foreclose all challenges against that first complaint. Finally, the Superior Court held thatequitable considerations did not require that the judgment of non pros be opened and that thetrial court had not abused its discretion in refusing to do so. The court noted that while Womerv. Hilliker, 908 A.2d 269 (Pa. 2006), had held that Rule 1042.3 is subject to equitableconsiderations, Rule 126 applied only where a plaintiff had substantially complied with Rule1042.3, not where a plaintiff had failed entirely to file a certificate of merit. Therefore, in thiscase Rule 126 did not apply. Moreover, when the case was evaluated under Rule 3051,Plaintiff’s argument failed because the reasons she offered for not having filed the certificate didnot constitute a reasonable excuse. Consequently, the decision of the trial court was affirmed.The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had granted appeal limited to the issues of 1) whether acertificate of merit must be filed within sixty days of the filing of the original complaint,notwithstanding the filing of preliminary objections and/or an amended complaint and 2)whether the complaint and amended complaint raise a professional negligence claim whichrequires the filing of a certificate of merit. As indicated above, the Supreme Court affirmedthe Superior Court, doing so by per curiam order, over the dissent of one Justice.On December 19, 2007, in light of the Supreme Court’s comment in a footnote inWomer, 908 A.2d 269 n.10, in a non-precedential, unpublished opinion the Harris court reversedits 2005 decision and remanded back to the trial court for the entry of judgments of non pros infavor of appellants, Jefferson, Weiss, and Neuburger.Previously, in Harris, 877 A.2d 1275, the Superior Court held that the trial court had notabused its discretion in opening judgments of non pros where Plaintiff had not filed certificatesof merit within sixty days of filing a medical malpractice complaint, but had, in that time period,provided Defendants with actual expert reports and CV’s. Despite having received these expertreports, which did state that Defendants had deviated from the standard of care and that suchdeviations caused Plaintiff harm, the appellants Jefferson, Weiss, and Neuburger filed praecipesfor non pros, on the basis of which judgment had been entered in their favor in accordance withRule 1042.6. However, appellant Childers failed to seek a judgment of non pros at that time.Plaintiff petitioned to have the judgments opened, arguing substantial compliance with Rule1042.3(a). The trial court granted the petition.On initial appeal, the Superior Court in its 2005 opinion held that this was proper becausethe underlying purpose of Rule 1042.3 was to prevent the filing of baseless medical malpracticeclaims and plaintiff had satisfied this purpose by supplying the actual expert reports. The courtfurther stated that Plaintiff had reasonably explained the lack of technical compliance with Rule1042.3 in that it was not unreasonable for him to believe that his actions constituted substantialcompliance with the Rule. Given the facts of the case, the Superior Court concluded, he shouldnot be barred from his day in court. Accordingly, the Superior Court relinquished jurisdictionand the matter was returned to the trial court.Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Womer, appellants filed motions in trial courtfor reconsideration of the earlier decision to open the judgment of non pros. In denying thesemotions, the trial court indicated that it was unable to entertain such motions based upon theSuperior Court’s earlier decision. Appellants filed interlocutory appeals.118
Relying on the language of Womer, the Superior Court on December 19, 2007 reversedits earlier decision and remanded the case to the trial court for the entry of judgments of non prosin favor of appellants Jefferson, Weiss, and Neuburger. However, with regard to appellantChilders, the Superior Court remanded the case back to the trial court for reconsideration of itsdecision to deny the judgment of non pros. The Superior Court explained that Childers failed toseek a judgment of non pros until after plaintiff filed a certificate of merit and after a great dealof time had been spent litigating the case. Therefore, the Court reasoned, “[t]here is not the total‘non-compliance’ that was present in Womer, and there are undeniable equities to be evaluatedby the fact finder in considering whether a judgment of non pros is warranted and equitable.”Interestingly, in a footnote, the Court in its December 2007 Opinion states: “[a] decisionby this court to stubbornly adhere to a precedent that has since been disapproved by the highestCourt in the Commonwealth, would merely delay the inevitable reversal of this Court’s decisionby the Supreme Court.”In Weaver v. University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, No. 08-411, 2009 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 57988 (W.D. Pa. July 30, 2008), the District Court examined whether Plaintiffsubstantially complied with the certificate of merit requirement. Defendant filed a Motion toDismiss, arguing Plaintiff’s corporate negligence claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff’scertificate of merit only supported a claim of vicarious liability against the hospital and not adirect claim of corporate negligence. Plaintiff conceded the certificate of merit only containedlanguage supporting a claim of vicarious liability, but claimed she simply checked the wrong boxwhen completing the certificate of merit.Plaintiff made several arguments why the court should not dismiss Plaintiff’s corporatenegligence claim. Plaintiff argued in light of the language of the Complaint that only set forth aclaim of corporate negligence (and not vicarious liability), Plaintiff’s incorrect certificate ofmerit was simply a procedural mistake. Plaintiff also produced the opinion of an expert that wasdated prior to the filing of the certificate of merit, which supported Plaintiff’s direct claim ofcorporate negligence and did not support a claim of vicarious liability. Finally, Plaintiff arguedthat since the statute of limitations had not run, the Complaint could simply be re-filed and thatthe re-filing of the Complaint would cause unnecessary paper shuffling.Plaintiff relied heavily on the recent opinion in Stroud, 546 F. Supp. 2d 238, wherecounsel for Plaintiff checked the vicarious liability box on the certificate of merit, not the box forcorporate liability. The court distinguished Stroud, noting the Plaintiff in Stroud could not re-filethe Complaint with a proper certificate of merit because the statute of limitations had run, butthat in the present case Plaintiff was able to re-file a new Complaint with a proper certificate ofmerit. The court also explained that in Stroud, Plaintiff failed to check both applicable boxes onthe certificate of merit (only checking box for vicarious liability); however, in the present case,Plaintiff checked the wrong box, which is clearly supported by Plaintiff’s Complaint and expertreport. The court noted “[w]hile the certificate of merit filed by Plaintiff’s counsel may reflectan egregious lack of attention to detail or knowledge of Pennsylvania law, we conclude Plaintiffhas substantially complied with Rule 1042.” Thus, the court held the filing of an impropercertificate of merit was excusable when counsel simply checked the wrong box (not the wrong119
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EMTALA CASES ......................
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Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
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II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
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The Superior Court reversed the tri
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to a third party pursuant to the st
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After approximately five months, De
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learned the day after the surgery t
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conduct to the delay in colon cance
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court admitted the expert’s testi
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(b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
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corroborated his testimony. The cou
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husband’s estate. Plaintiff alleg
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Other notable federal cases arising
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The Superior Court found that in re
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§ 1303.512(b). The court, however,
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In Neidig v. United States, No. 07-
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Additionally, the Supreme Court not
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were not indicated for her conditio
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surgeon is the same as it would be
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It should be noted that the Superio
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Finally, the court held that the tr
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania r
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nurses deviating from applicable st
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certainty, the court reviews expert
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Under Pennsylvania law, the Court n
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testimony, Defendant presented his
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Following Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.
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Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
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where payment is made by Medicaid w
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accomplished. In Valles v. Albert E
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In 1980, the Pennsylvania Superior
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Plaintiff had a routine monitoring
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Plaintiff’s Contract ClaimsThe Co
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is a failure to report changes in a
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unit to assure post-surgical patien
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In Liggon-Redding, 659 F.3d at 265,
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elieved of those minimum standards
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elevant to the proceedings, the com
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establish professional misconduct b
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Upholding the Superior Court’s Or
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Id.Rejecting revocation and suspens
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order as a sanction under Rule 4019
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