By an Amendatory Order dated March 3, 2003, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruledthat Pa. R. Civ. P. 1006 “shall apply to medical professional liability actions filed on or afterJanuary 1, 2002 and not to such action filed prior to that date.”The Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (“MCARE”) Act revised existinglaw regarding venue. Specifically, section 5101.1 of the Act relates to venue in medicalmalpractice actions. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5101.1. While previous venue principlesessentially permitted an action to be filed in a county in which any defendant conducted businessor had sufficient contacts, section 5101.1(b) specifically provides that a medical professionalliability action may only be filed in the county in which the cause of action arose. See id.Additionally, the Rules of Civil Procedure have recently been revised to conform to theGeneral Assembly’s changes set forth in MCARE. Rule 1006, relating to change of venue,provides that a medical malpractice action may be brought against a health care provider only ina county in which the cause of action arose. See Pa. R. Civ. P. 1006(a.1). Moreover, therevisions provide that if an action to enforce a joint or joint and several liability claim againsttwo or more defendants includes one or more medical malpractice claims, the action must bebrought in any county in which venue may properly be laid against any defendant undersubdivision (a.1). See Pa. R. Civ. P. 1006(c)(2). Section (f)(2) of the rule also sets forth that ifone or more of the causes of action stated against the same defendant is a medical malpracticeclaim, the action must be brought in a county required by subdivision (a.1). See Pa. R. Civ. P.1006(f)(2). The revisions to Rule 1006 as applied to individual defendants are incorporated intothe following other Rules of Civil Procedure: 2130 (Partnerships as Parties); 2156(Unincorporated Associates as Parties); and 2179 (Corporations and Similar Entities as Parties).By an Amendatory Order dated March 3, 2003, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruledthat Pa. R. Civ. P. 1006 “shall apply to medical professional liability actions filed on or afterJanuary 1, 2002 and not to such action filed prior to that date.”One recent venue case of interest, however, does not involve a medical malpracticeclaim. In Zappala v. Brandolini Property Management, Inc, 849 A.2d 1211 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004),aff’d & remanded, 909 A.2d 1272 (Pa. 2006), rev’d sub nom. Zappala v. The James LewisGroup, 982 A.2d 512 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009), the Philadelphia Court of Commons Pleas initiallytransferred a slip and fall case to Chester County based upon forum non conveniens and improperforum shopping, holding that the forum of Philadelphia was “vexatious, being designed toharass.” Plaintiff, a Delaware County resident was injured in a slip and fall accident thatoccurred in Chester County. Plaintiff sued two groups of defendants, one set from ChesterCounty who owned the land in Chester County, and another set of defendants from Philadelphiawho were allegedly responsible for maintaining the land in Chester County. After discovery wascompleted, all of the Philadelphia Defendants were dismissed from the case pursuant tounopposed motions for summary judgment, and only the Chester County Defendants remained.The initial trial judge, the Honorable Mark I. Bernstein granted the Chester CountyDefendants’ Motion to Transfer Venue, finding venue improper in Philadelphia because theChester County Defendants did not conduct business in Philadelphia. Plaintiffs appealed and theSuperior Court vacated the venue transfer order, finding that an objection to venue was waivedbecause Defendants did not challenge venue by way of preliminary objections. The Superior130
Court noted that Defendants claimed that the Philadelphia Defendants were “sham” Defendants,and that “[w]hile we are not entirely unsympathetic to [Defendants’] position, we are not atliberty to rewrite a rule which has been promulgated by the Supreme Court.” Id. at 1214. TheSupreme Court granted Defendants’ Petition for Allowance of Appeal.The Supreme Court stated there are only three bases which a defendant can challengevenue: (1) improper venue by preliminary objection; (2) forum non conveniens; and (3) inabilityto hold a fair and impartial trial. Zappala v. Brandolini Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 909 A.2d 1272, 1281(Pa. 2006). The court explained that when examining improper venue by preliminary objection,the court must examine whether venue is proper by taking a snapshot at the time the Complaintis filed. Id. The court stated if venue is proper at the time the Complaint was filed, then venuetechnically remains proper throughout litigation. Id. The court noted that challenges to venuevia forum non conveniens and inability to hold a fair and impartial trial can be raised at any timebefore trial. Since the Chester County Defendants did not challenge venue pursuant to forumnon conveniens, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to proceed, stating in afootnote that:any resolution of a subsection d [forum non conveniens] petitionlies within the trial court’s discretion, which, as noted wouldnecessarily involve balancing the inconvenience or fairness ofmaintaining the case in the plaintiff’s given forum, particularly inlight of the fact that the Chester County Defendants do not haveany connection thereto, against the fact that significant litigation inthe chosen forum has already occurred.Id. at 1285. The Supreme Court also stated in another footnote that “[w]e disapprove of forumshopping and explain in detail that a defendant aggrieved by such a strategy has recourse eitherthrough forum non conveniens in accord with Rule 1006(d)(1) or through averment that absent atransfer there cannot be a fair and impartial trial. See Pa. R. Civ. P. 1006(d).” Id. at 1286.Upon remand to the trial court, Judge Arnold L. New granted the Chester CountyDefendants’ Petition to Transfer Venue pursuant to forum non conveniens. The court noted thatthe forum on Philadelphia was vexatious, even considering the extent of the court’s involvementwith the case. The court stated that “Plaintiff’s claims against the Philadelphia CountyDefendants were tenuous at best when this action was brought.” The court also stated thatPlaintiff claimed both the Philadelphia and Chester County Defendants had a responsibility orownership interest in the land where the accident occurred, but “[n]othing on the record, beyondPlaintiff’s bald assertions in her complaint, supports this claim against [the Philadelphia]Defendants.” The court only pointed to one defendant, who stated “trial in Philadelphia Countywould create problems with staffing and unnecessary costs and time expenditure.” The courtalso stressed that it is important to note that the summary judgment motions against thePhiladelphia Defendants were dismissed without opposition. Additionally, the court noted, butdid not comment upon Defendants’ argument that Philadelphia County juries are more liberal inawarding damages to Plaintiffs in personal injuries suits, which results in cases settling at higherfigures.131
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EMTALA CASES ......................
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Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
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II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
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The Superior Court reversed the tri
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to a third party pursuant to the st
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After approximately five months, De
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learned the day after the surgery t
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conduct to the delay in colon cance
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court admitted the expert’s testi
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(b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
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corroborated his testimony. The cou
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husband’s estate. Plaintiff alleg
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Other notable federal cases arising
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The Superior Court found that in re
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§ 1303.512(b). The court, however,
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In Neidig v. United States, No. 07-
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Additionally, the Supreme Court not
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were not indicated for her conditio
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surgeon is the same as it would be
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It should be noted that the Superio
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Finally, the court held that the tr
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania r
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nurses deviating from applicable st
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certainty, the court reviews expert
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Under Pennsylvania law, the Court n
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testimony, Defendant presented his
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Following Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.
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Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
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where payment is made by Medicaid w
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accomplished. In Valles v. Albert E
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In 1980, the Pennsylvania Superior
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Plaintiff had a routine monitoring
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Plaintiff’s Contract ClaimsThe Co
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is a failure to report changes in a
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unit to assure post-surgical patien
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sliced his wrist and arm with a raz
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licensed professionals for whom the
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(c)Limitations of Corporate Neglige
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Even more recently, our Superior Co
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(a)HMO IssuesIn McClellan v. Health
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affidavit submitted by Defendants o
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order as a sanction under Rule 4019
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