were not indicated for her condition, that they were improperly performed and that appropriatetests and consultations regarding Plaintiff’s condition were not undertaken.At trial in 2002, Plaintiff called Charles Bull, M.D., who testified regarding his educationand experience. Plaintiff’s counsel then offered Dr. Bull as an expert in the field of orthopedicmedicine and orthopedic surgery. Defendants objected, arguing that Dr. Bull was not qualifiedbecause he was not board-certified, not licensed to practice in the United States and had neverdone surgery in the United States. The trial court ruled Dr. Bull was not qualified and precludedhis testimony. Plaintiff had no other standard of care expert and so a non-suit was entered infavor of defendants.In 2003, the Superior Court ruled that Dr. Bull did, in fact, have sufficient skill,knowledge and experience to aid the jury in making their determination, and remanded the casefor a new trial. In February 2005, before the second trial was to begin, Defendants filed a motionseeking once again to have Dr. Bull disqualified as an expert, arguing that he was not qualifiedunder the MCARE Act, and for summary judgment. The trial court granted this motion andPlaintiff once again appealed.On this appeal, the Superior Court first rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the prior findingthat Dr. Bull was qualified as an expert was not the controlling law of the case, because the courthad reached that determination “under the liberal common law standard” and now Defendantswere challenging his qualifications under the MCARE Act standards. The Court also rejectedPlaintiff’s arguments that the MCARE Act should not be applied retroactively to this case and ifit were, Plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to secure a substitute expert. The SuperiorCourt noted that the presumption against retroactivity does not apply to purely proceduralstatutes, and concluded that § 1303.512 of the MCARE Act is procedural and so could be appliedretroactively to this case. With respect to Plaintiff’s argument that she should be allowed tosecure a replacement expert, the Court found that she had not developed this argument and so itwas waived.Finally, the Superior Court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that Dr. Bull was qualified under§ 1303.512 of MCARE. The Court examined Dr. Bull’s qualifications in detail under theprovisions of this section and concluded that because he only possessed a license to practicemedicine in Canada, he was not qualified because he failed to meet the requirement ofpossessing an unrestricted physician’s license in any state or the District of Columbia.Consequently, and because Plaintiff conceded she had no other standard of care expert to testifyon her behalf, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of Defendant’s motion forsummary judgment.In Smith v. Paoli Memorial Hospital, 885 A.2d 1012 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005), the issueinvolved was whether Plaintiff’s expert witnesses, a surgeon and an oncologist/internist, werequalified to testify as to the standard of care of Defendant gastroenterologists pursuant to therequirements of the MCARE Act. The Superior Court affirmed the lower court’s decision andheld that Plaintiff’s experts were qualified to testify at trial.Donald J. Smith, administrator of the estate of his late wife, filed a wrongful death andsurvival action. Plaintiff claimed that Defendant physicians breached the standard of care in32
failing to timely diagnose and treat the decedent’s small bowel leiomyosarcoma, therebyresulting in her untimely death. Specifically, the decedent presented to Dr. Battafarano’s officein May 1998 with rectal bleeding.In support of his claim, Plaintiff experts retained W. Stuart Battle, M.D., a board-certifiedgeneral surgeon, and Allen Krutchik, M.D., a board-certified oncologist and internist, to addressthe standard of care for determining the cause of occult gastrointestinal bleeding. Specifically,the experts were retained to address whether gastroenterologists, Drs. Tolin and Astroff,breached the standard of care by failing to order a CT scan to investigate the possibility of asource extrinsic to the GI tract.Ten days prior to trial, Defendants filed motions in limine seeking to preclude Plaintiff’sexperts from testifying based upon their purported lack of qualification pursuant to the MCAREAct. Although Plaintiff agreed that the experts did not possess expertise in the subspecialty ofgastroenterology, Plaintiff asserted that their specialties and/or subspecialties overlap with that ofgastroenterology as to the standard of care applicable when a patient presents to anyappropriately trained medical care provider with an obscure GI bleed. The trial court deniedDefendants’ motion and concluded that both Drs. Battle and Krutchik met the requirements ofthe MCARE Act. Specifically, the court stated that Dr. Battle was board-certified in surgery,which overlaps with gastroenterology for the specific care at issue in this case and Dr. Krutchikwas board-certified in medical oncology which is a subspecialty of internal medicine, which hasa substantially similar standard of care as gastroenterology for the specific care at issue in thiscase.Defendants appealed the trial court determination. The Superior Court upheld the trialcourt’s order denying Defendants’ motion in limine. The court concluded that the MCARE Actrequires that experts be familiar with the standard of care for the specific care at issue andpractice in the same or a substantially similar subspecialty which has a substantially similarstandard of care for the specific care at issue. 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1303.512(c)(1). Althoughgastroenterology is not a subspecialty of oncology or general surgery, the court concluded that itis a subspecialty of internal medicine, in which Dr. Krutchik was board-certified. Further, Dr.Krutchik testified that he saw “all kinds of patients,” including patients with variousgastrointestinal cancers, including soft tissue sarcoma. Additionally, Dr. Krutchik instructedmedical students in the examination, diagnosis and management of patients with various cancers.He published papers on all types of sarcoma, including soft tissue sarcoma and small bowelsarcoma. Dr. Krutchik testified that there is an overlap in the standard of care among physiciansspecializing in different areas, i.e. internist, gastroenterologist, oncologist who are all involved inthe treatment of cancer and non-cancer related problems.Further, the court concluded that Dr. Battle is a general surgeon with specialization ingastrointestinal surgery. He testified that over the past thirty-three years he has diagnosed andtreated cancers of the intra-abdominal organs, specifically the gastrointestinal tract, the thyroidand skin cancers such as melanoma and smaller cancers of the skin. Dr. Battle was a member ofthe American Society of Gastrointestinal Endoscopy and had been one for over thirty years at thetime of trial. Dr. Battle was familiar with the standard of care for the evaluation and work-up ofa sixty year old woman with GI bleeding. Dr. Battle testified that the standard of care for a33
- Page 3 and 4: EMTALA CASES ......................
