligence.IV.MENTAL HEALTH LAWA. Qualified Immunity StandardMental health providers are entitled to statutory based qualified immunity pursuant to theMental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”). 50 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7101 et. seq. Under the MHPA,providers are immune from both civil and criminal liability absent a showing of gross negligenceor willful misconduct for any decisions related to a patient’s treatment. Recent decisions fromthe Supreme Court of Pennsylvania set forth the legal elements required to state liability againsta mental health provider.78
In Emerich v. Philadelphia Center for Human Development., Inc., 720 A.2d 1032 (Pa.1998), a case of first impression, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that, under certainlimited circumstances, mental health professionals have a duty to warn third parties of seriousbodily threats made by their patients. The court discussed certain parameters of the MHPA andcarefully reviewed policy issues related to mental health care.Writing for the majority, Justice Cappy set forth the limitations for the duty to warn:Emerich, 720 A.2d at 1043.In summary, find that in Pennsylvania, based upon the specialrelationship between a mental health professional and his patient,when the patient has communicated to the professional a specificand immediate threat of serious bodily injury against a specificallyidentified or readily identifiable third party, and when theprofessional determines, or should determine under the standardsof the mental health profession, that his patient presents a seriousdanger of violence to the third party, then the professional bears aduty to exercise reasonable care to protect by warning the thirdparty against such danger.In the instant case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the requisitepsychiatrist-patient relationship existed and that the psychiatrist had a duty to warn the thirdparty non-patient of any potential harm that his patient posed to the third party based on seriousthreats made by the patient.The court found that Defendant psychiatrist discharged this duty when he warned thenon-patient third party to not return to the patient’s apartment after the patient told thepsychiatrist earlier that day of his specific intent to kill the third party if she returned to theapartment. Although the third party disregarded the psychiatrist’s advice and was shot by thepatient when she went to the apartment, the psychiatrist was not deemed liable as he fulfilled hisobligation to protect another by warning the intended victim of possible danger.In a footnote, the court noted that the MHPA applies to “all involuntary treatment ofmentally ill persons, whether inpatient or outpatient, and [to] all voluntary inpatient treatment ofmentally ill persons.” It further noted that it was unclear whether the patient at issue had beentreated as an involuntary outpatient, but that if he had, and the MHPA was therefore applicable,“[a]ppellant [third party] may have the additional hurdle of the MHPA’s immunity provisionwhich permits liability only for willful misconduct or gross negligence.” Id. at 1038, n.7.Duty to a third party non-patient recently was addressed in again in DeJesus v. UnitedStates Department of Veterans Affairs, 479 F. 3d 271 (3d Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs, the wife of thedecedent and mother of the two children and the parents of the neighborhood children, filed suitafter Decedent killed his two children, two neighborhood children, and then himself. Decedenthad voluntarily entered the Veteran Affairs Domiciliary Program, where he was diagnosed ashaving intermittent explosive disorder. He had a history of domestic violence and hadpreviously attempted to hang himself multiple times. Decedent received various mental health79
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EMTALA CASES ......................
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Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
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II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
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The Superior Court reversed the tri
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to a third party pursuant to the st
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After approximately five months, De
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learned the day after the surgery t
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conduct to the delay in colon cance
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court admitted the expert’s testi
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(b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
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corroborated his testimony. The cou
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husband’s estate. Plaintiff alleg
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Other notable federal cases arising
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The Superior Court found that in re
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§ 1303.512(b). The court, however,
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- Page 56 and 57: Following Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.
- Page 58 and 59: Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
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- Page 62 and 63: accomplished. In Valles v. Albert E
- Page 64 and 65: In 1980, the Pennsylvania Superior
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claims and cross-claims remain agai
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By an Amendatory Order dated March
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The court acknowledged that there i
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apply and that the trial court misa
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Barbados had enough litigation-spec
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E. Preemption of Vaccine Design Def
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2. Pa. R. Civ. Pro. 1036.1 - Reinst
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Barrick, at *34-35.Furthermore, the
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(b) the utility of the defendant’
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2006). In this case, Plaintiffs bro
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B. Elements of a Cause of Action fo
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decision in Muhammad precluded Mr.
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considered speculative “only if t
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underlying cause of action involved
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In Capital Care Corp., the Superior
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The court found, however, to state
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of reasonable diligence. The standa
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not be set aside. On July 7, 2005,
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complete bar to recovery. Since a l
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On appeal, Plaintiffs claimed that
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In Liggon-Redding, 659 F.3d at 265,
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elieved of those minimum standards
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elevant to the proceedings, the com
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establish professional misconduct b
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Upholding the Superior Court’s Or
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Id.Rejecting revocation and suspens
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order as a sanction under Rule 4019
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