The court acknowledged that there is a right to “legitimate” forum shopping, but that thePlaintiff here “created” a forum by suing an unwarrantedly broad choice of parties. The courtstated even if Plaintiff had support for her claims against the Philadelphia Defendants, theconsideration of forum shopping would still be an appropriate factor to consider in deciding apetition to change venue based upon forum non conveniens. Id. This statement by the trial courtis by far the most significant part of the opinion because it opens the door for non-PhiladelphiaDefendants to successfully transfer venue whenever Philadelphia Defendants are dismissed froma case, even if Defendants cannot argue that the Philadelphia Defendants were “sham”defendants. The court also stated that even if defendants do not allege forum shopping, it isproper for a court to address forum shopping to determine whether the forum was designated toharass Defendants.In Zappala v. The James Lewis Group, 982 A.2d 512 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009), the SuperiorCourt reversed Judge New’s decision on remand and transferred the case back to Philadelphia.While the Superior Court agreed with Judge New’s analysis that improper forum shopping canprovide a basis for a change of venue forum non conveniens under Rule 1006(d)(2), the courtheld that the Chester County Defendants failed to present sufficient evidence to the trial courtdemonstrating that venue in Philadelphia County was harassing, oppressive, or vexatious suchthat transfer to Chester County was warranted. More specifically, the court held that, despitetheir assertions to the contrary, the Chester County Defendants failed to present sufficientevidence to support their claim that Plaintiffs had initially named the Philadelphia Defendants asparties to the action solely for the purpose of obtaining venue in Philadelphia, with theexpectation that the Philadelphia Defendants would ultimately be dismissed without opposition.In short, the Superior Court found that the Chester County Defendants failed to make a primafacie showing of improper forum shopping on the part of Plaintiff to support a finding of forumnon conveniens in Philadelphia County under Rule 1006(d)(2). However, it should be noted thecourt reiterated that, as a matter of law, improper forum shopping can provide grounds for forumnon conveniens if the proper evidentiary showing is made.In Bilotti-Kerrick v. St. Luke’s Hospital, 873 A.2d 728 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005), theSuperior Court applied the amended venue rule regarding medical malpractice actions and heldthat the trial court did not abuse its discretion in transferring venue from Northampton County toLehigh County, which is where the cause of action arose. The patient at issue in this case hadbecome ill and been taken to a hospital. The doctor there recommended transfer of the patient toSt. Luke’s Hospital for immediate cardiac catheterization. He contacted a cardiologist from St.Luke’s, who was at his home in Northampton County at the time, and who agreed to accept thepatient upon her arrival and perform the needed procedure by 6 a.m. Instead, the patient wastaken to the critical care unit at St. Luke’s, and the cardiologist did not see her until much later inthe day. After the catheterization and surgery, the patient died. Plaintiff argued venue wasproper in Northampton Co. because that is where the cause of action arose, based on the fact thatthe cardiologist’s residence was there and it was from there that he managed her care before hecame to St. Luke’s.The Superior Court held, however, that “for venue purposes the cause of action arose inthe county where the negligent act or omission of failing to provide the needed care occurred.”873 A.2d at 731. In this case, Plaintiff’s allegations of negligence were based on delay in the132
performance of the cardiac catheterization and in the overall care at St. Luke’s, which is LehighCounty. As such, St. Luke’s was the location of the negligent act or omission, even though thecardiologist had given orders over the phone from his Northampton County home. Those orderswere to be carried out in Lehigh County. Venue was only proper, therefore, in Lehigh County.In Forrester v. Hanson, 901 A.2d 548 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006), Plaintiff motorist brought apersonal injury action against the driver of a commercial vehicle and driver’s employer.Defendants subsequently filed a joinder complaint against Plaintiff’s treating physician, allegingthat physician’s negligent treatment of plaintiff was the true cause of plaintiff’s injuries.Critically, it must be noted that Defendants did not assert a separate cause of action againstphysician, but rather sought a jury determination of physician’s portion of the liability shouldDefendants be found negligent. After joinder was granted, physician objected to venue, arguingthat the case should be transferred from Philadelphia County to Montgomery County because allof the allegedly negligent acts as set forth in the joinder complaint took place at physician’soffice in Montgomery County. The court granted physician’s motion and transferred the case toMontgomery County pursuant to Rule 1006(a.1). Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial courtabused its discretion by transferring the case because Defendants did not bring any “medicalprofessional liability claim” in the joinder complaint as defined by the MCARE legislation.Rule 1006(a.1) provides that,(a.1) Except as otherwise provided by subdivision (c), a medicalprofessional liability action may be brought against a health careprovider for a medical professional liability action only in a countyin which the cause of action arose.Pa. R. Civ. P. 1006(a.1) (emphasis added). The explanatory note to 1006(a.1) explains that thedefinition of “medical professional liability action” for purposes of 1006(a.1) can be found insection 5101.1(c) of the MCARE Act.MCARE defines a “medical professional liability claim” as,[a]ny claim seeking the recovery of damages or loss from ahealthcare provider arising out of any tort or breach of contractcausing injury or death resulting from the furnishing of health careservices which were or should have been provided.42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5101.1(c).The Superior Court determined that Defendants in Forrester did not assert a “medicalprofessional liability claim” against physician because “[Defendants’] joinder complaint did notseek to recover damages or loss directly from [Defendant].” Rather, the Court noted thatDefendants merely sought a jury determination of physician’s portion of the liability. Given, inturn, that Defendants’ joinder complaint did not assert a medical professional liability claimwithin the meaning of the statute, the Superior Court determined that Rule 1006(a.1) did not133
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EMTALA CASES ......................
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Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
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II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
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The Superior Court reversed the tri
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to a third party pursuant to the st
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After approximately five months, De
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learned the day after the surgery t
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conduct to the delay in colon cance
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court admitted the expert’s testi
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(b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
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corroborated his testimony. The cou
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husband’s estate. Plaintiff alleg
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Other notable federal cases arising
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The Superior Court found that in re
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§ 1303.512(b). The court, however,
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In Neidig v. United States, No. 07-
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Additionally, the Supreme Court not
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were not indicated for her conditio
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surgeon is the same as it would be
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It should be noted that the Superio
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Finally, the court held that the tr
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania r
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nurses deviating from applicable st
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certainty, the court reviews expert
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Under Pennsylvania law, the Court n
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testimony, Defendant presented his
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Following Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.
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Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
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where payment is made by Medicaid w
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accomplished. In Valles v. Albert E
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In 1980, the Pennsylvania Superior
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Plaintiff had a routine monitoring
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Plaintiff’s Contract ClaimsThe Co
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is a failure to report changes in a
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unit to assure post-surgical patien
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sliced his wrist and arm with a raz
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licensed professionals for whom the
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(c)Limitations of Corporate Neglige
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Even more recently, our Superior Co
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(a)HMO IssuesIn McClellan v. Health
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affidavit submitted by Defendants o
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treatments while at VA’s faciliti
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