2012 PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY UPDATE - Eckert Seamans

from defendant Hose’s home. Plaintiff relied on Miller v. Philadelphia Geriatric Center, 463F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2006), in which the Court “carved out ‘a narrow equitable exception toKubrick’s reasonable person standard for mentally incapacitated persons who, for whateverreason, do not have a legally appointed guardian to act in their stead.’” Kach, 589 F.3d 626 at636. Plaintiff alleged that she was without a legal guardian during the time that she was indefendant Hose’s home. The Court noted that because the plaintiff reached the age of majorityin 1999, even if she had lacked a guardian, she would have to prove that she was mentallyincompetent prior to the government conduct that injured her in order to qualify for the Millerexception.Additionally, plaintiff argued that Pennsylvania “recognizes duress as a statute-oflimitationstolling mechanism.” Id. at 639. The Court disagreed that the cases relied upon by theplaintiff concluded that duress was an appropriate reason for tolling a statute of limitations. TheCourt even did its own survey of Pennsylvania law and concluded that no cases have even hintedthat duress is “a cognizable tolling device under Pennsylvania law.” Id. at 640. Plaintiff alsoargued that Pennsylvania’s discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations on her claims.However, the plaintiff seemed to confuse the discovery rule with Pennsylvania’s infancy tollingprovision and its 2002 amendment permitting someone who suffered childhood sexual abuse tocommence a civil action up to 12 years after reaching the age of 18. Nevertheless, the Courtrefers to the statutory language which clearly states that the amendment is not retroactive,therefore, because plaintiff’s claims were already time-barred at the moment the amendment wasenacted, the Plaintiff could not rely on the statute to revive her claims. Plaintiff fared no betterwith her argument that federal tolling law made her claims timely because she could not showthat Pennsylvania state law conflicted with a federal law or policy.As to the issue of whether defendant Hose was acting under the color of state law, theCourt determines that defendant Hose does not qualify as a state actor under any of the threetests outlined by the Supreme Court: “‘(1) whether the private entity has exercised powers thatare traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state’; (2) ‘whether the private party has actedwith the help or in concert with state officials’; and (3) whether ‘the [s]tate has so far insinuateditself into a position of interdependence with the acting party that it must be recognized as a jointparticipant in the challenged activity.’” Kach, 589 F.3d 626 at 646 (quoting Mark v. Borough ofHatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1142 (3d Cir. 1995)). The Court found that plaintiff’s assertions failedthe first test because she put forth no evidence that school security is purely a function of thestate. Similarly, the Court found that Plaintiff’s case failed the third test because there is noevidence that defendant Hose’s relationship with her was at the direction of any school official.Defendant Hose’s behavior was instead of his own accord and in violation of his prescribedduties. Therefore, he was not acting under color of law and the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim againsthim fails.Finally, the Court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the District Court should havemaintained jurisdiction over the state law claims that plaintiff raised against the defendants whofailed to respond to the federal claims. The Court points to statutory language allowing districtcourts to decline supplementary jurisdiction if “the district court has dismissed all claims overwhich it has original jurisdiction.” Id. at 650 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)). Therefore, the Court87