Finally, the court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the claims against Defendanthospitals. Id. at 1290. The court explained that Plaintiff’s claims against the hospitals soundedin respondeat superior liability and were therefore dismissed based on the trial court’s findingthat Plaintiff’s expert was unqualified. Accordingly, because the Superior Court foundPlaintiff’s witness qualified, it found in favor of Plaintiffs. Id.The Superior Court reversed and remanded, holding that Plaintiff’s expert was qualifiedto testify and that the trial court erred on all counts in granting summary judgment in favor of allDefendants.In Wexler v. Hecht, 928 A.2d 973 (Pa. 2007), Plaintiff brought a medical malpracticeaction alleging Defendant doctor breached the applicable standard of medical care in treatingPlaintiff’s bunion. Plaintiff submitted the curriculum vitae and expert report of a podiatricsurgeon. In his report, Plaintiff’s podiatrist expert “[o]pined that [Defendant] deviated from theordinary standard of care in the surgery; that he provided substandard post-surgical care; and thatthese alleged deviations were the direct and proximate cause of [Plaintiff’s] medical complaints.”Defendant filed a motion in limine in which he sought to preclude Plaintiff’s podiatristexpert from testifying at trial on the grounds that a podiatric surgeon was not competent to testifyto the standard of care pertaining to an orthopedic surgeon. In his motion, Defendant relied onthe common law “specialized knowledge in the subject matter of the inquiry” and the stricterMCARE standard. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion, initially indicating its oral rulingthat it was relying on the common law standard. However, in its written opinion, the trial courtindicated that its decision rested on the newly-enacted MCARE Act, specifically Section1303.512(b)(1). The trial court explained that (i) Plaintiff’s podiatrist expert received a degreefrom a school of podiatric medicine; (ii) the practice of podiatric medicine is limited to thediagnosis and treatment of the foot and those leg structures governing foot function; and (iii)MCARE distinguishes “physicians” from “podiatrists.” Therefore, the trial court concluded thatPlaintiff’s podiatrist expert “was not a physician holding an unrestricted license to practicemedicine; [therefore,] he was unqualified under [MCARE] Section 1303.512(b)(1) to render anopinion concerning the applicable standard of care pertaining to a medical doctor, such as[Defendant.]”On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling. Plaintiff appealed,arguing that: (i) MCARE is not applicable because it was enacted after alleged acts; (ii)Plaintiff’s podiatrist expert met MCARE’s competency requirements; and (iii) the trial courterred by failing to permit Plaintiff’s podiatrist expert to testify to his qualifications at the Motionin Limine hearing. Regarding the applicability of the MCARE Act, the Supreme Court held that“[MCARE] Section 1303.512 applies at trials of medical malpractice actions occurring after itseffective date, again, assuming the affordance of adequate time for preparation and adjustment.”Furthermore, the Court agreed with the lower court’s assessment of MCARE’scompetency standard. The Court explained, “[w]e find that the General Assembly’s reference inSection 1303.512(b)(1) to an expert ‘possessing an unrestricted physician’s license to practicemedicine’ unambiguously denotes a medical doctor or osteopath licensed by the state board38
appropriate to such practices.” The Court further noted that there is no waiver provisionregarding the competency requirement of expert testimony of the standard of care. Therefore,the Court reasoned that the trial court was correct in finding Plaintiff’s podiatrist expertunqualified to testify under the MCARE Act.In Herbert v. Parkview Hospital, 854 A.2d 1285 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004), Plaintiff claimedthat Defendants had been negligent in treating the decedent, who was an end-stage renal failurepatient who, two days after admission to the hospital, was found to have a large piece of steaklodged in his throat. Plaintiff entered into a joint tortfeasor release with the hospital and onephysician Defendant. At trial the jury found in favor of Plaintiff and apportioned liability to allDefendants. After trial, Plaintiff claimed that the names of the settling Defendants should nothave been on the verdict slip and argued that there was no basis for the jury to apportion liabilityto them because there was no expert testimony as to their liability. The non-settling Defendantargued that their inclusion on the verdict sheet was correct but challenged the qualifications ofPlaintiff’s expert. Plaintiff’s expert was an internist and the non-settling Defendant was anephrologist.The Superior Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence against the settlingDefendants to warrant submission of them to the jury for apportionment and to justify the jury’sapportionment of liability. The Court also found that while the MCARE Act plainly prefers, andin some cases may require, that expert testimony in professional medical malpractice cases comefrom witnesses with expertise in the Defendant’s particular subspecialty, the Act does not requirethat expert testimony in all cases be so restricted. In this case the allegation was that theDefendant nephrologist, during a nephrology consultation, had failed to notice symptomsindicating airway obstruction and respiratory distress. The Court held that the expert internistwas qualified to testify about the standard of care applicable to physician, such as the Defendantnephrologist, with internal medicine and critical care experience who encounters a patientmanifesting numerous signs of respiratory blockage and distress.In Gbur v. Golio, 932 A.2d 203 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007), aff’d, 963 A.2d 443 (Pa. 2009), theSuperior Court held that Plaintiff’s expert, a radiation oncologist, was qualified to opine as to thestandard of care applicable to Defendant, a urologist, with regard to Defendant’s alleged failureto diagnose Plaintiff’s decedent’s prostate cancer, which ultimately metastasized to his mandibleand caused his death.Applying the MCARE expert qualification standard, the court held that, althoughPlaintiff’s expert was not a board-certified urologist, his extensive experience and boardcertifications in radiation oncology qualified him under Section 1303.512(d) (relating to careoutside specialty) to opine regarding Defendant’s alleged failure to timely diagnose Plaintiff’sdecedent’s prostate cancer despite elevated PSA tests and suspicious radiological studies. Insupport of its holding, the Superior Court noted that Plaintiff’s expert did not testify as to thesubstantive standard of care applicable to urologists as such, but rather to the standard of careapplicable in diagnosing prostate cancer, an area in which Plaintiff’s expert was clearly qualifiedto testify. The Court thus concluded that Plaintiff’s expert did, in fact, meet the standardrequired to testify to care outside his own particular specialty under Section 1303.512(d) of theMCARE Act.39
- Page 3 and 4: EMTALA CASES ......................
