Barrick, at *34-35.Furthermore, the written communication between counsel andan expert witness retained by counsel is not discoverable underthe Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent thatsuch communication is protected by the work-productdoctrine, unless the proponent of the discovery request showspursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 4003.5(a)(2) specifically why thecommunication itself is relevant. As such, we also hold thatPa.R.C.P. 4003.3 immunizes from discovery any work productcontained within the correspondence between Appellants'counsel and Dr. Green.B. Release1. Maloney v. Valley Med. Facilities, Inc., 984 A.2d 478 (Pa. 2009)This important case held that a release of a principal, who was only liable under vicariousliability, does not release the agent. In Mamalis v. Atlas Van Lines, 560 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1989),the Supreme Court held that release of the agent operated to release the principal who was liablefor vicarious liability. The release of the active tortfeasor released the passive tortfeasor. Laterin Pallante v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 629 A.2d 146 (Pa. 1993), the court held that theopposite was also true.In Maloney, the plaintiff settled with the vicariously liable principal, and the releaseattempted to carve out the agent. The agent moved for summary judgment citing Pallante, andthe trial court granted the motion. The Superior Court affirmed, reasoning that there was a singleact that caused the damage. The Supreme Court reversed, essentially reversing Pallante, andholding that where the plaintiff releases a principal for vicarious liability only, and preserves itsclaim against the agent, the claims against the agent are not released.2. Tindall v. Friedman, 970 A.2d 1159 (Pa. Super. 2009)The court addressed the issue of whether a release including language that explicitlyreserves the right of the plaintiff to pursue excess insurance policy coverage applies to theMCARE fund. It is well settled Pennsylvania law that the court will scrutinize releaseagreements to a contract law analysis. Here, the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice claimagainst multiple parties including Dr. Schweitzer, the physician responsible for the reading of theMRI. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that Dr. Schweitzer failed to follow the primary carephysician’s orders to analyze the plaintiff’s MRI results for a calcified hematoma or a neoplasm,the latter being cancerous. Due to this failed procedure, the cancer diagnosis was delayed andthe plaintiff endured an increased injury, additional medical costs, and a number of avoidableinjuries. Before the trial commenced, the plaintiff agreed to a partial release of Dr. Schweitzerthat provided in exchange for $400,000, the primary medical insurance coverage limit, hispersonal assets would not be pursued. Further, the release agreement expressly stated that theplaintiff reserved the right to pursue Dr. Schweitzer and all other defendants to collect primaryand excess insurance policies regarding this matter.142
The trial court concluded that for all intents and purposes, the MCARE fund acts as aninsurance provider for medical professionals and institutions. It is undisputed that the purpose ofthe MCARE fund is to pay medical malpractice claims for losses or damages incurred in excessof the basic professional insurance coverage. Further, medical professionals and institutions arerequired by law to contribute to the MCARE fund annually. The court reasoned that theMCARE fund was functionally equivalent to an excess insurance policy. The court, however,did not take into consideration the express language of the release agreement reserving the rightof the plaintiff to pursue excess insurance policies.In Mamalis, the court held that the release of a principal would then automatically releasethe agent from any further exposure to liability. See Mamalis v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 560 A.2d1380 (Pa. 1989). Here, the Superior court distinguished Mamalis on the grounds that this is not afull release agreement but instead merely intended and expressly stated as a partial release of aportion of the defendants exposure of liability. Therefore, the court held that the plaintiff wasentitled to continue to pursue the MCARE fund as it was not restricted by the release agreement.C. No Tort for Negligent Spoliation of EvidenceIn Pyeritz v. Commonwealth, No. 9 WAP 2009, 2011 Pa. LEXIS 2831 (Pa. Nov. 23,2011), the Supreme Court decided an issue with potentially frequent and far-reachingimplications – whether a tort exists for negligent spoliation of evidence. In Pyeritz:. . . Appellants sued Appellees based on the destruction ofpersonal property, to wit, a black nylon tree stand safetyharness, or belt, that allegedly was crucial evidence in aseparate civil action. The Pennsylvania State Police ("StatePolice") had seized this item during a criminal investigation ofa suspicious death. A state trooper had agreed to retain the beltin the custody of the State Police, apparently for a longerperiod of time than permitted by internal State Policeregulations, for Appellants' later use. However, the belt wasdestroyed before Appellants' counsel asked for its return.Appellants sued, and the trial court granted summaryjudgment to Appellees, which judgment the CommonwealthCourt affirmed. The Commonwealth Court held, inter alia,that no cause of action exists against a third party — someoneother than the original alleged tortfeasor — for negligentspoliation of evidence.Pyeritz, 2011 Pa. LEXIS 2831, at *1-2. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 11 concluded thatPennsylvania law does not recognize a cause of action for negligent spoliation of evidence.In reaching the conclusion that it did, the Supreme Court determined that in weighingwhether to impose a duty – examining factors of (a) the relationship between the parties,11 Justice McCaffery wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Castille, Justice Saylor, and JusticeBaer joined. Justice Eakin and Justice Todd wrote concurring opinions.143
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EMTALA CASES ......................
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Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
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II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
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The Superior Court reversed the tri
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to a third party pursuant to the st
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After approximately five months, De
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learned the day after the surgery t
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conduct to the delay in colon cance
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court admitted the expert’s testi
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(b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
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corroborated his testimony. The cou
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husband’s estate. Plaintiff alleg
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Other notable federal cases arising
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The Superior Court found that in re
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§ 1303.512(b). The court, however,
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In Neidig v. United States, No. 07-
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Additionally, the Supreme Court not
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were not indicated for her conditio
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surgeon is the same as it would be
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It should be noted that the Superio
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Finally, the court held that the tr
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania r
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nurses deviating from applicable st
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certainty, the court reviews expert
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Under Pennsylvania law, the Court n
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testimony, Defendant presented his
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Following Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.
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Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
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where payment is made by Medicaid w
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accomplished. In Valles v. Albert E
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In 1980, the Pennsylvania Superior
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Plaintiff had a routine monitoring
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Plaintiff’s Contract ClaimsThe Co
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is a failure to report changes in a
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unit to assure post-surgical patien
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sliced his wrist and arm with a raz
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licensed professionals for whom the
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(c)Limitations of Corporate Neglige
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Even more recently, our Superior Co
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(a)HMO IssuesIn McClellan v. Health
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affidavit submitted by Defendants o
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treatments while at VA’s faciliti
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[s]ubstantively, we believe that a
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The party claiming the benefit of t
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deprive (him) of civil rights guara
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found that the District Court was w
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With respect to fraudulent concealm
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