2012 PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY UPDATE - Eckert Seamans

unable to testify about an estimated work reduction without anysupporting medical evidence. Defendant also argued that, in turn,Mr. Verzilli’s testimony was admitted in error because hisestimates were based on Dr. Lukas’ work reduction estimate. TheSuperior Court stated that: Dr. Lukas was qualified as a vocationalexpert and certainly was qualified to render an opinion about thedegree to which Mr. Novitski’s herniated discs and pinched nerveaffected his ability to work. Furthermore, we conclude there wasclear and concise medical testimony linking all of Mr. Novitski’sinjuries to the motor vehicle accident and that such medicaltestimony unquestionably indicates that his injuries will impact onhis ability to work.Id. at 49. Therefore, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decision.In Cimino v. Valley Family Medicine, 912 A.2d 851 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006), appealdenied, Cimino v. Valley Family Medicine, 591 Pa. 731 (Pa. 2007), Plaintiff’s only standard ofcare expert was a physician whose California medical license was subject to revocation, but thisrevocation had been stayed and he was placed on probation for five years. He was allowed topractice medicine during this time, but he had to comply with several terms and constraints,including completing specific courses in medical record keeping and ethics, having a billingmonitor and notifying the state if he left to live or practice medicine in another state. Theexpert’s agreement with California also stated that if he complied with certain requirementsduring the probationary period, his license would be fully restored in three years.Defendants challenged this expert’s qualifications under MCARE to testify as an expert.Specifically, Defendants argued that he did not possess an “unrestricted physician’s license” asrequired under § 1303.512(b)(1) of the Act. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argued that the purposeof this section was to ensure that any doctor giving expert testimony was a practicing physicianwho had met the necessary requirements through education and testing to have sufficientknowledge to provide competent testimony, and that this expert’s license to practice was notlimited.The Superior Court agreed with Defendants. The court noted that MCARE did notprovide a definition of “unrestricted” but that in common usage the meaning of this word denotesno limitations or constraints. The Court concluded that this expert’s license, therefore, was notunrestricted and he was not qualified to testify as an expert. Consequently, the Superior Courtaffirmed the trial court’s order precluding this expert’s testimony, as well as the order dismissingPlaintiff’s case for lack of the required expert testimony.In George v. Ellis, et al., 911 A.2d 121, (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006), the Superior Courtevaluated Plaintiff’s standard of care expert under the MCARE Act’s requirements regardingexpert qualifications and reached a conclusion contrary to that previously reached by the samecourt when the same expert was evaluated under the common law standard in George v. Ellis,820 A.2d 815 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003), appeal denied, 834 A.2d 114 (Pa. 2003). Plaintiff in thiscase alleged that Defendant performed three surgical procedures on her knee, that three surgeries31