accomplished. In Valles v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 758 A.2d 1238 (Pa. Super. Ct.2000), aff’d, 805 A.2d 1232 (Pa. 2002), the court held, as a matter of law, that a hospital cannotbe held vicariously liable for the failure of its physicians to obtain a patient’s informed consent.In finding no evidence of control, the court explained:While we agree with appellant that AEMC had a duty to generallyoversee Dr. Allen, nothing in the record indicates that AEMCexercised control over the manner in which he was to performradiology work, such as the aortogram. We fail to see how AEMCcould conduct such oversight, absent having another physicianpresent, in light of the fact that the procedure in question is of ahighly specialized nature and requires specific skills, education andtraining in order to be performed . . . [i]t is the surgeon and not thehospital who has the education, training and experience necessaryto advise each patient of the risks associated with the proposedsurgery.It should also be noted that in a recent case, Toney v. Chester County Hospital,961 A.2d 192 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008), appeal granted, 973 A.2d 415 (Pa. 2009) theSuperior Court permitted a plaintiff to bring causes of action for negligent infliction ofemotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress against a hospital after adoctor employed by the hospital allegedly misinterpreted an ultrasound as being normal,thus causing severe emotional distress for Plaintiff-mother after her child was born withsevere birth defects (the Superior Court ultimately dismissed Plaintiff’s claim forintentional infliction of emotional distress, however, for failure to set forth sufficientallegations in the Complaint to sustain her claim).On June 3, 2009, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted an appeal on thismatter. The issue on appeal to be decided by the Court is:Whether the Superior Court erred in finding a cause of action fornegligent infliction of emotional distress exists where emotionaldistress results from the negligent breach of a contractual orfiduciary duty, absent a physical impact or injury.Toney, 973 A.2d 415 (Pa. 2009). The court heard argument in March 2010. TheSupreme Court being equally divided, affirmed the Superior Court on December22, 2011. 2011 Pa. LEXIS 3101 (Pa. Dec. 22, 2011). Specifically, Justice OrieMelvin did not participate in the consideration of the case at the Supreme Courtlevel; Justice Baer , Justice Todd and Justice McCaffrey supported affirming theSuperior Court decision; Chief Justice Castille, Justice Saylor, and Justice Eakin allsupported reversing the Superior Court.56
Justice Baer, who wrote the lead opinion in support of affirming the SuperiorCourt, 4 noted that:[W]e would hold that NIED is not available in garden-variety"breach of contractual or fiduciary duty" cases, but only inthose cases where there exists a special relationship where it isforeseeable that a breach of the relevant duty would result inemotional harm so extreme that a reasonable person shouldnot be expected to endure the resulting distress. We furtherconclude that recovery for NIED claims does not require aphysical impact.Id. at *2. Justice Baer noted that “some relationships, including some doctorpatientrelationships, will involve an implied duty to care for the plaintiff'semotional well-being that, if breached, has the potential to cause emotional distressresulting in physical harm.” Id. at *35. In Toney, given the sensitive andemotionally charged field of obstetrics, the Justice’s writing in support ofaffirmance concluded that Defendants had such an implied duty to care forPlaintiff's emotional well-being. Justice Baer also wrote that “[a] plaintiff assertinga special relationship NIED cause of action absent physical injury, however, muststill demonstrate the genuineness of the alleged emotional distress, in part, byproving the element of causation.” Id. at *46-47.Justice Saylor, who wrote the lead opinion in support of reversal, believedthat the Court was engaging in judicial policymaking within the purview of thelegislature. Justice Saylor also wrote:. . . I have serious reservations about the practicalconsequences of introducing what is essentially "emotionalcrashworthiness" liability into the healthcare arena.Id. at *58. 5 (b) Ostensible Agency4 Justice Todd joined in Justice Baer’s opinion, but wrote separately noting, among other things, her supportfor dispensing the requirement of physical impact in negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, becauseit suggests that we do not trust our juries (and judges sitting as fact-finders) to discern between feigned andgenuine claims of emotional harm; she also noted her agreement that a doctor has a duty of care for apatient’s emotional well-being under the circumstances presented in Toney. Id., at *50-51.5 Chief Justice Castille departed from Justice Saylor’s view concerning “procedural matters,” but wrote, “Onthe substantive question presented in this case, however, where the Justices favoring affirmance woulddetermine, as a matter of policy, to innovate new liabilities in tort for health care providers, I am entirely inaccord with Justice Saylor's views.” Id. at *52.57
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EMTALA CASES ......................
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Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
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II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
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The Superior Court reversed the tri
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health center or its equivalent or
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In Pennsylvania Medical Society, th
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to any professional who is alleged
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Since the 2005 amendments, there ha
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ule, but who intentionally ignores
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the original Complaint was delivere
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foreclose all challenges against th
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number of boxes), which was support
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questions of professional judgment
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deviated from any professional stan
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The Third Circuit affirmed the Dist
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claims and cross-claims remain agai
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By an Amendatory Order dated March
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The court acknowledged that there i
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apply and that the trial court misa
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Barbados had enough litigation-spec
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E. Preemption of Vaccine Design Def
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2. Pa. R. Civ. Pro. 1036.1 - Reinst
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Barrick, at *34-35.Furthermore, the
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(b) the utility of the defendant’
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2006). In this case, Plaintiffs bro
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B. Elements of a Cause of Action fo
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decision in Muhammad precluded Mr.
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considered speculative “only if t
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underlying cause of action involved
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In Capital Care Corp., the Superior
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The court found, however, to state
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of reasonable diligence. The standa
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not be set aside. On July 7, 2005,
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complete bar to recovery. Since a l
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On appeal, Plaintiffs claimed that
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In Liggon-Redding, 659 F.3d at 265,
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elieved of those minimum standards
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elevant to the proceedings, the com
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establish professional misconduct b
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Upholding the Superior Court’s Or
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Id.Rejecting revocation and suspens
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order as a sanction under Rule 4019
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