claims and cross-claims remain against the third party defendant had no bearing on Rule 1042.3.Accordingly, the third party defendant’s motion to dismiss was granted.In contrast, the District Court in Guynup v. Lancaster County Prison, No. 06-4315, 2007U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63412 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2007), held that where jurisdiction lies solely infederal question, Rule 1042.3 is inapplicable. Thus, a certificate of merit was not required.In Ward v. Knox, McLaughlin, Gornall & Sennett, No. 08-43 Erie, 2009 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 20302 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2009), the United States District Court for the Western Districtof Pennsylvania has held that Rule 1042.7 is procedural in nature and thus inapplicable to federalpractice. Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for a judgment of nonpros, the proper procedure in federal court is to treat a motion to dismiss a professionalnegligence action for failure to comply with Rule 1042.3 as a motion to dismiss, withoutprejudice. But see, Liggon-Redding v. Estate of Robert Sugarman, 659 F. 3d 258 (3 rd Cir.2011).(iii)Expert TestimonyIn Quinn Construction, Inc. v. Skanska USA Building Inc., No. 07-406, 2009 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 45247 (E.D. Pa. May 27, 2009), the court addressed a defense motion for the preclusionof expert testimony, on the basis that the trial court ruled at an earlier stage that Plaintiff was notasserting a claim for professional liability. Plaintiff was a subcontractor who brought claimsagainst the general contractor and architect alleging negligent misrepresentation and breach ofcontract. The defense argued that based upon the comment to Rule 1042.3, Plaintiff cannotpresent expert testimony at the time of trial. The court explained that the comment to Rule1042.3 only addresses the situation where a plaintiff certifies that he/she is bringing a claim forprofessional liability, but that expert testimony is not required where the court finds that Plaintiffis bringing a claim for ordinary negligence. Plaintiff had not yet produced any expert reports, sothe court abstained from making any ruling on what expert testimony would be permitted at thetime of trial, noting Fed. R. Evid. 702 would govern the admission of such testimony. See alsoMcCool v. Department of Corrections, 2009 WL 3462498 (Pa. Commw. Ct. July 29, 2009),appeal denied, 742 A.2d 678 (Pa. 2009) (dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint when certificate ofmerit stated that expert testimony was not required and noting the damages of mastocytosis andesophageal dysphagia are complex and little known diseases requiring expert testimony).(iv)Dragonetti Act ClaimsIn Sabella v. Milides, 992 A.2d 180 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal denied 9 A.3d. 631 (Pa.2010), the court addressed whether a Dragonetti claim against an attorney required the filing of acertificate of merit. The trial court ruled that the Dragonetti claim required a certificate of merit,finding that plaintiff’s allegations that defendant filed an unfounded complaint constituted anaverment that defendant deviated from an acceptable professional standard. Id. at 189. TheSuperior Court explained that the uncontested facts were that: (1) defendant’s actions wereconducted as an attorney at law; (2) plaintiff was never a client of defendant, and (3) plaintiff didnot meet the narrow exception to the general rule of privity. Id. The Superior Court noted thatbased upon the uncontroverted facts, “Pennsylvania law makes clear that [plaintiff] could not sue[defendant] for legal malpractice.” Id. (citations omitted). The Superior Court reversed the128
trial court’s order, finding that “[t]he gist of the allegations involves actions [defendant] took asopposing counsel, not [plaintiff’s] counsel.” Id.The Superior Court noted that “[a]lthough [plaintiff’s] complaint might raise questions ofprofessional judgment beyond the realm of common knowledge and experience, his cause ofaction did not arise from within the course of a professional relationship with [defendant].” Id.(citation omitted). The Superior Court held that despite the fact that issues may arise regardingdefendant’s professional judgment, plaintiff’s complaint was not a cause of action forprofessional liability and thus did not require a certificate of merit.” Id.In Chizmar v. Borough of Trafford, 2009 WL 1743687 (W.D. Pa. June 18, 2009), theWestern District Court addressed whether a certificate of merit was required in the context of aclaim under the Dragonetti Act (wrongful use of civil proceedings). The court noted that theywere unable to find any authority on the issue whether a Dragonetti claim sounding inprofessional liability requires a certificate of merit. The court stated that expert testimony isoften needed with Dragonetti claims, but that the Act itself does not explicitly require experttestimony. The court explained that the rules governing certificates of merit are sufficientlybroad to warrant a reading that Dragonetti claims are included. The court held that a certificateof merit is required in the context of a Dragonetti claim when it is alleged that a lawyer deviatedfrom the acceptable professional standard.On January 27, 2003, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued two Orders, effectivethat date, promulgating new Rules of Civil Procedure and amending some existing Rules, all ofwhich relate specifically to professional liability cases. As mentioned above, on June 16, 2008,the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania made significant amendments to the rules governing theCertificate of Merit requirement.C. Amendments to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure GoverningProfessional Liability1. Certificate of MeritIn 2005 and again in 2008 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court amended the Certificate ofMerit rules. A full discussion of the Rules and the amendments is contained in the Certificate ofMerit section.2. Venue – Pa. R. Civ. P. 1006The Court also amended Pa. R. Civ. P. 1006 regarding venue, and established that amedical professional liability claim may only be brought in the county in which the cause ofaction arose. In a case involving multiple health care providers, the case may be brought in anycounty where venue may be laid against at least one of the providers. If it is a multiparty actionthat includes non-health care provider defendants, the action cannot be brought in a countywhere venue may not be laid against a health care provider defendant. See section regarding“Venue” specifically herein for more information regarding this recent amendment of the Rules.129
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EMTALA CASES ......................
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Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
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II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
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The Superior Court reversed the tri
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to a third party pursuant to the st
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After approximately five months, De
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learned the day after the surgery t
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conduct to the delay in colon cance
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court admitted the expert’s testi
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(b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
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corroborated his testimony. The cou
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husband’s estate. Plaintiff alleg
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Other notable federal cases arising
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The Superior Court found that in re
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§ 1303.512(b). The court, however,
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In Neidig v. United States, No. 07-
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Additionally, the Supreme Court not
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were not indicated for her conditio
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surgeon is the same as it would be
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It should be noted that the Superio
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Finally, the court held that the tr
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania r
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nurses deviating from applicable st
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certainty, the court reviews expert
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Under Pennsylvania law, the Court n
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testimony, Defendant presented his
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Following Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.
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Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
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where payment is made by Medicaid w
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accomplished. In Valles v. Albert E
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In 1980, the Pennsylvania Superior
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Plaintiff had a routine monitoring
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Plaintiff’s Contract ClaimsThe Co
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is a failure to report changes in a
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unit to assure post-surgical patien
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sliced his wrist and arm with a raz
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licensed professionals for whom the
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(c)Limitations of Corporate Neglige
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Even more recently, our Superior Co
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(a)HMO IssuesIn McClellan v. Health
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Id.Rejecting revocation and suspens
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order as a sanction under Rule 4019
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