decision in Muhammad precluded Mr. McMahon’s action. The majority, however, rejected thiscontention, and held that the reasoning of Muhammad has no application to these facts.Specifically, the court noted that Mr. McMahon was not attempting to attack the settlementvalue, but was alleging that his counsel failed to advise him as to the possible consequences ofentering into this settlement. Accordingly, the Court found that the analysis of Muhammad islimited to the facts of that case, and that the preliminary objections to Mr. McMahon’s actionshould have been dismissed. The concurring opinion joined the majority except to the extent thatthe majority limits Muhammad to its facts. Specifically, the concurrence emphasized that thepolicies underlying Muhammad are as necessary and valid today as they were when the decisionwas rendered five years ago and, therefore, Muhammad should not be limited to its facts.In Banks v. Jerome Taylor & Associates, 700 A.2d 1329 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997), appealdenied, 723 A.2d 668 (Pa. 1998), the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that a negligence actionmay not be maintained against an attorney on the ground that the settlement amount obtainedwas too small. The Court reasoned that in cases where a dissatisfied litigant merely wishes tosecond guess his decision to settle in the hope that he may have been able to “get a better deal,”the Muhammad rule applies to bar that litigant from suing his counsel for negligence.Following Muhammad, in Piluso v. Cohen, 764 A.2d 549 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000), appealdenied, 793 A.2d 909 (Pa. 2002), the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s entry of summaryjudgment in favor of the attorney-Defendant. In the underlying medical malpractice action, theattorney had settled claims against some defendants for $100,000 and had proceeded to trial onthe claim against one remaining doctor. Plaintiff was aware of the settlement, although it hadoccurred outside her presence, and she did not repudiate it. Rather, she permitted the trial tocontinue against only the one remaining defendant. The jury returned a verdict in the amount of$1,500,000, but apportioned no liability to the sole non-settling doctor. Plaintiff thereafter filed alegal malpractice action against her attorney and claimed that she had not consented to thesettlement.Citing Muhammad, the Superior Court in Piluso held that by failing to promptlyrepudiate her attorney’s actions Plaintiff had ratified them, and was foreclosed from later filingsuit against her attorney since there was no allegation of fraud. Additionally, Plaintiff’s claimeddamages were purely speculative, as the outcome of the trial was likely to have been different ifthe settling Defendants had been present and defended the claims against them.In Red Bell Brewing Co. v. Buchanan Ingersoll, P.C., 51 Pa. D. & C. 4th 129 (Phila. Ct.Ct. Com. Pl. 2001), the Court of Common Pleas for Philadelphia County held that Muhammaddid not bar Plaintiff’s negligence action against his former attorneys where Plaintiff alleged thatDefendant-attorneys failed to provide accurate material facts on which its decisions were madeand to adequately disclose a conflict of interest between Plaintiff and one of the firm’s otherclients. The Court reasoned that the facts of Muhammad had no application to the case. Rather,the facts of the case were more similar to those in McMahon.In Capital Care Corp. v. Hunt, 847 A.2d 75 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004), the Superior Courtapplied the rationale of Muhammad to its damage analysis to allow a corporation to prove thatthe attorney’s fraudulent misrepresentation induced it to sell its corporate assets for less than fair150
market value, resulting in the corporation realizing a much lower amount than it would have in afuture sale or upon liquidating its assets via Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Id. at 85.More recently, the court in General Nutrition Corp. v. Gardere Wynne Sewell, LLP., No.2:08-cv-831, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64585 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 2008), permitted Plaintiff tomaintain a legal malpractice suit despite settlement of the underlying case. By way ofbackground, Plaintiff, GNC, and the attorney-Defendants entered into a contract for legal adviceregarding the termination of a contract with Franklin. Attorney-Defendants advised GNC thatthe contact was governed by the UCC and, therefore, exposure for termination of its contractwith Franklin would not exceed $3 million. Based upon Defendants’ advice, GNC terminated itscontract with Franklin. As a result, Franklin sued for breach of contract. The court found thatthe contract was not governed by the UCC and damages could exceed $34 million. Due to thepotential for large exposure, GNC settled with Franklin and then GNC filed the instant suitagainst attorney-Defendants. Citing Muhammad, attorney-Defendants argued that GNC’s claimsare barred due to its settlement with Franklin. Without providing further explanation, the courtdetermined that “[t]he settlement of the underlying case by GNC . . . resulted in its allegeddamages being made actual and concrete.” Therefore, the court concluded that the settlement didnot act to bar a subsequent malpractice action.In Hauber v. Mudy, 2009 Phila Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 183 (Phila. Cty. Ct. Com. Pl. Sept. 1,2009), the court, citing Muhammad, granted Defendants’ preliminary objections and dismissedPlaintiff’s complaint holding that Plaintiff, while being represented by Defendants, hadknowingly entered into a voluntary settlement and therefore could not maintain a legalmalpractice claim against these same defendants.In Moon v. Ignelzi, No. 260 WDA 2008, 2009 Pa. Super. LEXIS 7016 (Pa. Super. Dec.11, 2009) (unpublished opinion), the Superior Court rejected a legal malpractice claim basedpredicated on the supposition that plaintiffs