questions of professional judgment beyond the realm of commonknowledge and experience.In its examination of Plaintiff’s allegations, the court reiterated Varner v. Classic CommunitiesCorp., 890 A.2d 1068 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006), and explained that it is the substance of theallegations, rather than the form that is important in this analysis. The court held that althoughthe alleged breach occurred during the performance of professional services, the allegations didnot raise questions of professional judgment beyond that of common knowledge and experience.Therefore, the court reasoned that plaintiff was simply asserting a trespass claim. Althoughexpert testimony may have been required to establish the property rights at issue, no experttestimony was necessary to establish a breach of the duty not to trespass. Thus, the courtconcluded that a certificate of merit was not necessary. Accordingly, the court reversed the trialcourt’s order denying plaintiff’s petition to open judgment of non pros.The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. Merlini v. GallitzinWater Auth., 980 A.2d 502 (Pa. 2009). The court focused on Plaintiff’s failure to allege that theDefendant’s actions fell below a professional engineering standard. The court stated Plaintiff’sallegations essentially constituted ordinary negligence and trespass. The court explained that theissues raised by Plaintiff were not issues involving professional judgment beyond the scope ofcommon knowledge and experience, despite the fact that the alleged negligence occurred duringthe performance of professional services. Accordingly, no certificate of merit was required. Seealso Smith v. Friends Hosp., 928 A.2d 1072 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (holding no certificate of meritrequired against defendant hospital where plaintiff’s allegations relate merely to the failure toproperly supervise and employ its employees).Krauss v. Claar, 879 A.2d 302 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005), appeal denied, 889 A.2d 1217 (Pa.2005), is another legal malpractice case that addresses the certificate of merit rules. Defendant inthis case was an attorney that had represented sellers in a transaction in which the buyers werethe successful bidders on property they wanted to use for logging. The buyers filed suit whenproblems arose with the sale and included the sellers’ attorney as a defendant. The attorneymaintained that the claims against him were for professional malpractice and filed a Praecipe forJudgment of Non Pros based on Plaintiffs’ failure to file a certificate of merit. Plaintiffs filed amotion to strike this praecipe, which the trial court denied.On appeal, the court found that the complaint did not raise any claims concerning theattorney’s duties as a licensed professional attorney. The allegations against him in thecomplaint were in connections with claims for negligent misrepresentation, intentionalmisrepresentation, promissory estoppel and tortious interference with contractual relations.These allegations did not assert that he had deviated from an acceptable professional standard,and so did not set forth a professional liability claim. Consequently, no certificate of merit wasrequired. The court also noted that a claim against a lawyer for legal malpractice could bebrought only by a client of that lawyer. The order of the trial court was reversed.In Perez v. Griffin, No. 1:06-CV-1468, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45240 (M.D. Pa. June 9,2008), aff’d, 304 Fed. Appx. 72 (3d Cir. 2008) (not precedential), Plaintiff, while incarcerated atthe Schuylkill Federal Correctional Institution, suffered a severe asthma attack and alleged that122
he received inadequate treatment. Plaintiff allegedly retained an attorney to pursue a claimagainst federal prison officials for the medical treatment administered during the asthma attack.Plaintiff commenced the suit pro se and the attorney never entered an appearance. A summaryjudgment was filed against the Plaintiff and he forwarded the papers to the attorney. The motionwas extended after the attorney failed to oppose the motion and the Plaintiff eventually preparedand filed an opposition without the attorney’s assistance. The court entered summary judgmentagainst the Plaintiff. Plaintiff then commenced an action, pro se, for legal malpractice, breach ofcontract and fraud against the attorney and failed to file a certificate of merit or a motion for anextension within the sixty-day period following the complaint filing.The District Court examined whether a certificate of merit is necessary where Plaintiffalleges that his attorney breached a contract and committed fraud. The court explained thatPlaintiff had attempted to “cloak a claim based upon breach of professional negligence in thelanguage of ordinary negligence, breach of contract, or fraud.” The court held a certificate ofmerit was needed for Plaintiff’s claims of fraud and breach of contract because the claims arosefrom the professional duties defendant owed to Plaintiff and were “beyond the realm of commonknowledge and experience of laypeople.” See also Levi v. Lappin, 2009 WL 1770146 (M.D. Pa.June 22, 2009) (stating Plaintiff prisoner’s mistaken belief he was proceeding on EighthAmendment claim of denial of medical care, not medical malpractice claim, and erroneous beliefa certificate of merit claim was not required, is not a reasonable excuse for not timely filing acertificate of merit). But see Davis v. U.S., 2009 WL 890938 (M.D. Pa. March 31, 2009)(holding a certificate of merit was not needed to proceed on a claim against a prison warden,when plaintiff alleged MRSA infection was caused by the warden’s failure to follow