sliced his wrist and arm with a razorblade. Id. at *2. Nearly one (1) year after his initial request,the decedent hung himself with a bed sheet in his cell. Id. at *3. Among other claims, theplaintiff, administrator of the decedent’s estate, set forth a claim of corporate liability againstMHM. Id. at *4. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that “MHM’s policies prevented [thedecedent] from receiving proper in or outpatient psychiatric care, and that these policies weremotivated by MHM’s desire to maximize profits.” Id. at *3. The plaintiff maintains that, due toMHM’s policies, the decedent did not receive appropriate care, which caused a decline in hismental health and ultimately his death. Id.The defendant MHM filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 12(b)(6). Id. at *4. In its motion, the defendant argued, inter alia, that the “plaintiffhas failed to state a claim of corporate liability as this is a limited cause of action in Pennsylvaniawhich does not extend beyond hospitals.” Id. at *7. The district court noted that thePennsylvania Supreme Court had not yet ruled on this issue; therefore, it was tasked atattempting to predict how that court would rule. Id. The court agreed with prior decisions of theEastern District of Pennsylvania, as well as other lower Pennsylvania state courts, which havepermitted corporate liability claims against private companies, such as MHM. Id. Specifically,the court explained that the Pennsylvania Courts have held institutions liable where the patients“[h]ad been constrained in their choice of medical care options by the entity sued.” Id.Moreover, the court noted “[n]o difference between the services provided by a hospital and theservices provided by health care institutions in prisons.” Id. Consequently, the court concludedthat “[a] corporation which provides medical services must be held to the same duty of care ashospitals.” Id. at *8. The court further found that the plaintiff had sufficiently pled this claim.Accordingly, the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss was denied on this issue. Id.See also Vochinksy v. Geo Group, Inc., 2009 WL 4017254 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2009)(holding plaintiff failed to state corporate liability claim where plaintiff failed to allege corporatedefendant’s knowledge of defect in procedure that resulted in harm to plaintiff).In Stroud v. Abington Memorial Hospital, 546 F. Supp. 2d. 238 (E.D. Pa. 2008), theUnited State District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that, under the moreliberal federal pleading standards, Plaintiff sufficiently pled a claim of corporate negligencedespite failing to allege that Defendant hospital was aware of its inadequate policies andprocedures.In Stroud, Plaintiff sued Defendant Abington Memorial Hospital (“Abington”) followingthe death of his father due to complications after knee surgery. In the Complaint, Plaintiffalleged that Abington was negligent for failing to have in place and enforce proper policies andprocedures for interdepartmental communication. Id. at 242. Defendant Abington subsequentlyfiled a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6), arguing, inter alia, that Plaintiff’sSecond Amended Complaint failed to state a claim for corporate negligence by “fail[ing] toadequately plead that it knew or reasonably should have known of the alleged failings in itspatient care procedures.” Id. at 245.Taking into the account the relaxed federal pleading standards, the court held thatalthough plaintiff had not expressly pled that Abington actually or constructively knew of thealleged defects in its patient care procedures:68
The Second Amended Complaint does however contain a detailedrecitation of the facts upon which the corporate negligence claim ispredicated. In addition, he specifically pled, among other things,that Hospital failed to have proper rules, policies, and proceduresin place concerning communication of critical test results andavailability of existing patient medical records from prioradmissions. He also specifically pled that Hospital failed toenforce its existing rules, policies, and procedures concerning suchmatters. These pled facts are certainly sufficient to give notice toHospital that Plaintiff reasonably asserted that its interdepartmentalcommunication procedures were deficient, and that this deficiencywas the predicate upon which the corporate negligence claim wasbased.Id. at 246 (citations omitted).Accordingly, the court concluded that Plaintiff’s corporate negligence claim stated alegally cognizable cause of action under the Federal Rules, and Abington’s motion to dismisswas denied (the corporate negligence claim was ultimately dismissed on other grounds,however). Id.(iii) Expert testimony RequiredUnless the matter under investigation is so simple and the lack of skill or want of care isso obvious as to be within the ordinary experience and comprehension of even non-professionalpersons, a plaintiff must produce expert testimony to establish that the hospital deviated from anaccepted standard of care and that the deviation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’sharm. Welsh v. Bulger, 548 Pa. 504, 698 A.2d 581 (1997).In Rauch v. Mike-Mayer, 2001 Pa. Super. 270, 783 A.2d 815 (2001), appeal denied, 568Pa. 634, 793 A.2d 909 (2002), the Superior Court held that where a hospital’s negligence is notobvious, Plaintiff’s expert witness must, in order to make out a prima facie case of medicalmalpractice, establish the following: (1) that the hospital deviated from the standard of care; and(2) the deviation was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. Plaintiff’s experts’ reportsin this case had fulfilled these requirements and, therefore, the trial court had erred in grantingDefendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The Superior Court reversed.(iv) Certificate of Merit RequiredA claim for corporate negligence against a hospital (or other qualifying corporate entity)requires the filing of a proper Certificate of Merit stating that an appropriate licensedprofessional has opined in writing that there is a “reasonable probability” that the care, skill, orknowledge associated with the treatment, practice, or work of the defendant fell outsideacceptable professional standards and that such conduct was a cause in bringing about the harm.See Pa. R. Civ. P. 1042.3; see also, Rostock v. Anzalone, 904 A.2d 943 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006);Weaver v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., No. 08-411, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57988 (W.D. Pa.July 30, 2008). Critically, a Certificate of Merit submitted in support of a corporate negligenceclaim must allege that the corporate entity itself deviated from the appropriate standard of care,not that the corporate entity’s liability is based solely upon the actions or inactions of other69
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EMTALA CASES ......................
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Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
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II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
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The Superior Court reversed the tri
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to a third party pursuant to the st
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After approximately five months, De
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learned the day after the surgery t
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conduct to the delay in colon cance
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court admitted the expert’s testi
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(b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
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- Page 28 and 29: Other notable federal cases arising
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- Page 34 and 35: In Neidig v. United States, No. 07-
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- Page 42 and 43: It should be noted that the Superio
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- Page 52 and 53: Under Pennsylvania law, the Court n
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- Page 56 and 57: Following Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.
- Page 58 and 59: Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
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- Page 62 and 63: accomplished. In Valles v. Albert E
- Page 64 and 65: In 1980, the Pennsylvania Superior
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- Page 84 and 85: affidavit submitted by Defendants o
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foreclose all challenges against th
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number of boxes), which was support
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questions of professional judgment
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deviated from any professional stan
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The Third Circuit affirmed the Dist
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claims and cross-claims remain agai
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By an Amendatory Order dated March
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The court acknowledged that there i
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apply and that the trial court misa
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Barbados had enough litigation-spec
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E. Preemption of Vaccine Design Def
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2. Pa. R. Civ. Pro. 1036.1 - Reinst
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Barrick, at *34-35.Furthermore, the
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(b) the utility of the defendant’
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2006). In this case, Plaintiffs bro
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B. Elements of a Cause of Action fo
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decision in Muhammad precluded Mr.
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considered speculative “only if t
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underlying cause of action involved
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In Capital Care Corp., the Superior
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The court found, however, to state
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of reasonable diligence. The standa
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not be set aside. On July 7, 2005,
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complete bar to recovery. Since a l
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On appeal, Plaintiffs claimed that
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In Liggon-Redding, 659 F.3d at 265,
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elieved of those minimum standards
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elevant to the proceedings, the com
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establish professional misconduct b
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Upholding the Superior Court’s Or
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Id.Rejecting revocation and suspens
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order as a sanction under Rule 4019
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