of reasonable diligence. The standard of reasonable diligence isobjective, not subjective. It is not a standard of reasonablediligence unique to a particular Plaintiff, but instead, a standard ofreasonable diligence as applied to a “reasonable person.”Id. at 167; see also Radman v. Gaujot, 53 Fed. Appx. 606 (3d Cir. 2002) (not precedential) (thehappening of the breach and the injured party’s awareness of the breach, not his knowledge ofthe resulting damage, is the focus of Pennsylvania law) Igbonwa v. Cameron, 2004 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 2128 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (in order to qualify for the discovery rule, a plaintiff must havemade reasonable efforts to protect his own interests, and must show why he was unable todiscover the facts necessary to plead the cause of action); Foueke v. Dugan, 187 F. Supp. 2d 253(E.D. Pa. 2002) (to bring a claim outside of the statute of limitations, a plaintiff faces the burdenof demonstrating that his claim falls into one of the exceptions to the occurrence rule); Amorosov. Morley, No. 00-3496, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4989 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2002) (the statute oflimitations is tolled only if a person in the plaintiff’s position exercising reasonable diligencewould not have been aware of the salient facts) (citing Baily v. Lewis, 763 F. Supp. 802, 806(E.D. Pa. 1991), aff’d, 950 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1991); Edwards v. Duane, Morris & Heckscher,LLP, et al., No. 01-4798, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16301 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2002) (discovery rulemay be applied to breach of contract actions “where the injured party is unable, despite theexercise of due diligence to know of an injury or its cause”); cf. Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850(Pa. 2005) (medical malpractice case in which Supreme Court held that “discovery rule appliesto toll the statute of limitations in any case where a party neither knows nor reasonably shouldhave known of his injury and its cause at the time his right to institute suit arises” and rejectedargument that rule should not extend statute of limitations in any case where cause of injury isdiscovered within original statutory period.)In Whitley v. Allegheny County, No. 07-403, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28739 (W.D. Pa.Mar. 24, 2008), Plaintiff filed the instant action in March 2007 and asserted, inter alia, a statelaw claim for professional negligence against his criminal defense attorney (“Defense attorney”).By way of background, Defense attorney represented Plaintiff in the first of two petitions ofpost-conviction relief (“PCRA”) and not the underlying criminal trial. The initial PCRA petitionwas denied. Id. Plaintiff subsequently filed a second PCRA petition. Plaintiff informed thecourt that he was no longer represented and requested appointment of counsel. Different counselwas appointed; but Defense attorney did not formally withdraw. Plaintiff alleged that thecriminal Defense attorney disregarded his duty to Plaintiff by failing to communicate withPlaintiff and failing to perform a proper investigation, which resulted in Plaintiff suffering aprolonged incarceration.The court noted, “[the parties] agree[d] that the appropriate starting point for a legalmalpractice action arising for an underlying criminal representation commences at thetermination of the attorney-client relationship.” However, the parties disagreed as to when theattorney-client relationship terminated. Defense attorney maintained that the relationship endedwhen the first PCRA petition was dismissed and new counsel was appointed; therefore,Plaintiff’s claims fell outside the two year statute of limitations. In response, Plaintiff contendedthat the relationship continued until the denial of the second PCRA petition, approximately tenmonths prior to Plaintiff filing the instant action.160
In finding Plaintiff’s claims barred, the court noted that Plaintiff petitioned the court toappoint new counsel to represent him in the appeal of the first PCRA petition in 1999. After newcounsel was appointed in December 1999, Plaintiff was no longer represented by Defensecounsel. Therefore, the court noted that the termination of the attorney-client relationshipoccurred on the date of appointment of new counsel. Accordingly, the court found Plaintiff’sclaims against Defense attorney were barred by the statute of limitations.In Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Ferretti, 935 A.2d 565 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007), the SuperiorCourt examined when a cause of action for legal malpractice accrues when an attorney failed tomark a judgment as satisfied. The Superior Court reiterated that “the trigger for the accrual of alegal malpractice action, for the statute of limitations purposes, is not the realization of actualloss, but the occurrence of a breach of duty.” Id. at 572. The court explained that an exceptionto the occurrence rule is the equitable discovery rule, which provides the statute of limitations istolled when the “injured party is unable, despite the exercise of due diligence, to know of theinjury or its cause.” The court cautioned, “[l]ack of knowledge, mistake or misunderstandingwill not toll the running of the statute.” Id. The Superior Court stressed that Pennsylvania doesnot follow the actual loss rule, where the statute of limitations is tolled in the legal malpracticesuit until a final judgment is entered in the underlying lawsuit. Id.The Superior Court explained that the statute of limitations began to run when theattorney failed to mark the judgment as satisfied, that is, when the attorney breached a duty. Id.Furthermore, the court stated that the equitable discovery rule could only toll the statute oflimitations until the time when the client was informed that a proceeding was being institutedagainst them regarding judgment that their attorney failed to mark as satisfied. Id. at 574. Thecourt recognized that the occurrence rule requires the filing of a legal malpractice claim beforethe client in the underlying claim knows whether he will suffer any damages as a result of hisattorney’s negligence. Id. at 574 The court stated while there is a dilemma in taking competingpositions in the underlying claim and the legal malpractice claim, the public policy concern ofavoiding stale claims must prevail over the public policy concern over having two casessimultaneously