islamic-jihad-legacy-of-forced-conversion-imperialism-slavery

Islamic Imperialism in Indiatransfer of Hindu police officers from key posts in Calcutta, putting twenty-two out of twenty-four policestations in Muslim hands; two were controlled by Anglo-Indians. The Muslim League activists mobilized thehooligans and unruly elements amongst Muslims and armed them with all kinds of weapons. Congress leaderKiron Shankar Ray drew the attention of the police to these ominous developments; it was ignored. On themorning of the day of Direct Action, Muslim hooligans paraded the streets of Calcutta armed with lathis,spears, daggers, hatchets and even guns. The European Superintendent of Police at the Howrah Bridgestopped a crowd heading for the rally; from them, 'lathis, spears, daggers, knives, unburnt torches, emptysoda water bottles, tins containing kerosene oil, rags soaked in oil, ready for being used in setting fire tohouses, were collected.’ 552On CM Suhrawardy’s Direct Action speech, writes Yasmin Khan, ‘if he did not explicitly inciteviolence, certainly gave the crowds the impression that they could act with impunity, that neither the policenor the military would be called out and that the ministry would turn a blind eye to any action that theyunleashed in the city.’ 553 At the close of the rally, these armed militants poured into the thickly-populatedHindu neighborhoods of Calcutta and started a gory rampage: looting, burning and massacre. The police,instructed as they were, remained indifferent, watching the burning and looting of Hindu and Sikh homes andbusinesses with utter nonchalance. Suhrawardy, arrived at the Police Headquarter, took charge of the ControlRoom and directed the police, preventing them from taking any action against Muslim rioters, looters andmurderers, but he directed the police to take quick action against any complaint of Hindu retaliations.Inspector Wade had arrested eight Muslims, who were looting at Mallick Bazaar Market wearing Red Crossbands; Suhrawardy ordered their immediate release. 554 Muslim shops were marked "Mussalman shop -Pakistan" to save them from looting and burning. The homes of the Congress Party leaders were attacked andset on fire; newspaper publishing houses were attacked and attempted to set on fire. The Fire Brigade wasprevented by unruly Muslim mobs from putting out fires in non-Muslim homes and properties. Hindu templeswere vandalized and set on fire; Medical colleges, schools and students hostels came under Muslim attacks,vandalism and intimidation.Justice Khosla of Lahore High Court recounts of the carnage: ‘The streets were strewn with deadbodies and the corpses… There were stories of children having been hurled down from the roofs of houses.Young children were reported to have been boiled in oil. Others were burnt alive. Women were raped andmutilated and then murdered.’ The Muslim rioters had their sway in the carnage and plunder for one-and-ahalfdays, before the Hindus and Sikhs recovered from their shock, plucked courage and began hitting back.Suhrawardy had delayed calling the army; he called in the army as soon as the Hindu and Sikh retaliationbegan. However, things had gone out of hands; the Hindus and Sikhs, two-thirds of the city’s population,unleashed violence in like manners wreaking havoc on Muslims. Three organizations that collected the deadbodies for the burial had gathered 3,173 corpses in all. These excluded those buried by the family members,thrown into the rivers and washed away, and those burnt to ashes. The total deaths were to the tune of 5,000.Of the dead, brought to hospitals or died there, 138 were Muslims against 151 Hindus plus sixty-two others—that is, some 43 percent were Muslim deaths in this count. Of the homes and properties set on fires, 65 percentbelonged to Hindus, 20 percent to Muslims and 15 percent to government and others. 555Although the properties lost by Muslims were negligible as compared to non-Muslim losses, thecount of the dead was not as good a reading—definitely unlike the spectacular success of the Prophet’s Jihadat Badr—which the Muslim League had hoped to achieve. Disappointed by Allah’s lack of favour and theunpleasant outcome, the Muslim League leaders blamed the kafirs, vehemently asserting ‘that the rioting was552. Ibid, p. 54553. Khan Y (2007) The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan, Yale University Press, p. 64554. Khosla, p. 59555. Ibid, p. 63-66174