found that the District Court was well within its rights to decline supplemental jurisdiction overthe state law claims of the defaulting defendants.In Byrne v. The Cleveland Clinic, 684 F. Supp. 2d 641 (E.D. Pa. 2010), the pro seplaintiff brought suit against defendant under the Emergency Medical Treatment and ActiveLabor Act (EMTALA), as well as a state law claim for breach of implied contract. Defendantsmoved to dismiss on multiple grounds, including plaintiff’s failure to file within the two yearstatutory period.The court notes that although a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not specifically includethe statute of limitations defense, “the so-called ‘Third Circuit rule’ allows such a defense to beraised in a 12(b)(6) motion ‘if the time alleged in the statement of a claim shows that the cause ofactions has not been brought within the statute of limitation.’” Id. quoting Zankel v. TempleUniv., 245 Fed. Appx’ 196, 198 (3d Cir. 2007).The court also notes that in the case of a pro se litigant who files a complaint and whoseeks to proceed in forma pauperis, the constructive date of filing is the date that the court clerkreceives the complaint, not the date that the filing fee is paid, so long as the fee is eventually paideither by the litigant or the court grants the request to proceed in forma pauperis. The courtspecifically points out that the constructive date of filing is not the date the litigant mails thecomplaint or when the complaint is notarized.Although the docket listed the complaint as being filed on February 27, 2009, there was ahandwritten date of February 14, 2009 on the complaint, one day before the statute of limitationsran. The court acknowledged that although it could not yet be sure who wrote that date, thepossibility existed that it was the court clerk, in which case the complaint had been received andtherefore, constructively filed, within the statute of limitations. As the court could not make thedetermination of whether or not the complaint was timely filed based on the pleadings alone, thecourt held that the Third Circuit Rule did not bar the claim.The court held that it could not dismiss the breach of contract claim on the statute oflimitations grounds based on the same reasoning. It did, however, dismiss that claim on thegrounds that the plaintiff alleged merely a delay in treatment and not a breach based on thequality or result of the treatment.In Fine v. Checcio; Ward v. Rice, 870 A.2d 850 (Pa. 2005), the Supreme Court looked attwo cases, consolidated on appeal, in which Plaintiffs were patients that had sued dentists andalleged dental malpractice. In both cases, the dentist-Defendant moved for summary judgmentbased on the two year statute of limitations and the patient-Plaintiff raised the discovery rule andthe doctrine of fraudulent concealment. The Supreme Court ruled in both cases that dentist-Defendant was not entitled to summary judgment and issued two important holdings in thiscourse of their opinion.In Fine, Dr. Checcio had recommended that the patient’s four wisdom teeth be surgicallyextracted. Fine accepted this recommendation and signed a consent form with complications andconditions that could follow surgery, including numbness of the lip, tongue, chin and cheeks.Dr. Checcio removed the teeth on July 17, 1998. On that date Fine had numbness on both sides88
of his face. According to Fine, on the ten occasions he saw Dr. Checcio between the surgery andOctober 9, 1998, the doctor told him it could take up to six months for the numbness to subside.About a year after the surgery, Fine came to believe the persistent numbness was abnormal. Hecommenced suit against Dr. Checcio on August 8, 2000. Dr. Checcio raised the statute oflimitations as a defense in her answer and new matter and subsequently filed a motion forsummary judgment asserting that the action was time-barred. Fine asserted that there weredisputed, material facts as to whether the limitations period was tolled under the discovery ruleor the doctrine of fraudulent concealment.The trial court denied Dr. Checcio’s motion. After trial resulted in a verdict in favor ofFine, and denied post-trial motions, Dr. Checcio appealed. The Superior Court reversed, rulingthat the limitations period began to run on the date of surgery and that Fine’s action, therefore,was barred.In Ward, plaintiff had her wisdom teeth extracted by Dr. Rice on March 28, 1995.Immediately following the surgery, Plaintiff experienced some numbness and occasional tinglingin her lip. Plaintiff told Dr. Rice of her condition, and he assured her it would go away. Plaintiffcontinued to treat with Dr. Rice until May, 1995. He continued to assure her the problems shewas having would subside. Plaintiff asked Dr. Rice for a referral on July 5, 1995, but it was notuntil September 20, 1995 that he directed her to another doctor. Her first visit to the new doctoroccurred on October 11, 1995. On September 26, 1997, Plaintiff filed a writ of summons. Dr.Rice filed a motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations and Wardresponded that her action was timely because the record showed the statute had been tolled underthe discovery rule and the doctrine of fraudulent concealment.The trial court granted the motion. The Superior Court remanded the case for furtherproceedings after finding that the discovery rule applied and the trial court had erred indismissing the lawsuit as time-barred.Because the cases covered the same issues, the Supreme Court consolidated the appeals.The Supreme Court decision reviewed the settled aspects of the discovery rule and then notedthat it remained unsettled whether the rule requires that it be determined whether the injury andits cause were reasonably ascertainable at any point within the prescribed statutory period. Oneschool of thought was that if they were—even if this occurred one day before the statutory periodended—the discovery rule does not apply and the statute is not tolled. Another camp believedthat the discovery rule always applies to toll the statute if at the time the injury occurs, the injuryor its cause is neither known nor reasonably knowable.The Supreme Court held that “the discovery rule applies to toll the statute of limitationsin any case where a party neither knows nor reasonably should have known of his injury and itscause at the time his right to institute suit arises.” Id. at 859. To adopt the alternate position, thecourt reasoned, could lead in many instances to unreasonable and arbitrary results. It would also,the court explained, nullify the recognized purpose of the rule, which is to see to it that personswho are reasonably unaware of an injury that is not immediately ascertainable have essentiallythe same rights as those who suffer an immediately ascertainable injury. Id. at 860.89
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EMTALA CASES ......................
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Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
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II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
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The Superior Court reversed the tri
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to a third party pursuant to the st
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After approximately five months, De
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learned the day after the surgery t
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conduct to the delay in colon cance
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court admitted the expert’s testi
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(b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
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corroborated his testimony. The cou
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husband’s estate. Plaintiff alleg
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Other notable federal cases arising
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The Superior Court found that in re
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§ 1303.512(b). The court, however,
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In Neidig v. United States, No. 07-
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Additionally, the Supreme Court not
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were not indicated for her conditio
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surgeon is the same as it would be
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It should be noted that the Superio
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- Page 56 and 57: Following Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.
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- Page 62 and 63: accomplished. In Valles v. Albert E
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E. Preemption of Vaccine Design Def
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2. Pa. R. Civ. Pro. 1036.1 - Reinst
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Barrick, at *34-35.Furthermore, the
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(b) the utility of the defendant’
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2006). In this case, Plaintiffs bro
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B. Elements of a Cause of Action fo
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decision in Muhammad precluded Mr.
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considered speculative “only if t
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underlying cause of action involved
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In Capital Care Corp., the Superior
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The court found, however, to state
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of reasonable diligence. The standa
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not be set aside. On July 7, 2005,
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complete bar to recovery. Since a l
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On appeal, Plaintiffs claimed that
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In Liggon-Redding, 659 F.3d at 265,
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elieved of those minimum standards
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elevant to the proceedings, the com
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establish professional misconduct b
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Upholding the Superior Court’s Or
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Id.Rejecting revocation and suspens
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order as a sanction under Rule 4019
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