The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently granted allocator in this case solely on theissue of Plaintiff’s experts’ qualifications under MCARE. Upon review, the Supreme Courtaffirmed the holding of the Superior Court and held that Defendant failed to preserve theargument that Plaintiff’s expert did not satisfy the statutory requirement of certification by thesame or similar board as Defendant physician; and that the Defendant physician also failed topreserve his challenge to the evidentiary foundation for admission of Plaintiff’s expert testimonyunder the “same subspecialty requirement.” Gbur v. Golio, 963 A.2d 443 (Pa. 2009).The Supreme Court did note in dicta, however, that the MCARE statute should be read torequire a close enough relation between overall training, experience, and practices of the expertand that of a defendant physician to assure the witness’ expertise would necessarily extend tostandards of care pertaining in the defendant physician’s field. The Court stated further that “themere fact that two physicians may treat the same condition [is] insufficient, in and of itself, toestablish such a relation among their fields of medicine.” Although the court noted that in lightof its conclusion concerning issue preservation that they need not apply section 512 to the case athand, the court stated that “those practicing radiation oncology and urology might be surprised tolearn of a judicial pronouncement—offered without reference to relevant supporting testimonyfrom those practicing in the respective subspecialties beyond a discussion of a single area oftreatment overlap—that their disciplines represent related fields of medicine for the purposes ofreform legislation.” Id.In Jacobs v. Chatwani, 922 A.2d 950 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007), appeal denied, 595 Pa. 708(Pa. 2007), Plaintiff alleged that she sustained injuries to her left ureter resulting from Defendantdoctor’s negligent performance of a hysterectomy. As a result, Plaintiff brought this medicalmalpractice action against the doctor who performed the surgery and hospital. In theDefendant’s urology expert’s report, he “[o]pined that the injury to [Plaintiff’s] ureter was notdue to any negligence in the performance of the hysterectomy but, rather, was the result of aknown risk involved in this type of surgery from temporary loss of blood supply to the uretersoccurring when the uterine arteries are clamped off . . . .” Plaintiff filed a motion in limine topreclude Defendant’s urology expert, arguing that the expert was unqualified to testify to thestandard of care of an obstetrician/gynecologist. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion,explaining that Defendant’s urology expert testified to the standard of care involved in avoidinguretal injury during abdominal surgery and to post-operative diagnostic testing. Ultimately,judgment was entered in Defendants’ favor and Plaintiff appealed.The Superior Court affirmed the lower court’s decision on appeal. The court agreed withthe lower court that “[a] board-certified urologist, who performs pelvic surgery, was qualifiedunder the MCARE Act to opine on the standard of care related to protection of the ureters duringpelvic surgery and to opine on diagnostic testing of urological structures following pelvicsurgery, all of which were directly within his area of expertise.” The Court explained that thestandard of care with regard to avoiding uretal injury does not differ among doctors, whether aurologist or gynecologist, who perform pelvic surgery. Furthermore, Defendant’s urology expertprovided extensive testimony concerning post-operative diagnostic procedures.Additionally, the Court agreed with the trial court that Defendant’s urology expert metthe common-law standard to testify as an expert. The Court explained that although the urologyexpert’s practice dealt primarily with male urological issues, the record established that40
Defendant’s urology expert had a specialized knowledge of the subject matter in question. Forthese reasons, the Court held that a board-certified urologist was qualified under MCARE andcommon law standards to qualify to the standard of care involved in avoiding uretal injuryduring pelvic surgery and post-operative assessment.The Superior Court recently addressed the issue of expert qualification in Hyrcza v. WestPenn Allegheny Health System, Inc., 978 A.2d 961 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009), appeal denied, Hyrczav. West Penn Allegheny Health System, Inc., 604 Pa. 707 (Pa. 2009). In Hyrcza, the executrixof a deceased patient’s estate brought a wrongful death and survival action against numerousmedical defendants after the patient died from massive gastrointestinal bleeding. On appeal,appellants argued that the trial court erred by permitting Plaintiff’s expert, a board certifiedpsychiatrist and neurologist, to testify as to the standard of care applicable to Defendantphysician, a board certified physiatrist. Appellants argued that because Plaintiff’s expert was notfamiliar with the applicable standard of care and did not practice in a specialty substantiallysimilar to that of physician Defendant, he was unqualified to render standard of care opinion asto Defendant physician under Section 1303.512 of the MCARE Act.Specifically, the trial court stated in its 1925(a) opinion that it was satisfied that the postoperativecare of the patient (a multiple sclerosis patient having undergone hip surgery) withaspirin and steroids was a matter within the expert’s training, regardless of specialty. Further,Plaintiff’s expert testified that his patients often undergo surgery and that he is involved in thepost-operative treatment and rehabilitation that includes administration of aspirin, and that hewas familiar with the risks involved in prescribing aspirin and steroids together. The SuperiorCourt accepted the trial court’s decision and affirmed its decision regarding Plaintiff’s expert.In Rettger v. UPMC Shadyside, 991 A.2d 915 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010), thePennsylvania Superior Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion byallowing a neurosurgeon to testify as an expert regarding a neurosurgical nurse’s standardof care. This case involved an action by the executors of the patient’s estate against ahospital for wrongful death, survival and professional negligence. In permitting theneurosurgeon to testify as an expert regarding the neurosurgical nurse’s standard of carein responding to a change in the patient’s pupil, which became fixed and dilated, the courtheld that neither the neurosurgeon’s “expertise nor his experience in working with nurseswas in any way deficient.” Furthermore, the court added that the record establishes thatthe neurosurgeon spent his entire career practicing in a hospital setting and interactingwith nurses daily. In such a situation, a “neurosurgeon whose orders provide dailydirection of the activities of the nurses who care for his patients is familiar with thestandard of care expected; if he were not, his ability to depend on their observations andjudgment would be sharply limited and his professional practice jeopardized as a result.”Id. at 930. Compare Rettger v. UPMC Shadyside, 991 A.2d 915 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010)(allowing neurosurgeon to testify as expert regarding neurosurgical nurse’s standard ofcare where neurosurgeon spent entire career practicing in hospital setting and interactingwith nurses daily), with Yacoub v. Lehigh Valley Medical Associates, P.C., 805 A.2d 579(Pa. Super. Ct. 2002), appeal denied, 825 A.2d 639 (Pa. 2003) (stating that Board certifiedneurosurgeon was not qualified, on basis of overlap or experience in internal medicine orspecial care unit nursing, to testify, in medical malpractice lawsuit, as to internists and41
- Page 3 and 4: EMTALA CASES ......................
