husband’s estate. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant failed to properly diagnose a pulmonaryembolism, or blood clots in the lungs, which resulted in the death of Plaintiff’s husband, thedecedent. The pathology report from the decedent’s death revealed evidence of the onset ofAlzheimer’s disease. Defendant proposed introducing an Alzheimer’s disease and dementiaexpert whose proposed testimony would include an estimate of the decedent’s medical decline.The expert’s opinion would include when the decedent would have stopped working, died, andthe various other effects of having the disease. In turn, this testimony would reduce Plaintiff’sestimated damages. Plaintiff challenged the proposed admissibility of the testimony asmisleading and speculative.The court analyzed the admissibility of the challenged testimony against those prongs setforth in Daubert. The court ultimately held that, “Dr. Rovener’s opinion is admissible becausethe process used in formulating and applying his opinion is reliable . . . and he states suchopinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.” Id. at 678; see also Meadows v. AnchorLongwall and Rebuild, Inc., No. 02-2062, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 32764 (W.D. Pa. May 3, 2007),aff’d, 306 Fed. Appx. 781 (3d Cir. 2009) (not precedential) (granting Defendant’s Daubertmotion in limine because the challenged expert’s hypothesis was not supported by his owntesting, and were based on assumptions unfounded in the record facts); Gannon v. United States,571 F. Supp. 2d 615 (E.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d, 292 Fed. Appx. 170 (3d Cir. 2008) (not precedential)(denying Defendant’s Daubert motion but ruling in favor of Defendant because Plaintiff failed toprove that his cancer was caused by a vaccine contaminated with a virus that Defendant hadallegedly negligently approved).An expert’s conclusions that are not based on reliable methodology areinadmissible. In Shannon v. Hobart, No. 09-5220, 2011 WL 442119 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 8. 2011),which involved injuries sustained by plaintiff while operating a commercial dough mixer,defendant challenged the qualifications of plaintiff’s mechanical engineering expert, on thebasis that the expert possessed no experience in the area of designing or manufacturingcommercial food mixers. Id. at *1-2. The court, in precluding the expert’s testimony, heldthat the expert’s methodology in forming his opinion was unreliable under Rule 702because the expert’s opinion was based on his own speculation about the mixer’s design,rather than on any reliable methodology. Id. at *4-5. More specifically, the expertproduced no persuasive, objective evidence that his method was subject to peer review, hada known or potential rate of error, could be measured against existing standards, or wasgenerally accepted, as required by Rule 702. Id. at *4. Further, the expert had noexperience in the design or manufacture of commercial food equipment, nor had he everworked for a commercial food manufacturer, published any articles on the design ormanufacture of commercial food equipment, been involved in a case regarding commercialfood equipment, or operated a commercial food mixer prior to his inspection of the mixerat issue in the case. Id. at *4.In Amadio v. Glenn, No. 09-4937, 2011 WL 336721 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1. 2011), a caseinvolving injuries sustained in an automobile accident, defendants sought to preclude thetestimony of plaintiff’s expert 1) because the expert allegedly did not possess the requisiterequirements to qualify as an expert with respect to determining whether plaintiff hadsuffered a “traumatic brain injury,” and 2) because the expert allegedly relied on unsound20
methodology, resulting in an unreliable opinion. 2011 WL 336721 at *7. The court heldthat the expert was qualified to offer an expert opinion regarding a traumatic brain injurybased upon a review of his curriculum vitae, which demonstrated his sufficient formalqualifications as well as his specific expertise in neurology and brain injury. Id. at *8.Further, the court held that the expert’s methodology, which involved review of otherphysicians’ examinations of plaintiff, an examination of plaintiff he himself performed, anda review of plaintiff’s medical records, was a reliable means of forming an expert opinion.Id. The court cited Qeisi v. Patel, No. 02-8211, 2007 WL 527445 at *7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 9,2007), for the proposition that an expert may arrive at an opinion by noting the symptomsa patient exhibits and making an evaluation based upon those symptoms. 2011 WL 336721at *8.Conversely, the court in Maldonado v. Walmart Store #2141, No. 08-3458, 2011 WL1790840 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 2011), excluded the testimony of two witnesses pursuant toDaubert because of their insufficiency with regard to methodology and “fit.” Expert #1 inthe case, which involved a decedent who fell into a pool purchased at defendant’s store andthe allegedly negligent design, marketing and sale of that pool, was an aquatics expert whosought to proffer several hypotheses to explain decedent’s injuries. Id. at *3, *9-10. Thecourt held this testimony inadmissible because Expert #1’s hypotheses regarding how thedecedent may have entered the pool and how the decedent may have sustained his injurieswere arrived at using insufficient methodology. Id. at *10-11. More specifically, Expert#1’s opinions regarding what caused decedent’s death could not withstand Daubertscrutiny because they consisted of unsupported speculation and conjecture that was notderived from any testable hypotheses. Id. at *11.Expert #2, a purported “drowning prevention issues” specialist, sought to testifyregarding the nature of the hazards associated with pools, industry awareness of thesehazards, and the proper, safe methods for hazard reduction. 2011 WL 1790840 at *11.The court, while finding Expert #2 was qualified based upon her experience to testifyregarding these issues, nonetheless barred her testimony because of Expert #2’s failure toreview any evidence in the case when forming her opinions. Id. at *12-13. Morespecifically, for evidence to be relevant under Rule 702, it must help the trier of fact tounderstand the evidence, but because Expert #2 failed to review any facts or data in thecase before forming her opinions, her testimony failed to meet this requirement. Id. at *13.Similarly, the court excluded expert testimony in Sterling v. Redev. Auth. of theCity of Phila., No. 10-2406, 2011 WL 6210679, (E.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2011), because of itsimproper basis. Plaintiff in this case, which involved an alleged breach of contract, soughtto introduce expert testimony that calculated plaintiff’s economic loss resulting from thebreach. Id. at *14. The court excluded this testimony because the expert’s calculationswere based upon projected revenue estimates provided by plaintiff and based on severalassumptions made by plaintiff. Id. at *16. Because plaintiff failed to adduce any evidenceto support his estimates or the assumptions upon which the estimates were based, and theexpert did not independently investigate the reasonableness of these figures, the figureswere based upon nothing more than speculation. Id. at *16-17. Consequently, plaintiff’sexpert was precluded from testifying pursuant to Rule 702. Id. at *16.21