- Page 5: Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
- Page 8 and 9: II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
- Page 10 and 11: The Superior Court reversed the tri
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- Page 14 and 15: After approximately five months, De
- Page 16 and 17: learned the day after the surgery t
- Page 18 and 19: conduct to the delay in colon cance
- Page 20 and 21: court admitted the expert’s testi
- Page 22 and 23: (b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
- Page 24 and 25: corroborated his testimony. The cou
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- Page 28 and 29: Other notable federal cases arising
- Page 30 and 31: The Superior Court found that in re
- Page 32 and 33: § 1303.512(b). The court, however,
- Page 34 and 35: In Neidig v. United States, No. 07-
- Page 36 and 37: Additionally, the Supreme Court not
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- Page 42 and 43: It should be noted that the Superio
- Page 44 and 45: Finally, the court held that the tr
- Page 46 and 47: The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania r
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- Page 52 and 53: Under Pennsylvania law, the Court n
- Page 54 and 55: testimony, Defendant presented his
- Page 56 and 57: Following Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.
- Page 58 and 59: Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
- Page 60 and 61: where payment is made by Medicaid w
- Page 62 and 63: accomplished. In Valles v. Albert E
- Page 64 and 65: In 1980, the Pennsylvania Superior
- Page 66 and 67: Plaintiff had a routine monitoring
- Page 68 and 69: Plaintiff’s Contract ClaimsThe Co
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- Page 72 and 73: unit to assure post-surgical patien
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- Page 76 and 77: licensed professionals for whom the
- Page 78 and 79: (c)Limitations of Corporate Neglige
- Page 80 and 81: Even more recently, our Superior Co
- Page 82 and 83: (a)HMO IssuesIn McClellan v. Health
- Page 84 and 85: affidavit submitted by Defendants o
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[s]ubstantively, we believe that a
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The party claiming the benefit of t
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deprive (him) of civil rights guara
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found that the District Court was w
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With respect to fraudulent concealm
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would be applied in situations wher
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they had not raised them in the cou
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(a)Informed ConsentUnder MCARE, a p
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civil enforcement provisions and ma
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MCARE also changes the manner in wh
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whose death, in 2005, was allegedly
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vicariously liable if the plaintiff
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health center or its equivalent or
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In Pennsylvania Medical Society, th
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to any professional who is alleged
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Since the 2005 amendments, there ha
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ule, but who intentionally ignores
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the original Complaint was delivere
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foreclose all challenges against th
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number of boxes), which was support
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questions of professional judgment
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deviated from any professional stan
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The Third Circuit affirmed the Dist
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claims and cross-claims remain agai
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By an Amendatory Order dated March
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The court acknowledged that there i
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apply and that the trial court misa
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Barbados had enough litigation-spec
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E. Preemption of Vaccine Design Def
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2. Pa. R. Civ. Pro. 1036.1 - Reinst
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Barrick, at *34-35.Furthermore, the
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(b) the utility of the defendant’
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2006). In this case, Plaintiffs bro
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B. Elements of a Cause of Action fo
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decision in Muhammad precluded Mr.
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considered speculative “only if t
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underlying cause of action involved
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In Capital Care Corp., the Superior
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The court found, however, to state
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of reasonable diligence. The standa
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not be set aside. On July 7, 2005,
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complete bar to recovery. Since a l
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On appeal, Plaintiffs claimed that
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In Liggon-Redding, 659 F.3d at 265,
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elieved of those minimum standards
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elevant to the proceedings, the com
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establish professional misconduct b
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Upholding the Superior Court’s Or
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Id.Rejecting revocation and suspens
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order as a sanction under Rule 4019
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