Barbados had enough litigation-specific contacts with Pennsylvania to justify the exercise ofpersonal jurisdiction where the hotel sent mailings and Plaintiff, who fell off a massage tablewhile at the hotel, had made her reservation for the massage at the hotel after receiving one ofthe brochures.For additional venue cases not involving medical malpractice, see Zampana-Barry v.Donaghue, 921 A.2d 500 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007), appeal denied, 940 A.2d 366 (Pa. 2007)(discussed in detail in the “Legal Malpractice” section of these materials); Walls v. The PhoenixIns. Co., 979 A.2d 847 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (holding defendant failed to present sufficientevidence in forum non conveniens petition to demonstrate that venue in Philadelphia was bothoppressive and vexatious such that case should be transferred to Monroe County); McMillan v.First Nat’l Bank of Berwick, 978 A.2d 370 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (holding trial court did notabuse its discretion in finding that proper venue in malicious prosecution case against bank wasin county where bank brought underlying claim against plaintiff).3. Other Rulesa. New/Amended Rules of Civil Procedure - Effective Since LastUpdatei. New Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 234.2 --Effective September 1, 2009Entitled “Subpoena. Issuance. Service. Compliance. Fees. Prisoners.”, this rule addressesthe issuance and service of a subpoena. The amendment affords greater protection to minors.ii. New Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1036.1 --Effective March 1, 2009By Order dated January 22, 2009, Rule 1036.1, entitled “Reinstatement of ClaimDismissed Upon Affidavit of Noninvolvement, was created, to become effective March 1, 2009.The Rule sets forth the procedure for a party to reinstate a claim that has been dismissed throughan affidavit of non-involvement.Rule 1036.1 provides that if a party is dismissed through an affidavit of noninvolvementpursuant to Rule 1036, any party can file a motion to reinstate the dismissed party. The motionto reinstate must set forth facts showing that the statements made in the affidavit ofnoninvolvement were false or inaccurate. Any party can respond to the motion to reinstate.After the court reviews the motion and responses, if the court determines there is a primafacie case of involvement of the dismissed party, the court shall enter an order allowing anyparty to either: (1) conduct limited discovery solely regarding the involvement of the dismissedparty, and (2) file affidavits, depositions and other evidence that would allow a jury to find thatthe dismissed party was involved in the actions upon which the claim is based. Additionally, thecourt shall schedule an argument to decide the motion, limiting the sole issue to whether themoving party has produced evidence, that when considered in a light most favorable to the136
moving party, would require the issue of the involvement of the dismissed party to be submittedto a jury.D. The Fair Share Act – Changes To 42 Pa.C.S.A §7102On Tuesday, June 28, 2011, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Corbett signed into lawSenate Bill 1131, or the “Fair Share Act.” The Act had been adopted in the House ofRepresentatives the day before by a 116-83 vote, and had passed in the Senate the weekprior by a 32-18 vote. The Act passed was an amended version of House Bill 1, which theHouse had passed in April of 2011. The Act amends Title 42 of the PennsylvaniaConsolidated Statutes section 7102, and applies to causes of action which accrue on or afterthe effective date of the Act, June 28, 2011.Pennsylvania’s Fair Share Act abolishes most forms of joint and several liability,which had been the law in Pennsylvania civil cases prior to the Act’s passage. Under jointand several liability, a defendant with as little as one percent fault could be required to paythe share of a verdict that a co-defendant could not afford, no matter what percentage ofliability was assessed to both, then leaving it up to the paying-defendant to seek repaymentfrom the non-paying defendant.Under the Fair Share Act, most liability is several, but not joint. This means that anindividual defendant will only be responsible for damages proportionate to his share of thejudgment, as determined by the jury. However, if a defendant is determined to be liable forsixty percent or more of the total liability of all the defendants, this defendant could bejointly liable for all of the damages owed to the injured party.The Fair Share Act has four exemptions:1) a suit including an intentional misrepresentation;2) a case of intentional tort;3) a suit concerning the release or threatened release of a hazardous substanceunder the Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act; and4) a civil action in which a defendant has violated section 487 of the LiquorCode.The Act also states that the fact that a plaintiff is found to be contributorilynegligent will not bar the plaintiff’s recovery where the plaintiff’s negligence is not greaterthan the negligence of the defendant(s). However, damages awarded to the plaintiff will bediminished by the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff.Finally, the Act states that for purposes of apportioning liability only, uponappropriate requests and proof, the jury will decide the question of the liability of adefendant or third party who entered into a release with the plaintiff. The defendantrequesting the apportioning of that settling defendant or third party’s liability must,however, prove the liability. An exception is an employer protected with immunitypursuant to the Worker’s Compensation Act.137
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EMTALA CASES ......................
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Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
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II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
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The Superior Court reversed the tri
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to a third party pursuant to the st
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After approximately five months, De
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learned the day after the surgery t
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conduct to the delay in colon cance
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court admitted the expert’s testi
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(b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
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corroborated his testimony. The cou
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husband’s estate. Plaintiff alleg
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Other notable federal cases arising
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The Superior Court found that in re
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§ 1303.512(b). The court, however,
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In Neidig v. United States, No. 07-
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Additionally, the Supreme Court not
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were not indicated for her conditio
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surgeon is the same as it would be
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It should be noted that the Superio
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Finally, the court held that the tr
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania r
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nurses deviating from applicable st
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certainty, the court reviews expert
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Under Pennsylvania law, the Court n
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testimony, Defendant presented his
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Following Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.
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Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
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where payment is made by Medicaid w
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accomplished. In Valles v. Albert E
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In 1980, the Pennsylvania Superior
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Plaintiff had a routine monitoring
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Plaintiff’s Contract ClaimsThe Co
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is a failure to report changes in a
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unit to assure post-surgical patien
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sliced his wrist and arm with a raz
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licensed professionals for whom the
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(c)Limitations of Corporate Neglige
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Even more recently, our Superior Co
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(a)HMO IssuesIn McClellan v. Health
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affidavit submitted by Defendants o
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treatments while at VA’s faciliti
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[s]ubstantively, we believe that a
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The party claiming the benefit of t
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