apply and that the trial court misapplied the law when it transferred the case to MontgomeryCounty.In Olshan v. Tenet Health System, 849 A.2d 1214 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004), appeal denied,864 A.2d 530 (Pa. 2004), Plaintiff appealed an order of the Philadelphia County Court sustainingpreliminary objections filed by Defendants, corporate health care providers and a doctor,regarding venue and transferring the case to Montgomery County for trial.Plaintiff’s mammogram had been taken and read by a doctor in Montgomery County. Acancerous lesion was missed in this reading, resulting in a much more serious cancer whenfinally diagnosed. Plaintiff sued the doctor for malpractice. Plaintiff also sued the corporateproviders who were located in Philadelphia County, alleging corporate liability in failing toretain competent physicians, failing to implement adequate rules and policies and failing tosupervise. The patient had received no treatment in Philadelphia County. All treatment occurredin Montgomery County.The Superior Court held that the trial court properly transferred venue to MontgomeryCounty because all of the medical care was furnished to the patient in Montgomery County andtherefore the “cause of action arose” in Montgomery County. In so holding, the Court examinedRule 1006. The Court also looked at the MCARE Act, which defines “medical professionalliability claim”, in part, as “resulting from the furnishing of health care services”. The Courtconcluded that venue is created not by where alleged corporate negligence occurred, but wherethe action affected the patient. i.e. where the care was “furnished.”In Searles v. Estrada, 856 A.2d 85 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004), appeal denied, 871 A.2d 192(Pa. 2005), the parties all resided in Pennsylvania. The surgical procedure from which the actionarose occurred in a New Jersey hospital. Plaintiffs filed their complaint in Pennsylvania andDefendant doctor filed preliminary objections in the nature of a motion to dismiss on the basis ofimproper venue. The trial court denied this motion.On appeal, Defendant contended that the court had erred in failing to dismiss the actionpursuant to Rule 1006(a.1). The Superior Court concluded that the newly amended Rule 1006applied to the case and that because the cause of action arose in New Jersey venue was notproper in any county in Pennsylvania. Because there was no county in Pennsylvania to whichthe trial court could properly transfer the case, the only alternative available was dismissal.Consequently, the trial court erred in failing to sustain the doctor’s preliminary objections basedon improper venue and in failing to grant his motion to dismiss.In Peters v. Geisinger Medical Center, 855 A.2d 894 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004), the SuperiorCourt held that venue is proper where alleged acts of negligence occurred and not where thealleged injury to the patient occurred.Plaintiff received outpatient medical care from Defendant physicians in MontourCounty. She alleged that the doctors negligently prescribed a drug which caused her to suffer anallergic reaction at her home in Columbia County. Plaintiff filed suit in Luzerne County.Defendants filed a petition to transfer venue to Montour County where they argued the cause of134
action arose. The trial court found that venue in Luzerne County was improper, but transferredthe case to Columbia County, where Plaintiff had suffered the injury.On appeal, the Superior Court stated the issue was where the cause of action arose andnoted that Pennsylvania Courts have defined “cause of action” to mean the negligent act oromission, as opposed to the injury which flows from the tortious conduct. The court furtherstated that it would be unfair to hold that a person could seek medical attention from a physicianin one county, receive a prescription from that physician, and then go to any county to ingest thatmedication and have the physician be subject to venue in whatever county that happens to be.The court held that the correct county for venue is the venue where the alleged negligenceoccurred and ordered the case transferred to Montour County.The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, citing Olshan, recently held that venue doesnot lie in the county where corporate action took place, but in the county where the actionaffected the patient. See Cohen v. Maternal Wellness Center, et al., 2007 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl.LEXIS 265 (Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. Aug. 22, 2007), aff’d, 946 A.2d 125 (Pa. Super. 2008). InCohen, Plaintiff developed pregnancy complications around the thirty-second week of herpregnancy. Id. In response to these complications Plaintiff consulted with Defendant TheMaternal Wellness Center and Defendant “Certified Childbirth Educator” (“PhiladelphiaDefendants”), both located in Philadelphia County. At the thirty-forth week of her pregnancy,following the advice of the Philadelphia Defendants, Plaintiff decided to treat with the DefendantGynecologists and to plan to deliver her baby at Lankenau Hospital. Defendant Gynecologistsand Lankenau Hospital are located in Wynnewood, Montgomery County.When Plaintiff’s contractions began, she traveled to Lankenau Hospital for labor anddelivery of her child. Plaintiff gave birth, but after suffering numerous post-partumcomplications, her son died at Thomas Jefferson University Hospital. Thomas JeffersonUniversity Hospital was not named as a defendant in the suit.Plaintiffs filed their complaint alleging negligence, medical malpractice and wrongfuldeath against the Philadelphia Defendants, defendant Gynecologists, Lankenau Hospital, andother defendants that provided pre- and post-natal care. Plaintiffs filed their Complaint inPhiladelphia County. Defendants filed timely Preliminary Objections in the form of a Motion toTransfer Venue to Montgomery County.The court held that proper venue lay in Montgomery County. The court determined thatthere was, at best, a tenuous connection with Philadelphia County based on the conversationswith, and advice received from, the Philadelphia Defendants. Although Plaintiff, as a result ofthis advice, decided to deliver her baby at Lankenau Hospital and receive pre-natal care fromdefendant Gynecologists, the court found that she did not actually receive any medical care inPhiladelphia County. The court, relying on the Superior Court’s decision in Olshan, held that thealleged negligent advice provided by the Philadelphia Defendants is exactly the type of “nonmedicalcare activity which cannot be the basis for venue under the MCARE Act.” Further, thecourt stated that Plaintiffs had not alleged that any medical care had been provided inPhiladelphia County. Therefore, the court held that venue was proper in Montgomery County asthat is where the plaintiff was “furnished” medical care. See also O’Connor v. Sandy Lane HotelCo., 496 F.3d 312 (3d Cir. 2007), in which the Third Circuit held that Defendant hotel in135
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EMTALA CASES ......................
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Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
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II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
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The Superior Court reversed the tri
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to a third party pursuant to the st
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After approximately five months, De
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learned the day after the surgery t
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conduct to the delay in colon cance
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court admitted the expert’s testi
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(b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
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corroborated his testimony. The cou
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husband’s estate. Plaintiff alleg
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Other notable federal cases arising
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The Superior Court found that in re
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§ 1303.512(b). The court, however,
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In Neidig v. United States, No. 07-
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Additionally, the Supreme Court not
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were not indicated for her conditio
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surgeon is the same as it would be
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It should be noted that the Superio
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Finally, the court held that the tr
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania r
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nurses deviating from applicable st
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certainty, the court reviews expert
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Under Pennsylvania law, the Court n
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testimony, Defendant presented his
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Following Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.
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Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
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where payment is made by Medicaid w
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accomplished. In Valles v. Albert E
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In 1980, the Pennsylvania Superior
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Plaintiff had a routine monitoring
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Plaintiff’s Contract ClaimsThe Co
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is a failure to report changes in a
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unit to assure post-surgical patien
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sliced his wrist and arm with a raz
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licensed professionals for whom the
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(c)Limitations of Corporate Neglige
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Even more recently, our Superior Co
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(a)HMO IssuesIn McClellan v. Health
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affidavit submitted by Defendants o
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treatments while at VA’s faciliti
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[s]ubstantively, we believe that a
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