(a)HMO IssuesIn McClellan v. Health Maintenance Organization, 686 A.2d 801 (Pa. 1996), theexecutors of the estate of a patient who died from malignant melanoma sued Decedent’s doctorand Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) for negligence, breach of contract andmisrepresentation. The Superior Court was presented with the issue of whether the PPRPAprecludes the discovery of peer review material in an action against an Independent PracticeAssociation HMO. The court held that since HMOs are not specifically identified by thelegislature as health care providers, it will not construe the statute to extend protection orconfidentiality to the HMO in this case.On appeal, the Supreme Court was evenly divided. Consequently, the order of theSuperior Court was affirmed. Justice Nigro, who wrote in favor of reversal of the SuperiorCourt’s holding, stated that HMOs, like health care facilities, evaluated and reviewed doctors.Moreover, HMOs conduct peer review to select competent doctors. Since other health carefacilities that conduct peer review are protected from producing confidential peer reviewdocuments, HMOs should also be protected. Justice Nigro wrote that this conclusion isconsistent with the purpose of the Act—to foster candor and frankness at peer review committeemeetings. Justice Zappala, who also wrote in favor of reversal and was joined by JusticeCastille, stated that hospitals and IPA model HMOs are sufficiently similar as to impose on botha duty to select and retain competent physicians. He then went on to conclude that IPA modelHMOs merit the same protection as is afforded to hospitals under the Act.Those justices who wrote in support of affirming the Superior Court Opinion stated thatthe definition of “health care provider” in the Act is ambiguous. Thus, they sought to ascertainthe intention of the General Assembly. Using the statutory construction doctrine of ejusdemgeneris, the Justices concluded that an HMO is not a health care provider or administrator of ahealth care facility as defined by the Act. Accordingly, the justices held that an HMO cannot be“embraced by the confidentiality protection of the Act”.(b)Discovery of Hospital FilesIn Piroli v LoDico, M.D., 909 A.2d 846 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006), Plaintiff sued a physicianand his practice after his wife died following a transforaminal epidural steroid injection duringwhich, Plaintiff alleged, Defendant punctured Decedent’s vertebral artery. At issue in this casewas whether information gathered during a peer review was discoverable under the Peer ReviewProtection Act (“PRPA”) given that individuals other than health care providers (including abilling manager) were present during the peer review session. Id. at 847. The trial courtconcluded that the PRPA did not shield the information in question from discovery because abilling manager, who is not considered a “professional health care provider” according to thatterm in the PRPA, was present during the review process, thus destroying any protectionafforded by the PRPA. Id.On appeal, the Superior Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and held that theinformation was protected by the PRPA even though non-health care professionals were presentat the peer review session. Id. As explained by the Superior Court, the Peer Review Protection76
Act protects the confidentiality of information gathered and presented by “review organizations,”defined as:any committee engaging in peer review . . . to gather and reviewinformation relating to the care and treatment of patients for thepurposes of: (i) evaluating and improving the quality of health carerendered; (ii) reducing morbidity or mortality; or (iii) establishingand enforcing guidelines designed to keep within reasonablebounds the cost of health care.Id. at 849 (quoting 63 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 425.2). Section 425.2 defines “peer review,”furthermore, as “the procedure for evaluation by professional health care providers of the qualityand efficiency of services ordered or performed by other health care providers . . .” 63 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 425.2 (emphasis added).Despite the PRPA’s provision that peer review must be conducted by “health careprofessionals,” however, the Superior Court gave more weight to the purpose of the statute thanto the plain language. As explained by the Superior Court, “the PRPA was promulgated to servethe legitimate purpose of maintaining high professional standards in the medical practice for theprotection of patients and the general public.” Piroli, 909 A.2d at 850 (quoting Troescher v.Grody, 869 A.2d 1014, 1020-1021 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)). The court explained, furthermore, thatthe “‘overriding intent of the Legislature’ is to ‘protect peer review records.’” Id. at 849 (quotingTroescher v. Grody, 869 A.2d at 1022). The court concluded, in turn, that subjecting informationgathered and presented during a peer review session to discovery simply because non-healthcareprofessionals were present would defeat the purpose of the PRPA and hinder the advancement ofthe health care profession in general. The Superior Court thus concluded that the informationsought by Plaintiffs was protected by the PRPA despite the fact that a billing agent was presentat the peer review session. Id. at 853.In Dodson v. Deleo, 872 A.2d 1237 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005), Defendants sought review ofan order of the trial court which held that certain documents sought by Plaintiff in the medicalmalpractice litigation against the hospital were discoverable and not protected by the PeerReview Protection Act.Plaintiff alleged that Defendant’s performance of a vertical banded gastroplasty andsubsequent post-operative care fell below the standard of care for a reasonable physician.Plaintiff sought credentialing reports specific to Dr. DeLeo, a physician Plaintiff accused ofmalpractice. Defendants maintained that these documents were protected by the Peer ReviewProtection Act. After an in camera review of the disputed documents, the trial court concludedthat these documents were not privileged and ordered disclosure.On appeal, Defendants maintained that the trial court erred in concluding that documents,which memorialized hospital peer review activity with respect to a given physician for a givenyear, which were generated by a hospital department charged with gathering and generating peerreview committee documents, and were used exclusively for purposes of physician credentialing,were not protected by the Peer Review Protection Act. The Superior Court found that an77
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EMTALA CASES ......................
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Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
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II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
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The Superior Court reversed the tri
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to a third party pursuant to the st
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After approximately five months, De
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learned the day after the surgery t
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conduct to the delay in colon cance
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court admitted the expert’s testi
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(b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
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corroborated his testimony. The cou
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husband’s estate. Plaintiff alleg
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Other notable federal cases arising
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The Superior Court found that in re
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The Third Circuit affirmed the Dist
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claims and cross-claims remain agai
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By an Amendatory Order dated March
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The court acknowledged that there i
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apply and that the trial court misa
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Barbados had enough litigation-spec
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E. Preemption of Vaccine Design Def
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2. Pa. R. Civ. Pro. 1036.1 - Reinst
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Barrick, at *34-35.Furthermore, the
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(b) the utility of the defendant’
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2006). In this case, Plaintiffs bro
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B. Elements of a Cause of Action fo
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decision in Muhammad precluded Mr.
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considered speculative “only if t
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underlying cause of action involved
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In Capital Care Corp., the Superior
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The court found, however, to state
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of reasonable diligence. The standa
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not be set aside. On July 7, 2005,
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complete bar to recovery. Since a l
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On appeal, Plaintiffs claimed that
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In Liggon-Redding, 659 F.3d at 265,
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elieved of those minimum standards
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elevant to the proceedings, the com
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establish professional misconduct b
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Upholding the Superior Court’s Or
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Id.Rejecting revocation and suspens
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order as a sanction under Rule 4019
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