- Page 5: Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
- Page 8 and 9: II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
- Page 10 and 11: The Superior Court reversed the tri
- Page 12 and 13: to a third party pursuant to the st
- Page 14 and 15: After approximately five months, De
- Page 16 and 17: learned the day after the surgery t
- Page 18 and 19: conduct to the delay in colon cance
- Page 20 and 21: court admitted the expert’s testi
- Page 22 and 23: (b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
- Page 24 and 25: corroborated his testimony. The cou
- Page 26 and 27: husband’s estate. Plaintiff alleg
- Page 28 and 29: Other notable federal cases arising
- Page 30 and 31: The Superior Court found that in re
- Page 32 and 33: § 1303.512(b). The court, however,
- Page 34 and 35: In Neidig v. United States, No. 07-
- Page 36 and 37: Additionally, the Supreme Court not
- Page 38 and 39: were not indicated for her conditio
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- Page 42 and 43: It should be noted that the Superio
- Page 44 and 45: Finally, the court held that the tr
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- Page 52 and 53: Under Pennsylvania law, the Court n
- Page 54 and 55: testimony, Defendant presented his
- Page 56 and 57: Following Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.
- Page 58 and 59: Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
- Page 60 and 61: where payment is made by Medicaid w
- Page 62 and 63: accomplished. In Valles v. Albert E
- Page 64 and 65: In 1980, the Pennsylvania Superior
- Page 66 and 67: Plaintiff had a routine monitoring
- Page 68 and 69: Plaintiff’s Contract ClaimsThe Co
- Page 70 and 71: is a failure to report changes in a
- Page 72 and 73: unit to assure post-surgical patien
- Page 74 and 75: sliced his wrist and arm with a raz
- Page 76 and 77: licensed professionals for whom the
- Page 78 and 79: (c)Limitations of Corporate Neglige
- Page 80 and 81: Even more recently, our Superior Co
- Page 82 and 83: (a)HMO IssuesIn McClellan v. Health
- Page 84 and 85: affidavit submitted by Defendants o
- Page 86 and 87: treatments while at VA’s faciliti
- Page 88 and 89: [s]ubstantively, we believe that a
- Page 90 and 91: The party claiming the benefit of t
- Page 92 and 93: deprive (him) of civil rights guara
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With respect to fraudulent concealm
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would be applied in situations wher
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they had not raised them in the cou
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(a)Informed ConsentUnder MCARE, a p
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civil enforcement provisions and ma
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MCARE also changes the manner in wh
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whose death, in 2005, was allegedly
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vicariously liable if the plaintiff
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health center or its equivalent or
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In Pennsylvania Medical Society, th
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to any professional who is alleged
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Since the 2005 amendments, there ha
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ule, but who intentionally ignores
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the original Complaint was delivere
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foreclose all challenges against th
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number of boxes), which was support
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questions of professional judgment
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deviated from any professional stan
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The Third Circuit affirmed the Dist
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claims and cross-claims remain agai
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By an Amendatory Order dated March
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The court acknowledged that there i
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apply and that the trial court misa
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Barbados had enough litigation-spec
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E. Preemption of Vaccine Design Def
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2. Pa. R. Civ. Pro. 1036.1 - Reinst
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Barrick, at *34-35.Furthermore, the
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(b) the utility of the defendant’
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2006). In this case, Plaintiffs bro
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B. Elements of a Cause of Action fo
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decision in Muhammad precluded Mr.
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considered speculative “only if t
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underlying cause of action involved
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In Capital Care Corp., the Superior
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The court found, however, to state
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of reasonable diligence. The standa
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not be set aside. On July 7, 2005,
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complete bar to recovery. Since a l
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On appeal, Plaintiffs claimed that
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In Liggon-Redding, 659 F.3d at 265,
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elieved of those minimum standards
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elevant to the proceedings, the com
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establish professional misconduct b
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Upholding the Superior Court’s Or
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Id.Rejecting revocation and suspens
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order as a sanction under Rule 4019
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