The court found, however, to state a claim the third-party beneficiary must be named inthe will the attorney drafted. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that they shouldbe accorded third-party beneficiary status because the defendant’s failure to draft a willwhich accurately represented their step grandmother’s intent deprived the plaintiffs oftheir bequest, which was contained in an earlier will. The court reasoned the decedentcontracted with the defendant to draft her later will and the fact the plaintiffs werementioned in an earlier will did not accord them third-party beneficiary status.H. Waiver of Meritorious DefenseIn Ammon v. McCloskey, 655 A.2d 549 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995), appeal denied, 670 A.2d139 (Pa. 1995), the court ruled that waiver of a viable release defense, resulting in the entry of ajudgment against the client, constituted a viable cause of action for legal malpractice whichmight subject the attorney to damages for the underlying judgment. However, the court furtherstated that the issue of whether a waiver had actually occurred had never been fully litigatedagainst the lawyer, and therefore remained a valid factual question to be resolved in litigation ofthe legal malpractice case. Id. at 553-54.I. Duty to Keep Client InformedIn Perkovic v. Barrett, 671 A.2d 740 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996), Plaintiffs sued their attorneyfor legal malpractice based on the following fee agreement:CLIENTS expressly retain Attorney [***] for the handling of theappeal of this matter to Superior Court which has been timelyfiled; ATTORNEY is to prepare and prosecute said appeal in adiligent and professional manner;CLIENTS agree to pay ATTORNEY the sum of $15,000 toprepare and prosecute this appeal; this includes the preparation andfiling of the proper notices of appeal, preparation, legal researchand legal writing necessary for the Legal Brief. . . ATTORNEYagrees to represent CLIENTS at any oral argument that may benecessitated by the Superior Court in the perfecting of this appeal.The court held that this fee agreement required Defendant-attorney to notify the client ofthe results of the appeal. The court also held, however, that the fee agreement did not imposeupon Defendant-attorney a duty to continue representation following the remand of the case as itonly contemplated the appeal referenced therein. Id. at 744.J. Statute of LimitationsA legal malpractice action founded upon negligence is subject to the two-year statute oflimitations while such an action founded upon breach of contract is subject to the four-yearstatute of limitations. See, e.g., Fiorentino v. Rapoport, 693 A.2d 208 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997),appeal denied, 701 A.2d 577 (Pa. 1997). It should also be noted, that the courts have rejectedattempts to “[r]e-package a negligence-based malpractice claim under an [contract] theory toavoid the statute of limitations.” The court, citing Sherman Industries, Inc. v. Goldhammer, 683158
F. Supp. 502 (E.D. Pa. 1988), explained, “[a] malpractice plaintiff may not sidestep the two-yearlimitation on tort actions by pleading tort claims as breaches of contract.” Id.The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently held in Steiner v. Markel, 968 A.2d 1253(2009), that Plaintiffs had waived their right to argue that their professional malpractice claimshould be construed as a contract claim, in order to avoid the two-year limitation, when theirComplaint did not contain a claim described as a breach of contract claim. Additionally, theCourt held that the Superior Court may not sua sponte, search within a complaint to find a causeof action that Plaintiffs never argued was present in their complaint. Id.Under Pennsylvania law, the occurrence rule is used to determine when the statute oflimitations begins to run. Fiorentino, 693 A.2d at 208. Under this rule, “the statutory periodcommences when the harm is suffered, or if appropriate, at the time an alleged malpractice isdiscovered.” Id.; see also Deere & Co. v. Reinhold, No. 99-CV-6313, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS5276 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 24, 2000) (a cause of action for legal malpractice accrues on the date theharm is suffered and not on the date that the attorney-client relationship ends); TowerInvestments, Inc. v. Rawle & Henderson, LLP, 2009 Phila Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 18 (Phila. Cty.Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 7, 2009) (holding “[t]he statute of limitations in legal malpractice actionsbegins upon the happening of an alleged breach of duty and is tolled only when the client,despite the exercise of due diligence, cannot discover the injury or its cause”).To date, Pennsylvania courts have expressly rejected the “continuing representationexception” under which a claim for malpractice accrues upon termination of the professionalrelationship which gave rise to the alleged malpractice. See, e.g., Glenbrook Leasing Co. v.Beausang, 839 A.2d 437, 441-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003), appeal granted, 870 A.2d 318 (Pa. 2005),aff’d, 881 A.2d 1266 (Pa. 2005); see also Ward v. Knox McLaughlin Gornall & Sennett, No. 09-68, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86058 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2009) (citing Glenbrook, court refused toapply “continuous representation rule”). It is noteworthy, however, that after the SuperiorCourt’s discussion of the continuous representation rule in Glenbrook, and acknowledgmentthere that adoption of this rule would have to come from the Supreme Court, the PennsylvaniaSupreme Court has granted an appeal in this case limited to the issue of “[w]hether thecontinuous representation rule should be adopted in Pennsylvania to toll the applicable statute oflimitations in an action for legal malpractice.” Glenbrook Leasing Co. v. Beausang, 870 A.2d318 (Pa. 2005). Without issuing a written opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the SuperiorCourt’s decision. Glenbrook Leasing Co. v. Beausang, 881 A.2d 1266 (Pa. 2005).If the discovery rule applies, the statutory period commences at the time the allegedmalpractice is discovered. Davis v. Grimaldi, Haley & Frangiosa, P.C., No. 97-CV-4816, 1998U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15681 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (citing Bailey v. Tucker, 621 A.2d 108, 115 (Pa.1993)). The discovery rule “provides that where the existence of the injury is not known to thecomplaining party and such knowledge cannot reasonably be ascertained within the prescribedstatutory period, the limitations period does not begin to run until the discovery of the injury isreasonably possible.” Id. at 4-5 (citing Dalrymple v. Brown, 701 A.2d 164, 167 (Pa. 1997)).The Dalrymple Court discussed the standard for the application of the discovery rule:The party seeking to invoke the discovery rule bears the burden ofestablishing the inability to know of the injury despite the exercise159
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EMTALA CASES ......................
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Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
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II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
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The Superior Court reversed the tri
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to a third party pursuant to the st
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After approximately five months, De
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learned the day after the surgery t
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conduct to the delay in colon cance
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court admitted the expert’s testi
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(b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
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corroborated his testimony. The cou
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husband’s estate. Plaintiff alleg
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Other notable federal cases arising
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The Superior Court found that in re
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§ 1303.512(b). The court, however,
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In Neidig v. United States, No. 07-
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Additionally, the Supreme Court not
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were not indicated for her conditio
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surgeon is the same as it would be
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It should be noted that the Superio
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Finally, the court held that the tr
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania r
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nurses deviating from applicable st
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certainty, the court reviews expert
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Under Pennsylvania law, the Court n
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testimony, Defendant presented his
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Following Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.
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Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
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where payment is made by Medicaid w
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accomplished. In Valles v. Albert E
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In 1980, the Pennsylvania Superior
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Plaintiff had a routine monitoring
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Plaintiff’s Contract ClaimsThe Co
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is a failure to report changes in a
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unit to assure post-surgical patien
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sliced his wrist and arm with a raz
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licensed professionals for whom the
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(c)Limitations of Corporate Neglige
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Even more recently, our Superior Co
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(a)HMO IssuesIn McClellan v. Health
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affidavit submitted by Defendants o
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treatments while at VA’s faciliti
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[s]ubstantively, we believe that a
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The party claiming the benefit of t
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deprive (him) of civil rights guara
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found that the District Court was w
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With respect to fraudulent concealm
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would be applied in situations wher
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they had not raised them in the cou
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(a)Informed ConsentUnder MCARE, a p
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civil enforcement provisions and ma
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MCARE also changes the manner in wh
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whose death, in 2005, was allegedly
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vicariously liable if the plaintiff
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health center or its equivalent or
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