2012 PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY UPDATE - Eckert Seamans

Under Pennsylvania law, the Court noted that the Plaintiff has the burden of proof in amedical malpractice claim and must establish that there was: “(1) a duty owed by the physicianto the patient (2) a breach of duty from the physician to the patient (3) that the breach of dutywas the proximate cause of, or a substantial factor in, bringing about the harm suffered by thepatient, and (4) damages suffered by the patient that were a direct result of that harm.” Hankey,2009 WL 2043392, at *4 (quoting Mitzelfelt v. Kamrin, 526 Pa. 54, 584 A.2d 888, 891 (Pa.1990)). The Court also determined that in cases where a patient is likely to suffer harm,regardless of the quality of medical treatment, the proximate cause prong of the test is relaxedand it becomes the realm of the jury “to balance probabilities and decide whether defendant’snegligence was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.” Id. (quoting Hamil v. Bashline,481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280, 1286 (Pa. 1978)).In their motions for summary judgment, all the defendants alleged that the Plaintiff couldnot establish that their actions were the proximate cause of the Plaintiff’s injury. However, thePlaintiff put forth expert testimony for each claim stating that each doctor or facility had notadhered to the required standard of care. The Court noted that the substance of all the testimonywould be weighed at trial, but for the purposes of summary judgment there remained a dispute asto the material facts, which warranted denial of the motions for summary judgment.Dr. Baker also sought summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for violation of theEighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Particularly, Plaintiff allegedthat Dr. Baker, as a prison official, breached his “obligation to provide medical care for thosewhom [he is] punishing by incarceration.” 2009 WL 2043392, at *9 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). The Plaintiff had the burden of proof toshow that “Dr. Baker acted with deliberate indifference to Rorhbaugh’s serious medical needs.”Id.Dr. Baker argued that he did follow-up with Rorhbaugh after the surgery and tried torefer him to an oncologist, but that Rorhbaugh insisted on waiting until he was released to seekmedical help. Dr. Baker testified that he then checked with the prison officials to determineRorhbaugh’s release date, which he verified was within 2-8 weeks and met once more with himto ensure that Rorhbaugh knew the severity of the situation and that follow-up care wasnecessary. Plaintiff tried to counter that because Dr. Baker did not order a consultation with anoncologist and because Dr. Baker referred Rorhbaugh to a general surgeon for the excision andnot an oncologist, Dr. Baker displayed deliberate indifference. The Court agreed with Dr. Bakerthat a dispute between preferred choices of treatment does not rise to the level of deliberateindifference and therefore, the § 1983 claims against Dr. Baker could not stand.The Court then discussed Dr. Esper’s request that it “remand or transfer” all state lawclaims remaining after any § 1983 claims had been dismissed. It noted that it would interpretthis request as a request to decline supplementary jurisdiction as the case had originated infederal court, and had not been removed from state court. The Court acknowledged thatexercising supplementary jurisdiction was a matter of discretion, which should be weighedagainst several factors, including judicial economy, convenience and fairness to parties. Becausethe case had been in federal court for numerous years, a date for trial had been set and the statute46