[s]ubstantively, we believe that a patient does have a cause ofaction against either a psychiatrist or a general practitionerrendering psychological care, when during the course of treatmentthe physician has a sexual relationship with the patient that causesthe patient’s emotional or psychological symptoms to worsen.Id. at 364. More specifically, in explaining the viability of a cause of action for medicalmalpractice resulting in psychological harm under these circumstances, the court noted that:When a general practitioner is . . . rendering psychological care,just like a psychiatrist, that general practitioner owes a duty ofprofessional care to such patient. The physician’s actions coupledwith his or her awareness of the patient’s emotional issues(anxiety, depression and marital problems) carries with it aforeseeable and unreasonable risk of mental and/or emotional harmto the patient.. . .As such, it is very common that the patient is in a vulnerableposition and as a result puts a high degree of trust in her doctor. Insuch relationships where the players are on unequal playing fields,it is even more incumbent on our legal system to protect patientsfrom the malfeasance of medical professionals when they becomesexually involved with their trusting patients.Id. at 366. Accordingly, the Superior Court held that, based on the facts set forth in theComplaint, Plaintiff had established a prima facie cause of action for medical malpractice againstDefendant physician.It is also important to note that the court made a bright line distinction between thesituation in which a doctor rendering psychological or psychiatric care as opposed to medicalcare, such as treatment for arthritis. In this latter situation, the court suggested that a cause ofaction for medical malpractice resulting from consensual sexual relations with a patient wouldnot lie.However, on November 24, 2009, Defendant’s Petition for Allowance of Appeal wasgranted but Allocatur was limited to the following issue:Whether, for purposes of determining professional negligence, a general practitioner whoprovides mental health treatment to a patient is held to the same higher duty as aspecialist in psychiatry or psychology?In Gormley v. Edgar, 995 A.2d 1197 (Pa. Super. 2010), Plaintiff motorist appealed adiscovery order requiring her to produce emergency room records pertaining to mental healthissues, arguing that the records were protected under the Mental Health Procedures Act (50 P.S.§ 7101, et seq.), the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act (50 P.S. § 4101, et seq.) and thePennsylvania Alcohol and Drug Abuse Act (71 P.S. § 1690.101, et seq.), as well as the82
Pennsylvania psychiatrist-patient privilege (42 Pa.C.S. § 5944). Affirming the trial Court’sOrder, the Superior Court held that the MHPA, MHMRA and PADAA did not apply as Plaintiffvoluntarily sought mental health treatment and drugs and alcohol were admittedly not at issue.Id. at 1202-1203. As for the psychiatrist-patient privilege, the Court noted that while theprivilege is based upon a strong public policy designed to encourage and promote effectivetreatment, the privilege may be waived in civil actions where the plaintiff places the confidentialinformation at issue in the case. Id. at 1204. Because Plaintiff sought damages for frustrationand anxiety, the Superior Court held that the psychiatrist-patient privilege did not apply andconcluded that “[Plaintiff] directly placed her mental condition at issue when she alleged that shesuffered from anxiety as a result of the accident. Absent other considerations militating againstdisclosure, the records as discoverable.” Id. at 1206.V. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONSA. General RuleA statute of limitations provides that no suit shall be maintained for certain prescribedcauses of action unless brought within a specified period of time after the right to bring suit hasaccrued. B.F.W.R. Co. v. Quaker City Flower Mills Co., 127 A. 845, 846 (Pa. 1925). “Thepurpose of any statute of limitations is to expedite litigation and thus discourage delay in thepresentation of state claims which may greatly prejudice the defense of such claims.” Ins. Co. ofN. Am. v. Carnahan, 284 A.2d 728, 729 (Pa. 1971).For a medical professional liability action based on negligence or lack of informedconsent, the statute of limitations is two years. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2). The two-yearperiod begins to run on the date the injury is sustained. See Caro v. Glah, 867 A.2d 531 (Pa.Super. Ct. 2004), reargument denied, 2005 Pa. Super. LEXIS 275 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 2005).B. Discovery RulePennsylvania law also recognizes the discovery rule, which extends this limitationsperiod when the complaining party does not immediately know of, and cannot reasonablyascertain, the existence of an injury. See Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850 (Pa. 2005); Ayers v.Morgan, 154 A.2d 788 (Pa. 1959); Bickford v. Joson, 533 A.2d 1029 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987),appeal denied, 544 A.2d 959 (Pa. 1988).Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations is not triggered until the plaintiffknows or reasonably should know that (1) he has been injured, and (2) his injury has been causedby the conduct of another. Levenson v. Souser, 557 A.2d 1081, 1086-87 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989),appeal denied, 571 A.2d 383 (Pa. 1989); Bickford, 533 A.2d at 1032.The “discovery rule” provides an exception to the general rule that precludes a party frombringing suit once the statutory period expires. The purpose of the discovery rule is to extend theperiod of time in which the injured party may file suit when there is an inability to ascertain thefact that an injury has been sustained, despite the exercise of due diligence. MacCain v.Montgomery Hosp., 578 A.2d 970 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 592 A.2d 45 (Pa. 1990).Accordingly, the “discovery rule” can serve to ameliorate the harsh effects of the statute oflimitations.83
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EMTALA CASES ......................
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Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
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II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
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The Superior Court reversed the tri
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to a third party pursuant to the st
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After approximately five months, De
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learned the day after the surgery t
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conduct to the delay in colon cance
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court admitted the expert’s testi
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(b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
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corroborated his testimony. The cou
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husband’s estate. Plaintiff alleg
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Other notable federal cases arising
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The Superior Court found that in re
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§ 1303.512(b). The court, however,
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In Neidig v. United States, No. 07-
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Additionally, the Supreme Court not
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- Page 58 and 59: Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
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The court acknowledged that there i
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apply and that the trial court misa
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Barbados had enough litigation-spec
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E. Preemption of Vaccine Design Def
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2. Pa. R. Civ. Pro. 1036.1 - Reinst
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Barrick, at *34-35.Furthermore, the
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(b) the utility of the defendant’
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2006). In this case, Plaintiffs bro
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B. Elements of a Cause of Action fo
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decision in Muhammad precluded Mr.
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considered speculative “only if t
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underlying cause of action involved
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In Capital Care Corp., the Superior
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The court found, however, to state
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of reasonable diligence. The standa
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not be set aside. On July 7, 2005,
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complete bar to recovery. Since a l
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On appeal, Plaintiffs claimed that
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In Liggon-Redding, 659 F.3d at 265,
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elieved of those minimum standards
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elevant to the proceedings, the com
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establish professional misconduct b
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Upholding the Superior Court’s Or
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Id.Rejecting revocation and suspens
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order as a sanction under Rule 4019
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