elieved of those minimum standards to which all attorneys are held, nor are they held to aseparate and unique standard.” The court further stated that the testimony offered at trialestablished that the experts “clearly possessed more expertise than is within the ordinary range oftraining, knowledge, intelligence, or experience, even if . . . not actively practicing in the area ofinsurance defense . . . .” Thus, the Superior Court held that Plaintiff’s evidence did, in fact,support the verdict.The Superior Court also reversed the trial court with respect to its judgmentnotwithstanding the verdict in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s breach of insurance contractclaim, and remanded for reinstatement of the jury’s verdict.Also, in an unpublished opinion in Rice v. Saltzberg, Trichon, Kogan & Wertheimer, 918A.2d 799 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006), appeal denied, 929 A.2d 1162 (Pa. 2007), the Superior Courtheld that the trial court had properly allowed Plaintiff’s attorney-expert to testify as to thesettlement value of Plaintiff’s underlying slip and fall claim, which Defendant-attorney hadfailed to settle or file within the applicable statute of limitations. The court found that thistestimony was relevant and material as it assisted the jury in assessing the value of theunderlying claim, which would have been filed in New York. The court did not agree withDefendant’s argument that this testimony was impermissible as concerning an ultimate issue ofthe case that the jury should have decided. The expert testified that the underlying case wasworth between $75,000 and $250,000. The jury in the legal malpractice case awarded Plaintiff$282,000. In addition to giving a likely settlement range, the expert testified that ninety percentof similar cases in New York settle prior to trial. The court held that, given New York’sdemonstrated desire to settle these types of cases, the possibility that the case would have settledwas not speculative. The judgment in favor of Plaintiff was affirmed.In Frost v. Fox Rothschild, 18 Pa. D. , &, C.5th 295, 2010 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS346, No. 03292 (Nov. 12, 2010), Plaintiff alleged legal malpractice claims of negligence againsthis divorce attorney, as well as a claim of breach of fiduciary duty. Defendant filed a motion forsummary judgment, which raised the issue of whether Plaintiff was required to provide an expertwitness and report in support of his claims.Noting that “expert testimony becomes necessary when the subject matter of the inquiryis one involving special skills and training not common to the ordinary lay person,” the courtaddressed each of the plaintiff’s claims to assess the need for an expert. Id. quoting Storm v.Golden, 371 Pa. Super. 368, 376, 538 A.2d 51, 64 (1988). The court determined that whetherdefendant’s analysis and recommendation of a settlement agreement was reasonable, whetherDefendant failed to exercise reasonable care and skill in choosing not to obtain a vocationalexpert, whether Defendant should have filed a post-trial motion on the issue of the trial court’sright to impose an obligation of evaluation of Plaintiff’s business, whether Defendant shouldhave had an expert do a valuation of Plaintiff’s personal effects were all issues that required anexpert witness, which Plaintiff failed to produce. Therefore, the court granted summaryjudgment in Defendant’s favor on those claims.Plaintiff’s remaining claims were determined to have no supporting evidence, or evidencethat directly contradicted Plaintiff’s position and were, therefore, dismissed.170
P. Immunity From LiabilityIn a case involving a question of first impression, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals inCarino v. Stefan, 376 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2004), considered the issue of whether an attorney hiredby a labor union to represent a union member at an arbitration hearing as part of a collectivebargaining agreement is immune from liability to the member for legal malpractice.In Carino, an attorney, Stefan, was hired by the United Food and Commercial WorkersInternational Union (“Union”) to represent Plaintiff, Ms. Carino, in an employment disputeagainst Prudential Insurance Company of America (“Prudential”). Union had entered into acollective bargaining agreement with Prudential. The Union was dissatisfied by the initialgrievance procedure and exercised its right to have the matter arbitrated.Shortly before the arbitration was to commence, Stefan contacted Ms. Carino to discussthe matter. Stefan asked Carino what she hoped to gain from the arbitration, to which she repliedwith several conditions, including having her employment record cleared, having a federalinvestigation closed, and having her pension reinstituted. Stefan stated that he would be able tosatisfy her wishes in return for her withdrawal of her grievance against Prudential. Ms. Carinoreleased Prudential, but none of her concessions were ever granted.The trial court dismissed Carino’s claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Third Circuit agreed, statingthat the Labor Management Relations Act barred the suit. The court relied on the SupremeCourt’s interpretation of Section 301(b) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(b), and Atkinson v.Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962) and its progeny, to conclude that “§ 301 of theLMRA immunizes attorneys employed by or hired by unions to perform services related to acollective bargaining agreement from suit for malpractice.” Carino, 376 F.3d at 162.In Cole v. Beros, No. 2:08-cv-541, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42780 (W.D. Pa. May 29,2008), the district court held that the LMRA “[i]mmunizes an attorney hired by the union againstlegal malpractice claims from union members.” By way of background, Plaintiff was suddenlyhospitalized and required surgery, causing her to remain out of work for three weeks. Plaintiffalleged that she called Defendants, the union president and also a union attorney, Steve Jordan,and was instructed to request medical leave. Mr. Jordan subsequently assisted Plaintiff inrequesting medical leave, but her leave was ultimately denied. Plaintiff alleged that Mr. Jordan’snegligence in assisting with her medical leave resulted in denial of benefits under the FederalFamily and Medical Leave Act. In holding that Mr. Jordan was immune to such suit, the courtexplained that Mr. Jordan was acting in his role as union attorney when he allegedly assisted inconnection with her labor grievance proceeding.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the judicial privilege does not absolutelyimmunize an attorney from liability for legal malpractice for publishing to a reporter a complaintthat had already been filed. Bochetto v. Gibson, 860 A.2d 67 (Pa. 2004). The judicial privilegegrants absolute immunity to persons for “communications which are issued in the regular courseof judicial proceedings and which are pertinent and material to the redress or relief sought.” Id.at 71 (quoting Post v. Mendel, 507 A.2d 351, 355 (Pa. 1986)). Because the attorney publishedthe complaint to a reporter outside the context of judicial proceedings and publishing it was not171