proceed with inconsistent positions. Id. The court reasoned, “[t]he purpose ofthe statute would not be served if an attorney is kept in the state of breathless apprehension whilea former client pursues appeal from the trial court, to the Court of Appeal, to the Supreme Court .. . during which time memories fade, witnesses disappear or die, and evidence is lost. Id. Insum, the public policy concern of raising stale legal malpractice claims requires the filing of aclaim for legal malpractice at the time of the breach of a duty. The statute of limitations willonly be tolled under the doctrine of equitable discovery until the time clients are made aware ofproceedings against them, even if the clients are uncertain whether they will prevail in defendingthe underlying claim.”The United State Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed the applicabilityof the discovery rule to legal malpractice claims in Knopick v. Connelly, 639 F.3d 600 (3dCir. 2011). In Knopick, the plaintiff hired the Connelly defendants to represent him in alawsuit involving a motion to set aside a separation and property agreement between himand his wife. His wife alleged the plaintiff failed to disclose two million dollars worth ofstock prior to entering the agreement. The plaintiff informed the defendants of fourwitnesses who could testify as to his wife’s knowledge of the assets. At the August 2, 2004hearing, the defendants called no witnesses, and assured the plaintiff the agreement would161
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EMTALA CASES ......................
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Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
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II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
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The Superior Court reversed the tri
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to a third party pursuant to the st
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After approximately five months, De
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learned the day after the surgery t
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conduct to the delay in colon cance
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court admitted the expert’s testi
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(b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
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corroborated his testimony. The cou
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husband’s estate. Plaintiff alleg
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Other notable federal cases arising
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The Superior Court found that in re
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§ 1303.512(b). The court, however,
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In Neidig v. United States, No. 07-
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Additionally, the Supreme Court not
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were not indicated for her conditio
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surgeon is the same as it would be
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It should be noted that the Superio
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Finally, the court held that the tr
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania r
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nurses deviating from applicable st
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certainty, the court reviews expert
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Under Pennsylvania law, the Court n
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testimony, Defendant presented his
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Following Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.
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Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
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where payment is made by Medicaid w
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accomplished. In Valles v. Albert E
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In 1980, the Pennsylvania Superior
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Plaintiff had a routine monitoring
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Plaintiff’s Contract ClaimsThe Co
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is a failure to report changes in a
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unit to assure post-surgical patien
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sliced his wrist and arm with a raz
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licensed professionals for whom the
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(c)Limitations of Corporate Neglige
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Even more recently, our Superior Co
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(a)HMO IssuesIn McClellan v. Health
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affidavit submitted by Defendants o
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treatments while at VA’s faciliti
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[s]ubstantively, we believe that a
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The party claiming the benefit of t
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deprive (him) of civil rights guara
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found that the District Court was w
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With respect to fraudulent concealm
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would be applied in situations wher
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they had not raised them in the cou
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(a)Informed ConsentUnder MCARE, a p
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civil enforcement provisions and ma
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MCARE also changes the manner in wh
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whose death, in 2005, was allegedly
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vicariously liable if the plaintiff
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health center or its equivalent or
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In Pennsylvania Medical Society, th
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