- Page 5: Filing an Affidavit of Non-Involvem
- Page 8 and 9: II.PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - AN OVER
- Page 10 and 11: The Superior Court reversed the tri
- Page 12 and 13: to a third party pursuant to the st
- Page 14 and 15: After approximately five months, De
- Page 16 and 17: learned the day after the surgery t
- Page 18 and 19: conduct to the delay in colon cance
- Page 20 and 21: court admitted the expert’s testi
- Page 22 and 23: (b)(c)other reasonable causes, incl
- Page 24 and 25: corroborated his testimony. The cou
- Page 26 and 27: husband’s estate. Plaintiff alleg
- Page 28 and 29: Other notable federal cases arising
- Page 30 and 31: The Superior Court found that in re
- Page 32 and 33: § 1303.512(b). The court, however,
- Page 34 and 35: In Neidig v. United States, No. 07-
- Page 36 and 37: Additionally, the Supreme Court not
- Page 38 and 39: were not indicated for her conditio
- Page 40 and 41: surgeon is the same as it would be
- Page 42 and 43: It should be noted that the Superio
- Page 46 and 47: The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania r
- Page 48 and 49: nurses deviating from applicable st
- Page 50 and 51: certainty, the court reviews expert
- Page 52 and 53: Under Pennsylvania law, the Court n
- Page 54 and 55: testimony, Defendant presented his
- Page 56 and 57: Following Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.
- Page 58 and 59: Plaintiff developed chronic diarrhe
- Page 60 and 61: where payment is made by Medicaid w
- Page 62 and 63: accomplished. In Valles v. Albert E
- Page 64 and 65: In 1980, the Pennsylvania Superior
- Page 66 and 67: Plaintiff had a routine monitoring
- Page 68 and 69: Plaintiff’s Contract ClaimsThe Co
- Page 70 and 71: is a failure to report changes in a
- Page 72 and 73: unit to assure post-surgical patien
- Page 74 and 75: sliced his wrist and arm with a raz
- Page 76 and 77: licensed professionals for whom the
- Page 78 and 79: (c)Limitations of Corporate Neglige
- Page 80 and 81: Even more recently, our Superior Co
- Page 82 and 83: (a)HMO IssuesIn McClellan v. Health
- Page 84 and 85: affidavit submitted by Defendants o
- Page 86 and 87: treatments while at VA’s faciliti
- Page 88 and 89: [s]ubstantively, we believe that a
- Page 90 and 91: The party claiming the benefit of t
- Page 92 and 93: deprive (him) of civil rights guara
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found that the District Court was w
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With respect to fraudulent concealm
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would be applied in situations wher
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they had not raised them in the cou
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(a)Informed ConsentUnder MCARE, a p
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civil enforcement provisions and ma
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MCARE also changes the manner in wh
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whose death, in 2005, was allegedly
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vicariously liable if the plaintiff
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health center or its equivalent or
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In Pennsylvania Medical Society, th
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to any professional who is alleged
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Since the 2005 amendments, there ha
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ule, but who intentionally ignores
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the original Complaint was delivere
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foreclose all challenges against th
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number of boxes), which was support
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questions of professional judgment
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deviated from any professional stan
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The Third Circuit affirmed the Dist
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claims and cross-claims remain agai
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By an Amendatory Order dated March
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The court acknowledged that there i
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apply and that the trial court misa
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Barbados had enough litigation-spec
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E. Preemption of Vaccine Design Def
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2. Pa. R. Civ. Pro. 1036.1 - Reinst
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Barrick, at *34-35.Furthermore, the
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(b) the utility of the defendant’
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2006). In this case, Plaintiffs bro
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B. Elements of a Cause of Action fo
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decision in Muhammad precluded Mr.
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considered speculative “only if t
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underlying cause of action involved
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In Capital Care Corp., the Superior
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The court found, however, to state
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of reasonable diligence. The standa
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not be set aside. On July 7, 2005,
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complete bar to recovery. Since a l
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On appeal, Plaintiffs claimed that
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In Liggon-Redding, 659 F.3d at 265,
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elieved of those minimum standards
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elevant to the proceedings, the com
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establish professional misconduct b
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Upholding the Superior Court’s Or
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Id.Rejecting revocation and suspens
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order as a sanction under Rule 4019
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