were improperly advised of the affect of a lien ontheir settlement. The court held that the plaintiffs’ challenge in this regard was “at its core, achallenge to the attorney’s judgment regarding an amount to be accepted in settlement.” Moon2009 Pa. Super LEXIS 7016 at *18. The Superior Court therefore held that the trial courtproperly rejected this claim on preliminary objections. In doing so, the court quoted languagefrom the Muhammad v. Strassburger, McKenna, Messer, Shilobod and Gutnick, 526 Pa. 541,587 A.2d 1346, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 867, 112 S. Ct. 196, 116 L.Ed. 2d 156 (1991), which notesthat “we will not permit a suit to be filed by a dissatisfied plaintiff against his attorney followinga settlement to which that plaintiff agreed, unless that plaintiff can show he was fraudulentlyinduced to settle.” The court determined that the case created a bright-line rule that “shield[s]attorneys from malpractice claims sounding in negligence or contract in cases concluded bysettlement.” Moon 2009 Pa. Super LEXIS 7016 at *15.E. DamagesThe legal malpractice plaintiff must prove actual loss and often will find this to be adifficult task. As stated in Duke & Co. v. Anderson, 418 A.2d 613, 617 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980),“when it is alleged that an attorney has breached his professional obligations to his client, anessential element of the cause of action . . . is proof of actual loss.” However, damages are151
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Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
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II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
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The Superior Court reversed the tri
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to a third party pursuant to the st
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After approximately five months, De
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learned the day after the surgery t
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conduct to the delay in colon cance
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court admitted the expert’s testi
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(b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
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corroborated his testimony. The cou
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husband’s estate. Plaintiff alleg
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Other notable federal cases arising
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The Superior Court found that in re
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§ 1303.512(b). The court, however,
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In Neidig v. United States, No. 07-
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Additionally, the Supreme Court not
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were not indicated for her conditio
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surgeon is the same as it would be
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It should be noted that the Superio
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Finally, the court held that the tr
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania r
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nurses deviating from applicable st
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certainty, the court reviews expert
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Under Pennsylvania law, the Court n
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testimony, Defendant presented his
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Following Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.
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Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
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where payment is made by Medicaid w
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accomplished. In Valles v. Albert E
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In 1980, the Pennsylvania Superior
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Plaintiff had a routine monitoring
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Plaintiff’s Contract ClaimsThe Co
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is a failure to report changes in a
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unit to assure post-surgical patien
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sliced his wrist and arm with a raz
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licensed professionals for whom the
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(c)Limitations of Corporate Neglige
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Even more recently, our Superior Co
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(a)HMO IssuesIn McClellan v. Health
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affidavit submitted by Defendants o
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treatments while at VA’s faciliti
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[s]ubstantively, we believe that a
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The party claiming the benefit of t
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deprive (him) of civil rights guara
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found that the District Court was w
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With respect to fraudulent concealm
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would be applied in situations wher
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they had not raised them in the cou
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(a)Informed ConsentUnder MCARE, a p
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civil enforcement provisions and ma
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