- Page 3 and 4: EMTALA CASES ......................
- Page 5: Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
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- Page 10 and 11: The Superior Court reversed the tri
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- Page 14 and 15: After approximately five months, De
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- Page 18 and 19: conduct to the delay in colon cance
- Page 20 and 21: court admitted the expert’s testi
- Page 22 and 23: (b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
- Page 24 and 25: corroborated his testimony. The cou
- Page 28 and 29: Other notable federal cases arising
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- Page 34 and 35: In Neidig v. United States, No. 07-
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- Page 38 and 39: were not indicated for her conditio
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- Page 42 and 43: It should be noted that the Superio
- Page 44 and 45: Finally, the court held that the tr
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- Page 52 and 53: Under Pennsylvania law, the Court n
- Page 54 and 55: testimony, Defendant presented his
- Page 56 and 57: Following Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.
- Page 58 and 59: Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
- Page 60 and 61: where payment is made by Medicaid w
- Page 62 and 63: accomplished. In Valles v. Albert E
- Page 64 and 65: In 1980, the Pennsylvania Superior
- Page 66 and 67: Plaintiff had a routine monitoring
- Page 68 and 69: Plaintiff’s Contract ClaimsThe Co
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licensed professionals for whom the
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(c)Limitations of Corporate Neglige
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Even more recently, our Superior Co
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(a)HMO IssuesIn McClellan v. Health
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affidavit submitted by Defendants o
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treatments while at VA’s faciliti
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[s]ubstantively, we believe that a
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The party claiming the benefit of t
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deprive (him) of civil rights guara
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found that the District Court was w
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With respect to fraudulent concealm
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would be applied in situations wher
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they had not raised them in the cou
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(a)Informed ConsentUnder MCARE, a p
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civil enforcement provisions and ma
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MCARE also changes the manner in wh
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whose death, in 2005, was allegedly
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vicariously liable if the plaintiff
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health center or its equivalent or
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In Pennsylvania Medical Society, th
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to any professional who is alleged
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Since the 2005 amendments, there ha
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ule, but who intentionally ignores
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the original Complaint was delivere
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foreclose all challenges against th
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number of boxes), which was support
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questions of professional judgment
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deviated from any professional stan
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The Third Circuit affirmed the Dist
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claims and cross-claims remain agai
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By an Amendatory Order dated March
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The court acknowledged that there i
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apply and that the trial court misa
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Barbados had enough litigation-spec
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E. Preemption of Vaccine Design Def
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2. Pa. R. Civ. Pro. 1036.1 - Reinst
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Barrick, at *34-35.Furthermore, the
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(b) the utility of the defendant’
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2006). In this case, Plaintiffs bro
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B. Elements of a Cause of Action fo
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decision in Muhammad precluded Mr.
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considered speculative “only if t
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underlying cause of action involved
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In Capital Care Corp., the Superior
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The court found, however, to state
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of reasonable diligence. The standa
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not be set aside. On July 7, 2005,
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complete bar to recovery. Since a l
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On appeal, Plaintiffs claimed that
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In Liggon-Redding, 659 F.3d at 265,
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elieved of those minimum standards
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elevant to the proceedings, the com
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establish professional misconduct b
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Upholding the Superior Court’s Or
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Id.Rejecting revocation and suspens
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order as a sanction under Rule 4019
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