With respect to fraudulent concealment, that court noted that this also serves to toll thestatute of limitations, but that the court has not yet ruled upon the circumstances under which adefendant, once estopped under this doctrine, may invoke the statute of limitations andcommence its running. The court stated that the standard of reasonable diligence, which isapplied when the discovery rule is at issue, should also be applied when tolling takes place basedon the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. Consequently, the court held that “a statute oflimitations that is tolled by virtue of fraudulent concealment begins to run when the injured partyknows or reasonably should know of his injury and its cause.” Id. at 861.Applying the applicable principles of law to the cases at hand, the court found in boththat Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment because in both cases the jury needed todetermine what the dentist had said to the patient following surgery and whether these statementsamounted to fraudulent concealment. Thus, there were genuine issues of material fact withrespect to the statute of limitations defense.In Santos v. United States, 523 F. Supp. 2d 435, (M.D. Pa. 2007), rev’d, 559 F.3d 189 (3dCir. 2009), the minor Plaintiff alleged a failure to diagnose and treat an infection in Plaintiff’sneck area at a federally subsidized health care clinic. Plaintiff, unaware the health care providerswere deemed federal employees, filed suit in state court more than two years after the cause ofaction accrued but within the time allowed by Pennsylvania’s Minor’s Tolling Statute. The casewas removed to federal court, as it has exclusive jurisdiction over tort claims against federalemployees. Ultimately, the claims were dismissed by stipulation to allow Plaintiff to pursue anadministrative complaint. Plaintiff brought an administrative complaint, but it was subsequentlydenied.Pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), Plaintiff fileda claim in federal court. The FTCA requires that a claim be filed within two years from which itaccrues. Unlike Pennsylvania, the FTCA does not contain a minor tolling statute. However, itdoes contain a limited exception to save claims mistakenly filed in a state court within the twoyear statute of limitation.Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the claim was barred as itwas not filed within the FTCA’s two year statute of limitations. Although Plaintiff admitted thatthe claim was not brought within the FTCA’s two year statute of limitation, Plaintiff claimed thatthe statute of limitations should be equitably tolled. Plaintiff explained that she had no reason tobelieve that the clinic was a federal entity. However, Plaintiff admitted that she took no steps toconfirm this assumption.The Court found Plaintiff’s response unpersuasive and granted Defendant’s motion forsummary judgment. The court explained, “Plaintiff’s error does not amount to more than agarden-variety claim of excusable neglect, to which the Supreme Court has stated that equitabletolling should not extend.” Santos, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 443-44.On Appeal, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded concluding that there can beequitable tolling of the FTCA’s limitation period and that it was warranted in the instant case.See Santos v. U.S., 559 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2009). The court explained that although the statute of90
limitations under the FTCA was not tolled due to Plaintiff’s status as a minor, it was tolled forpurposes surrounding Plaintiff’s timely assertion of her rights in the wrong forum coupled withher exercising due diligence. See id. The court held that Plaintiff diligently and vigorouslypursued her claim, albeit prior to realizing that she filed a state court action against a federaldefendant. See id. at 198. Evidence in support of the diligence included the fact that sheretained diligent counsel who requested and reviewed medical records, visited Defendant,corresponded with Defendant, performed a public records search on Defendant, retained experts,all of whom prepared expert reports. See id.The Government argued that several other courts of appeals from other circuits held thatthe equitable tolling rule would not apply in those situations where Plaintiff failed to performreasonable investigations that would have demonstrated that Defendants had been deemedfederal employees covered by the FTCA. See id. at 199. The court explained that even thedistrict court concluded that it was not clear whether Plaintiff knew or should have known thatDefendant received federal funds. See id. at 200 The court went on to explain that the Plaintiff’sbelief that Defendant was a state entity, was far from a baseless assumption as Defendantresembled a private clinic and except for FTCA purposes, the clinic and its employees wereprivate actors rather than federal employees. See id. Plaintiff’s attorney also performed a publicrecords search on Defendant which revealed it as an apparently private corporation. Plaintiff’scounsel’s many visits and discussions with Defendant also failed to provide any evidence thatthey were indeed a Federal entity. See id. at 200-01.The Government argued, inter alia, that the website for Defendant indicated that it is a“federally qualified health center.” See id. at 201. The court explained that although Defendantreceived grant support from the United States Department of Health and Human Services:See Id.York Health and its employees did not become employees of theother entities supporting them. With respect to the significance ornot of federal aid, we cannot conceive that anyone would contendthat on the basis of the common law application of the doctrine ofrespondeat superior the entities contributing to York Health’sfunding, including the United States itself, would be liable forYork Health’s employees’ malpractice. After all, if making acontribution to an entity could have such a consequence,contributions to many charities . . . would cease.The court further held that if Defendant was a federal employee, it would not be expectedto be receiving state and local government aid or charitable contributions. See Id. In conclusion,the court held that the record revealed no reasons which should have caused Plaintiff to inquireinto the federal status of Defendant. See Id. at 202.The court warned that its decision to apply equitable tolling to the FTCA claim camewith great caution and was an extraordinary remedy that was rarely applied, however, tolling91
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EMTALA CASES ......................
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Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
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II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
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The Superior Court reversed the tri
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to a third party pursuant to the st
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After approximately five months, De
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learned the day after the surgery t
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conduct to the delay in colon cance
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court admitted the expert’s testi
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(b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
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corroborated his testimony. The cou
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husband’s estate. Plaintiff alleg
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Other notable federal cases arising
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The Superior Court found that in re
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§ 1303.512(b). The court, however,
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In Neidig v. United States, No. 07-
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Additionally, the Supreme Court not
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were not indicated for her conditio
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surgeon is the same as it would be
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It should be noted that the Superio
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Finally, the court held that the tr
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- Page 56 and 57: Following Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.
- Page 58 and 59: Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
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2. Pa. R. Civ. Pro. 1036.1 - Reinst
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Barrick, at *34-35.Furthermore, the
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(b) the utility of the defendant’
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2006). In this case, Plaintiffs bro
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B. Elements of a Cause of Action fo
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decision in Muhammad precluded Mr.
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considered speculative “only if t
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underlying cause of action involved
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In Capital Care Corp., the Superior
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The court found, however, to state
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of reasonable diligence. The standa
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not be set aside. On July 7, 2005,
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complete bar to recovery. Since a l
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On appeal, Plaintiffs claimed that
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In Liggon-Redding, 659 F.3d at 265,
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elieved of those minimum standards
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elevant to the proceedings, the com
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establish professional misconduct b
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Upholding the Superior Court’s Or
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Id.Rejecting revocation and suspens
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order as a sanction under Rule 4019
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