guidelinesand provide a reasonably safe place of confinement).In Campbell v. Sunrise Senior Living Management, 2009 WL 4258070 (E.D. Pa. Nov.29, 2009), the court addressed whether Plaintiff, an independent contractor of the Defendantlong-term care facility, asserted a claim for professional liability. Plaintiff was a certifiednursing assistant who was attacked by a patient of the long-term care facility. Plaintiff allegedthe long-term care facility knew of a patient’s violent propensities, but failed to correct them.The court stated that the long-term care facility’s professional duties are to its patients, not everyinvitee who enters their building. The court noted the long-term care facility only owed ordinaryduties to Plaintiff, which only required a duty to warn of a known danger or to take steps toprevent injury from a known danger. The court denied the long-term care facility’s motion todismiss, holding Plaintiff’s lawsuit sounded in ordinary negligence and did not require the filingof a certificate of merit. See also Zatuchi v. Richman, 2009 WL 1886118 (E.D. Pa. June 30,2009) (stating intermediate care facility resident did not need to file certificate of merit for claimagainst care center operator, who was not a health care provider, which alleged that Plaintiff wasentitled to more therapy and support than she received—including a power wheelchair andaugmentive communication device).In Quinn Construction, Inc. v. Skanska USA Building, Inc., No. 07-0406, 2008 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 45980 (E.D. Pa. June 10, 2008), the District Court examined whether a certificate ofmerit is needed in a case involving claims of negligent misrepresentation against an architect.The District Court explained that merely suing an architect does not mandate the filing of acertificate of merit. The court stated the key issue was whether Plaintiff alleged the architect123
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EMTALA CASES ......................
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Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
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II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
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The Superior Court reversed the tri
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to a third party pursuant to the st
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After approximately five months, De
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learned the day after the surgery t
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conduct to the delay in colon cance
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court admitted the expert’s testi
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(b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
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corroborated his testimony. The cou
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husband’s estate. Plaintiff alleg
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Other notable federal cases arising
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The Superior Court found that in re
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§ 1303.512(b). The court, however,
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In Neidig v. United States, No. 07-
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Additionally, the Supreme Court not
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were not indicated for her conditio
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surgeon is the same as it would be
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It should be noted that the Superio
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Finally, the court held that the tr
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania r
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nurses deviating from applicable st
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certainty, the court reviews expert
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Under Pennsylvania law, the Court n
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testimony, Defendant presented his
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Following Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.
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Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
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where payment is made by Medicaid w
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accomplished. In Valles v. Albert E
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In 1980, the Pennsylvania Superior
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Plaintiff had a routine monitoring
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Plaintiff’s Contract ClaimsThe Co
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is a failure to report changes in a
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unit to assure post-surgical patien
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sliced his wrist and arm with a raz
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licensed professionals for whom the
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elevant to the proceedings, the com
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establish professional misconduct b
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Upholding the Superior Court’s Or
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Id.Rejecting revocation and suspens
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order as a sanction under Rule 4019
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