(c)Limitations of Corporate NegligenceUntil relatively recently, neither the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania nor the StateSuperior Court had addressed the issue of whether the doctrine of corporate liability should beextended to physicians’ practices or professional corporations. Then, in Sutherland v.Monongahela Valley Hospital, 856 A.2d 55 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004), in a very brief section of itsopinion, the Superior Court “declined” Defendant-physician’s “invitation to extend thenegligence principles contemplated by Thompson” to the physician’s practice. While thisopinion held only that the court would not extend the negligence principles of Thompson “to thecase sub judice,” the reasoning of the court appears to apply more generally. The court reasoned:Id. (citations omitted).We note that the policy considerations underlying the PennsylvaniaSupreme Court’s creation of the theory of corporate liability forhospitals are not present in the situation of a physician’s office. InThompson, the Supreme Court recognized that “the corporatehospital of today has assumed the role of a comprehensive healthcenter with responsibility for arranging and coordinating the totalhealth care of its patients.” The same cannot be said for aphysician’s practice group.However, in Zambino v. Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania, No. 06-3561, 2006U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69119 (E.D. Pa. September 25, 2006), the United States District Court for theEastern District of Pennsylvania denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s corporatenegligence claim against Defendant hospital trustees, health system and practice group. Thecourt noted that although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not addressed the extension ofcorporate liability to medical providers other than hospitals, other courts (such as thePennsylvania Superior Court in Shannon v. McNulty, infra) have extended this doctrine to otherentities in limited circumstances “such as when the patient is constrained in his or her choice ofmedical care options by the entity sued, and the entity controls the patient’s total health care.”The court held that Plaintiffs were entitled to develop a factual record to support the applicationof this theory to Defendants, and that they may be able to show that Defendants were hospitalentities against whom they could maintain a corporate negligence claim.In Hyrcza v. West Penn Allegheny Health System, Inc., 978 A.2d 961 (Pa. Super. Ct.2009), reargument denied, 2009 Pa. Super. LEXIS 4448 (Pa. Super. Sept. 11, 2009), the SuperiorCourt confronted numerous objections raised by Defendant-appellants, a physician and aprofessional corporation, after a trial on claims sounding in medical malpractice and corporatenegligence resulted in the entry of a multi-million dollar judgment against them. One of thearguments the Superior Court confronted on appeal, was whether the jury should have beencharged on the issue of corporate negligence, with respect to the appellant professionalcorporation. The appellant corporation argued that professional corporations are not liable undera theory of corporate negligence. The Superior Court acknowledged its prior decision inSutherland v. Monongahela Valley Hospital, 856 A.2d 55 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004), in which it haddeclined to extend the doctrine of corporate negligence to physicians’ offices. Ultimately,however, the Hyrcza Court concluded that the appellant corporation was more in the nature of a72
hospital or HMO, as to whom corporate negligence claims have been found viable. Citing toboth Thompson v. Nason Hospital, 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991) and Shannon v. McNulty, 718 A.2d828 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998), the Hyrcza court concluded that the trial court did not err in chargingthe jury on corporate negligence.By way of additional background, the professional corporation at issue held an agreementwith the rehabilitation unit of a hospital, “to provide medical care for patients admitted to itsRehabilitation Unit.” Hyrcza, 978 A.2d at 966 (quoting the Trial Court Opinion). Theprofessional corporation was responsible for the decision to assign the Defendant-appellantphysician to Decedent’s care, following Decedent’s successful hip surgery. Plaintiff theorizedthat Defendant physician erred in prescribing and continuing decedent “on two medications,which, in combination, are known to cause stomach bleeding, without taking appropriateprecautions or monitoring her.” Id. at 967 (quoting the Trial Court Opinion). Apparently,Decedent had showed signs of gastrointestinal bleeding on July 4, 2001, two days prior to thetime that the Defendant-appellant physician left the professional corporation’s care. On July 8,2001, the decedent had to be transferred to the intensive care unit for shortness of breath; shedied two days after that, “from massive gastrointestinal bleeding.” Id. at 967 (quoting the TrialCourt Opinion). Notably, after the appellant physician left the professional corporation’semploy, the professional corporation did not assign another physician to Decedent’s care. Id.The Superior Court wrestled with whether Defendant-appellant corporation was moreakin to a Hospital or HMO on the one hand, or a physician’s office on the other, the latter ofwhich no liability attaches to under a corporate negligence theory. The trial court found that:[Defendant-appellant] arranged and coordinated the total healthcare for its patients in the Rehabilitation Unit. [The appellantcorporation]was responsible for all of the medical care of patientsin the Rehab Unit. There was testimony from physicians affiliatedwith [the appellant-corporation] that the corporation had all theduties of a hospital under [Thompson] except the duty to usereasonable care in the maintenance of safe and adequate facilitiesand equipment . . . .. . .After [the appellant-physician] left, [the appellant-corporation] didnot assign another physician to attend to Decedent. It did notarrange for another physician to check on her after July 5 th ,literally leaving her in the Rehabilitation Unit bleeding to death.Id. at 983. The Superior Court concluded that the appellant corporation was “responsible for thecoordination and management of all patients in the rehabilitation unit at [the hospital], which itindependently operated,” and that it “failed to deliver the comprehensive care it wascontractually obligated to provide the Decedent.” Id., at 984. The Superior Court thus agreedwith the trial court’s decision to charge the jury regarding corporate negligence.73
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EMTALA CASES ......................
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Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
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II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
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The Superior Court reversed the tri
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to a third party pursuant to the st
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After approximately five months, De
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learned the day after the surgery t
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conduct to the delay in colon cance
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court admitted the expert’s testi
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(b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
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corroborated his testimony. The cou
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husband’s estate. Plaintiff alleg
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- Page 58 and 59: Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
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questions of professional judgment
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deviated from any professional stan
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The Third Circuit affirmed the Dist
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claims and cross-claims remain agai
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By an Amendatory Order dated March
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The court acknowledged that there i
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apply and that the trial court misa
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Barbados had enough litigation-spec
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E. Preemption of Vaccine Design Def
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2. Pa. R. Civ. Pro. 1036.1 - Reinst
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Barrick, at *34-35.Furthermore, the
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(b) the utility of the defendant’
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2006). In this case, Plaintiffs bro
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B. Elements of a Cause of Action fo
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decision in Muhammad precluded Mr.
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considered speculative “only if t
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underlying cause of action involved
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In Capital Care Corp., the Superior
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The court found, however, to state
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of reasonable diligence. The standa
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not be set aside. On July 7, 2005,
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complete bar to recovery. Since a l
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On appeal, Plaintiffs claimed that
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In Liggon-Redding, 659 F.3d at 265,
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elieved of those minimum standards
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elevant to the proceedings, the com
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establish professional misconduct b
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Upholding the Superior Court’s Or
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Id.Rejecting revocation and suspens
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order as a sanction under Rule 4019
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