The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision and held that the District Courthad correctly applied Rule 1042.3 as substantive law. The Third Circuit further held that thedecision to involuntary commit an individual is a question of medical judgment and Defendant’sconduct in admitting Plaintiff constitutes “an integral part of the process of rendering medicaltreatment.” As a result, Rule 1042.3 was applicable. The Court further noted that at the timeDefendant filed its Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the sixty-day window for filing a certificate of merithad not yet closed. Therefore, even if the Rule 1042.3 defense were required to be raised in aRule 12(b)(6) motion, Defendant did not waive it. The defense was not “then available” toDefendant under Rule 12(g). Accordingly, Defendant was entitled to raise it in a separatemotion. Thus, Rule 1042.3 applied and Plaintiff was required to file a certificate of merit.In Lopez v. Brady, No. 4:CV-07-1126, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73759 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 25,2008), Plaintiff, a prisoner, filed a claim against the United States pursuant to the Federal TortClaims Act, alleging he failed to receive proper medical care while incarcerated. The courtnoted that the government’s duty of care was one of ordinary diligence, but Plaintiff’s claimsconstituted allegations of medical malpractice, triggering the need for filing a certificate of merit.The court noted “Plaintiff’s incarceration or pro se status is not a viable basis upon which toexcuse compliance with Rule 1042.3.” The court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims, finding thatPlaintiff needed to file a certificate of merit and failed to present a reasonable explanation orlegitimate excuse for not timely filing a certificate of merit. See also Glenn v. Mataloni, 949A.2d 966 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008) (holding Plaintiff’s motion to extend time to file a certificateof merit was properly denied where Plaintiff’s motion only stated there was a “difficulty” insecuring a certificate of merit and did not set forth any specific actions Plaintiff took to secure acertificate of merit).In D.V. v. Westmoreland County Children’s Bureau, No. 07-829, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS15951 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2008), the court examined whether a certificate of merit is required toassert a claim under federal law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the First andFourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff’s claims arose out of a report issued by a psychologist, whowas hired by Westmoreland County Children’s Bureau and resulted in the suspension ofPlaintiff’s custodial rights of his children. The court stated the standard for determining whethera right conferred under the United States Constitution was violated is different than the standardfor determining whether there was a violation of state tort law. The court explained that the DueProcess Clause is not implicated by a negligent act. The court further determined that when a§1983 claim is asserted, the court must look at the underlying substantive right that was violated,which Plaintiff asserted was a violation of his United States Constitutional Rights.The court also examined Plaintiff’s argument Rule 1042.3 is pre-empted by §1983. Thecourt further examined whether a state procedural rule, such as a notice of claim provision, wasapplicable to §1983 actions brought in federal court. The specific question for the court was“whether the state statute was ‘indispensible’ to the federal scheme of justice, requiring thefederal court to borrow it under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.”The court followed the three step analysis required by §1988, for determining whetherRule 1042.3 is indispensible to the federal scheme of justice. The court stopped their analysis atstep one, finding step one was met because “this state rule is not vital to the adjudication of126
federal issues because the federal laws address the same concern through F.R.C.P. Rule 11(b),and F.R.C.P. Rule 26(a)(2).” The court reasoned, since Rule 11(b) (which providesrepresentations to the court are made for proper purpose) and 26(a)(2) (which governs disclosureof expert testimony) address the concern of weeding out “clearly nonmeritorious lawsuits earlyin the litigation process,” Rule 1042.3 does not need to be imported into the federal judicialsystem.Likewise, in Staten v. Lackawanna County, No. 4:07-CV-1329, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS6539 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2008), the District Court examined whether a certificate of merit neededto be filed in cases involving claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Specifically, in cases wherePlaintiff alleged Defendant violated her constitutional rights by acting with deliberateindifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs. The court held a certificate of merit was not requiredbecause Plaintiff did not allege a state law negligence claim and instead claimed herconstitutional rights were violated. The court noted, even if the certificate of merit rule could bedeemed applicable to a claim under the Eighth Amendment, the Supremacy Clause would beviolated for a federal or state court to require a certificate of merit to be filed in a case involvinga claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The court explained, if the certificate of merit requirement wasapplied to causes of action based solely on federal law, it would interfere with federal law bycreating a barrier to plaintiffs pursuing their rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Therefore, acertificate of merit does not need to be filed to support a claim for a violation of constitutionalrights brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983, even if the claim alleges defendant violated Plaintiff’sconstitutional rights by acting with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs.In US Airways, Inc. v. Elliot Equipment Co., Inc., No. 06-CV-1481, 2007 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 78332 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2007), Plaintiff filed a complaint against various Defendants fordamage sustained to an aircraft. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint naming anadditional third party Defendant. The allegations against the third party Defendant included aclaim the defendant negligently provided professional services.Plaintiff failed to file a certificate of merit within the sixty day time frame. The thirdparty Defendant filed a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss based upon Plaintiff’s failure to file acertificate of merit. In response, Plaintiff argued that Defendant’s motion should be deniedbecause: (i) Rule 1042.3 had not yet been held applicable to a federal court sitting in diversity;(ii) the delay in filing the certificate of merit was reasonable due to lead counsel being out onmaternity leave; (iii) third party Defendant waived its objection because it failed to raise theobjection in its answer; and (iv) Plaintiff’s failure to file a certificate of merit did not prejudiceadditional Defendant; third party Defendant remained a party to this action because otherdefendants have filed certificate of merits to support their claims.At the outset, the court found that Rule 1042.3 does not conflict with the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure. As such, the rule must be applied by the federal courts sitting in diversity. Thecourt held that the claims against third party Defendant essentially amounted to a claim that thisDefendant rendered professional services; therefore, Plaintiff was required to file a certificate ofmerit. The court found Plaintiff’s inability to file a certificate of merit due to lead counsel beingout on maternity leave unpersuasive. Additionally, the court noted that Rule 1042.3 does notrequire a defendant to assert the rule in its answer. Finally, the court held that the fact that other127
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EMTALA CASES ......................
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Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
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II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
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The Superior Court reversed the tri
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to a third party pursuant to the st
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After approximately five months, De
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learned the day after the surgery t
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conduct to the delay in colon cance
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court admitted the expert’s testi
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(b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
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corroborated his testimony. The cou
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husband’s estate. Plaintiff alleg
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Other notable federal cases arising
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The Superior Court found that in re
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§ 1303.512(b). The court, however,
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In Neidig v. United States, No. 07-
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Additionally, the Supreme Court not
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were not indicated for her conditio
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surgeon is the same as it would be
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It should be noted that the Superio
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Finally, the court held that the tr
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania r
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nurses deviating from applicable st
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certainty, the court reviews expert
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Under Pennsylvania law, the Court n
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testimony, Defendant presented his
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Following Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.
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Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
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where payment is made by Medicaid w
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accomplished. In Valles v. Albert E
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In 1980, the Pennsylvania Superior
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Plaintiff had a routine monitoring
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Plaintiff’s Contract ClaimsThe Co
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is a failure to report changes in a
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unit to assure post-surgical patien
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sliced his wrist and arm with a raz
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licensed professionals for whom the
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(c)Limitations of Corporate Neglige
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Even more recently, our Superior Co
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Upholding the Superior Court’s Or
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Id.Rejecting revocation and suspens
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order as a sanction under Rule 4019
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