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EMTALA CASES ......................
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Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
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II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
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The Superior Court reversed the tri
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to a third party pursuant to the st
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After approximately five months, De
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learned the day after the surgery t
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conduct to the delay in colon cance
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court admitted the expert’s testi
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(b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
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corroborated his testimony. The cou
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husband’s estate. Plaintiff alleg
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Other notable federal cases arising
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The Superior Court found that in re
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§ 1303.512(b). The court, however,
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In Neidig v. United States, No. 07-
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Additionally, the Supreme Court not
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were not indicated for her conditio
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surgeon is the same as it would be
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It should be noted that the Superio
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Finally, the court held that the tr
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania r
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nurses deviating from applicable st
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certainty, the court reviews expert
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Under Pennsylvania law, the Court n
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testimony, Defendant presented his
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Following Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.
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Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
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where payment is made by Medicaid w
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accomplished. In Valles v. Albert E
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In 1980, the Pennsylvania Superior
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Plaintiff had a routine monitoring
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Plaintiff’s Contract ClaimsThe Co
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is a failure to report changes in a
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unit to assure post-surgical patien
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sliced his wrist and arm with a raz
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licensed professionals for whom the
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(c)Limitations of Corporate Neglige
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Even more recently, our Superior Co
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(a)HMO IssuesIn McClellan v. Health
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affidavit submitted by Defendants o
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treatments while at VA’s faciliti
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[s]ubstantively, we believe that a
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The party claiming the benefit of t
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deprive (him) of civil rights guara
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found that the District Court was w
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With respect to fraudulent concealm
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would be applied in situations wher
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they had not raised them in the cou
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(a)Informed ConsentUnder MCARE, a p
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civil enforcement provisions and ma
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MCARE also changes the manner in wh
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whose death, in 2005, was allegedly
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vicariously liable if the plaintiff
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health center or its equivalent or
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In Pennsylvania Medical Society, th
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to any professional who is alleged
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Since the 2005 amendments, there ha
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ule, but who intentionally ignores
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the original Complaint was delivere
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foreclose all challenges against th
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